

DECENTERING IR: EXCAVATING STORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT:

The thesis aims to underline the Eurocentrism of the field of international relations and the way in which the conceptualizations and writings of history contribute to the reproduction of specific narratives of international relations. The thesis argues that the 'decentering' of the field should not only focus on questioning the narratives produced in the center but also focus on the reproduction of Eurocentrism in the 'periphery'. The thesis through the example of the 'Cold War' discusses the way in which the 'Cold War' has been written and the presuppositions about international relations that has been produced and reproduced in the center and in the periphery.

KEYWORDS: Eurocentrism, Historiography, Cold War, Decentering, International Relations

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INTRODUCTION

“When I began going to school and learned to read, I encountered stories of other people and other lands. In one of my essays, I remember the kind of things that fascinated me. Weird things, even, about a wizard who lived in Africa and went to China to find a lamp . . . Fascinating to me because they were about things remote, and almost ethereal. Then I grew older and began to read about adventures in which I didn’t know that I was supposed to be on the side of those savages who were encountered by the good white man. I instinctively took sides with the white people. They were fine! They were excellent. They were intelligent. The others were not . . . they were stupid and ugly. That was the way I was introduced to the danger of not having your own stories. There is that great proverb—that until the lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter. That did not come to me until much later. Once I realized that, I had to be a writer. I had to be that historian. It’s not one man’s job. It’s not one person’s job. But it is something we have to do, so that the story of the hunt will also reflect the agony, the travail—the bravery, even, of the lions”.¹

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the ways in which one can tell the story of the hunt without glorifying the hunter and “also reflect the agony, the travail – the bravery, even of the lions”. The focus of the thesis is the debates surrounding ‘decentering IR’, and the underlying argument is that one of the most important steps in decentering IR is questioning the ‘history’ upon which it is built. In reference to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe*², Cooper ponders the question, “can one really provincialize Europe” and answers by stating that “one way to do is to dig more deeply into European history itself”.³ Whereas Cooper focuses on the myth of “narrating European history around the triumph of the nation-state⁴” this thesis focuses on the period entitled as the ‘Cold War’ and the historiographical boundaries drawn around it that silence, edit out, naturalize concepts, identities and events. Furthermore, the thesis aims to discuss the ways in

¹ Jerome Brooks, “Interviews: Chinua Achebe, The Art of Fiction No.139”, *The Paris Review* 133, Winter (1994)

² Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2000).

³ Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 22

⁴ *Ibid.*

which these historiographical boundaries are re/produced within the Turkish context and how these boundaries and silences, edited out and naturalized concepts, identities and events can be used to destabilize and disrupt the story imposed by the historiographical operations on the Cold War.

I. DECENTERING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Relations “as a body of knowledge and set of discourses, as a discipline/field of study in which we participate as scholars, theorists, and students, and as a field of ‘practical’ political decisions and structures - is ‘centred’”.⁵ The center - the West - established the concepts, periodizations, theories used to make sense of the international system. Thus breaking out of the hierarchical system is impossible as long as the discourses and concepts that reproduce the hierarchical system themselves are employed.

As Branwen Gruffydd Jones summarizes;

International Relations (IR) scholarship and teaching has remained concerned predominantly with relations between and issues of concern to the great powers, the hegemons, the large and powerful in the global political economy. The standard historical reference points of the discipline’s rendering of international relations are drawn almost exclusively from Europe’s ‘internal’ history. The acknowledged disciplinary canon of modern IR consists of European classical thought. For much of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the field of IR has been dominated by North American, European, and to a lesser extent Australian scholars. Thus, the majority of literature in the discipline of IR is written by and about only some of the peoples of the world - predominantly Americans and Europeans. IR remains guilty of forgetting and detracting from the thought and acts of not only the people of Africa but also the ‘rest’ of the non-Western world.⁶

The literature has developed considerably since Stanley Hoffman’s article declaring International Relations an American social science.⁷ The last decade has seen a plethora of work on decolonizing international relations, decentering International Studies, non-western thought and international relations that have all

⁵ Meghana Nayak and Eric Selbin, *Decentering International Relations* (London: Zed Books, 2010), 2

⁶ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, and Imperialism,” in *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed., Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 1-2

⁷ Stanley Hoffman, “An American social science - International Relations,” *Daedalus*, 106: 3 (1977): 68-82

employed various strategies to overcome the issue of western centrism in international relations⁸. Sabaratnam identifies five ‘decolonizing strategies’ that “aim at reconfiguring our understanding of world politics through subjecting its main perspectives to philosophical and empirical challenges”.⁹ This study aims at “pluralizing the various potential subjects of social inquiry and analyzing world politics from subaltern perspectives”.¹⁰

In order to decentralize IR the thesis argues that attention needs to be paid to the use of history by the field. History is an intricate part of IR in that it is used to narrate the evolution of the international system and historical ‘events’ are used as in explaining and validating theories. Yet, the understanding of history is premised upon a certain narrative of European history whereby;

“ancient Greece begat Rome, Rome begat Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, the Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the industrial revolution. Industry crossed with democracy, in turn yielded the United States, embodying the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. [...] History is thus converted into a tale about the furtherance of virtue, about how the virtuous win out over the bad guys”.¹¹

This linear narrative presents not only a Eurocentric view of events but also silences other possible stories of Europe’s past.¹² As such, the way in which

⁸ Nayak and Selbin, *Decentering International Relations* ; B.G. Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations* ; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory : Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* eds, (London and New York , 2010) ; Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* eds, (London and New York : Routledge, 2003) ; Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship around the World* eds, (London and New York, Routledge, 2009) ; Arlene Tickner and David L. Blaney, *Thinking the International Differently* (London and New York : Routledge, 2012) ; Arlene Tickner and David L. Blaney, *Claiming the International* eds, (London and New York : Routledge, 2013) ; L.H.M. Ling, *The Dao of World Politics : Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations* (London and New York : Routledge, 2013) ; Arlene Tickner, ‘Core, periphery and (neo)imperialist International Relations, *European Journal International Relations*, 19 :3 (2013) : 627-646 ; Robbie Shilliam, ed., *International Relations and Non-Western Thought* (London : Routledge, 2011) ; Arlene Tickner, ‘Dealing with Difference : Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations’, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 39 :3 (2011) : 607-618 ; Giorgio Shani, ‘Towards a post-Western IR : The *Umma*, *Khalsa Panth*, and critical International Relations theory’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 10 :4 (2008) : 722-734.

⁹ Meera Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue But Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of Decolonising Strategies for the Study of World Politics’, *Millennium: Journal of International Relations*, 39 (2011): 782

¹⁰ *Ibid.*; 789

¹¹ Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), 5

¹² Halperin argues that the history of Europe that is utilized as the backdrop of the main theoretical approaches itself is problematic and silences and distorts much of Europe’s own history. She states

history is defined, narrated and comes to construct the ‘past’ in a central way is a central component of the field of IR and should be a central part of the projects to decenter it. As Said notes;

“a comparative or, better, a contraptual perspective is required in order to see a connection between coronation rituals in England and the Indian dunbars of the late nineteenth century. That is, we must be able to think through and interpret together experiences that are discrepant, each with its particular agenda and pace of development, its own internal formations, its internal coherence and system of external relationships, all of them coexisting and interacting with others”.¹³

The thesis will as stated focus on the historiographical operations on the Cold War and the manner in which these are re/produced in the Turkish context. The ‘Cold War’ is one of the defining epochs of Western-centric historiography of IR and has also been instrumental in shaping the field and the theories produced within the field. As such, “the dominant discourse in security studies embodied a ‘Cold War narrative’ in which drama and meaning derived from an unending, but constantly shifting clash between two global empires, and from the repeated introduction of new technologies possibilities and threats into the story line”.¹⁴ The example of Turkey is important because it demonstrates not ‘difference’ but rather a ‘similarity’ that also needs to be problematized in the efforts to decenter IR. It needs to be underlined that;

“the seeming ‘similarity’ may be rooted in policies of survival shaped in an international political context characterized by an unequal division of labour and distribution of power. What is more, this may be true not only for ‘non-Western’ policy-making, but also for ‘non-Western’ scholarly studies of IR. That is to say, if ‘non-Western’ scholars come across as ‘social science socialized’ products of ‘Western’ IR, the domestic and international politics of such socialization is worth inquiring into. Arguably, such inquiry into the agency of the non-West in the production of ways of thinking and doing, that are ‘almost the same but

that,

“the historical accounts on which much of mainstream IR theory depends are shaped by a profound mythology about modern European history, one that wrongly places Europe at the root and center of modernity and the modern world and transforms Europe’s brutal expansion and political-military hegemony into a story of enlightenment and progress. The notion of European modernity was produced as part of a hegemonic project”.

Sandra Halperin, “International Relations Theory and the Hegemony of Western Conceptions of Modernity”, in *Decolonizing International Relations*, 57

¹³ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 32

¹⁴ Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security,” in *Cultures of insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger*, eds. Jutta Weldes et.al (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 327

not quite' will allow the project of thinking past 'Western' IR to further flourish".¹⁵

It is with this intervention in mind that the thesis focuses on Turkey and the way in which the historiographical operations on the Cold War were re/produced, re/formulated by the works discussing Turkish foreign policy in general and the Cold War in particular. The paradoxes of the Turkish case, of being similar but not the same and of where it is situated is an important point that needs to be underlined.

II. SITUATING TURKEY

"we formulate our policies through a solid and rational judgment of the long-term historical trends and an understanding of where we are situated in the greater trajectory of world history. More importantly, we constantly question and self-reflect on our position and make revisions where necessary. By adopting such a deep-rooted stance on current affairs, we manage to tackle the challenges of the drastic transformations taking place in the global system".¹⁶

"But now Turkey's priority should not be persisting that "Esad should go" instead it should be to put the dreamy, emotional, ideological and extremely personalized Syria policy within the orbit of realism".¹⁷

"On the one hand depending on the status of the international system and on the other depending on Turkey's economic status there are periods of "relative autonomy" and "dependence". But in all of them Turkey paints a typical Middle Sized State rationality: Supporter of the "hegemon" state of the West but can affect the regional issues it deems vital".¹⁸

¹⁵ Pinar Bilgin, "Thinking past 'Western' IR?", *Third World Quarterly*, 29:1 (2008), 19-20

¹⁶ Ahmet Davutoglu, 'Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring', Turkey Policy Brief Series, 2012 (3), Accessed from: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/bakanmakale_tepev.pdf

¹⁷ Kadri Gursel, 'Islami monserlere buyuk ihtiyac var', *Milliyet*, 18 February 2013, Accessed from: <http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/islami-monserlere-buyuk-ihtiyac-var/dunya/dunyayazardetay/18.02.2013/1670114/default.htm>

¹⁸ Baskin Oran, Interview with Radikal Newspaper about Turkish Foreign Policy, November 2011 Accessed from: <http://baskinoran.com/roportaj/RadikalKitapEki.pdf>

The underlying theme of these quotes¹⁹ is the centrality of an idea/ideal of “rationality”. Turkish foreign policy either is rational or needs to be rational. Rationality as the desirable and acceptable approach is present amongst policymakers, the media and academics. Furthermore, it cuts across political affiliations. A foreign policy approach can be defended as being the rational choice by the policymaker as the media and/or academic criticize it for being emotionally driven and not rational enough. Making rationality the yardstick against which policies are measured is not a value-free endeavor. Invoking rationality associates the speaker with a myriad of notions related to truth, progress and reason. Such invocations function to delineate between the good/the acceptable/the Western and the bad/the unacceptable/the Eastern. Being rational automatically embeds the speaker with an authority denied to them if they did not invoke the word.

This is a binary reproduced in all aspects of Turkish political space and the academia that attempts to study it. As such it should not be overlooked that, with respect to the study of security studies in non-Western states, “Doing international relations and security studies in the ‘Western’ way emerged as a way of signaling a break with the (ostensibly ‘non-rational’) past and an embrace of post-Enlightenment/modern (‘rational’) ways”.²⁰ These binaries become further complicated since even as they are employed in order to delineate a Westernness as opposed to non-Westernness, there is also a continuing reaction against the West. It is a constant process of using, reproducing and striving to fit the definitions of what is Western at the same time as reacting against it.

This dual process of belonging and not belonging is visible in the foreign policy discourses of the Justice and Development Party;

¹⁹ The first quote is from Ahmet Davutoglu, the Foreign Minister of Turkey explaining the main approach of Turkish foreign policy, the second quote is from a newspaper article written by Kadri Gursel criticizing Davutoglu’s foreign policy approach, the third quote is from Baskin Oran, a renowned academic working on Turkish foreign policy and the editor of the three volume set on Turkish Foreign Policy that is considered to be compulsory reading material in most, if not all, Turkish foreign policy courses given in Turkey. See; Baskin Oran, ed., *Türk Dis Politikasi Cilt I: 1919-1980* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001); *Türk Dis Politikasi Cilt II: 1980-2001* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001) and *Türk Dis Politikasi Cilt III: 2001-2012* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2013).

²⁰ Pinar Bilgin, “The ‘Western-Centrism’ of Security Studies: ‘Blind-Spot’ or Constitutive Practice?”, *Security Dialogue*, 41 (2010): 618.

“Should NATO intervene in Libya? Can there be such nonsense? What has NATO got to do with Libya? This could become an issue if there was an interference with a NATO member. But outside of that how can one intervene in Libya? Look as Turkey we are against this, something like this cannot be spoken of, it cannot be thought”.²¹

“NATO should enter Libya in order to determine and affirm that Libya belongs to Libyans”.²²

The above quotes²³ demonstrate the constant battle within the Turkish imagination with the idea/ideal and reality of the West. These binaries and the questions they raise are the starting point of this study. How to make sense of this constantly reproduced duality that permeates not only understanding of Turkish foreign policy but Turkish identity in general.

Zarakol²⁴ explains this duality with the manner in which Turkey - and the Ottoman Empire before it - were socialized into the international system. She argues that “the Turkish modern state identity was a deliberate construction in direct response to the lessons drawn from the international interactions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” and the reason for this construction was “to change the hierarchical, stigmatizing relationship between Turkey and Europe, and join the circle of the “established” states”.²⁵ According to Zarakol, the constant duality of wanting to be Western but also being deeply suspicious of it is a result of the manner in which Turkey has reacted to the hierarchies in the international system. Thus the,

²¹ ‘NATO’nun ne isi var Libya’da?’, Sabah, 28 February 2011, Accessed from: http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/02/28/natonun_ne_isi_var_libyada

²² ‘Hangisi Erdogan’, Radikal, 22 February 2013 Accessed from: <http://blog.radikal.com.tr/Sayfa/hangisi-erdogan-15112>

²³ It might be argued that the change in discourse with respect to Libya was a consequence of balance of power considerations and as such it was not an example of the identity split being discussed here. The reasons for the change in discourse are not the focus point here but rather that such a change in discourse can occur and can be accepted in such a short time. Most policymakers display these alterations in discourse because of the issue of identity split. Moreover, it should be underlined that the ‘anti-Western’ stance is not an alternative per se of the ‘Western’ stance. The ‘anti-Western’ discourse itself is defined with respect to the West and reproduces the Western hegemony as much as the ‘Western’ discourses. In that sense rather than being monumental shifts in foreign policy, these stances are mirror-reflections of each other.

²⁴ Ayse Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

²⁵ *Ibid.*; 156-7

“Ottoman Empire did not lose all of its sovereign power in battlefields; that power was chipped away by her own gradual acceptance of and aspirations to the Standard of Civilization by which the European powers ostensibly operated. The more the Ottoman Empire aspired to meet European standards, the weaker it became. Indeed, the more the Ottoman Empire participated in the international system, the more she internalized the norms of modernity, the more “ashamed” the leaders became of their own people and institutions, dedicating limited resources to emulation efforts which were doomed to fail”.²⁶

As the loss of material forces alone cannot explain the decline of Ottoman Empire neither can material factors alone explain the present issues with respect to Turkish foreign policy. Its reproduction of the hierarchies of IR discourse needs to be taken into account. Zarakol in her conclusion argues that the way out of constantly reproducing these binaries is if the outsiders “accept that an ordered world with a fixed center is itself a sham, they may perhaps be able to liberate themselves”.²⁷

The question then becomes where should research focus on in order to overcome this constant duality? How to define Turkey, Turkish foreign policy and how to locate Turkey within the international arena? Where to go on from Zarakol's analysis, if the “center is a sham” and Turkey needs to go to the side without a center, how does Turkey go there? How does one analyze the policies of a state whether in the international arena or internally that is so entrenched in the narratives of the centre. Thus this thesis argues that one of the strategies of decentering IR should be if decentering the instances of reproducing the centre as well. In that sense, decentering Turkey, problematizing Turkey's narrative of itself and decentering the texts produced within the field of Turkish foreign policy is an important step in understanding how the periphery works to re/produce the hierarchies of the field.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The thesis will be divided into two main sections; Historiographical Operations on the Cold War and Stories of Silences. Before proceeding to these sections the

²⁶ *Ibid.*; 119

²⁷ *Ibid.*; 255

thesis will first discuss the concept of history and the stories of international relations. The first chapter entitled ‘Problematizing History’ will provide an overview of the concept of history and underline the differences between ‘the past’, ‘the chronicle’ and ‘the narrative’. As such, the aim of this chapter will be to problematize history by elaborating upon what Louis Mink summarizes as;

“Stories are not lived but told. Life has no beginnings, middles or ends: there are meetings, but the start of an affair belongs to the story we tell ourselves later, and there are partings, but final partings only in the story. There are hopes, plans, battles, and ideas, but only in retrospective stories are hopes unfulfilled, plans miscarried, battles decisive, and ideas seminal. Only in the story is it America which Columbus discovers, and only in the story is the kingdom lost for want of a nail So it seems truer to say that narrative qualities are transferred from art to life. We could learn to tell stories of our lives from nursery rhymes, or from culture-myths if we had any, but it is from history and fiction that we learn how to tell and to understand *complex* stories, and how it is stories answers questions”.²⁸

The second chapter entitled ‘Stories of International Relations’ will discuss the different stories of the field and concepts that are constitutive of the field such as the international system, state and sovereignty and security. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the discourses on IR and the different stories that ‘critical’ perspectives are attempting to tell with respect to the international system, the state and sovereignty and security. This chapter will also discuss the way in which non-Western stories are embedded into the stories of international relations and why it is important to problematize this centering of non-western narratives that works to silence and naturalize concepts, events and identities.

These two chapters will establish the foundations of the main aim of the thesis. Firstly, problematizing the way in which history is used in the field of IR and the historiographical operations that draw the boundaries of epochs, concepts and events based on Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics. Secondly, the Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics is reproduced in non-western contexts whereby stories are embedded within these meta-narratives and in the process events, concepts and identities are fixed or edited out. As such, the thesis aims to underline that projects to decenter IR should not only focus on decentering IR and the Eurocentric knowledge production in the center but also

²⁸ Louis Mink, “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension”, *New Literary History*, 1 (1970), 557–558

the way that knowledge is produced and re/produced in the non-Western context. The next two sections of the thesis ‘Historiographical Operations on the Cold War’ and ‘the Stories of Silences’ elaborate further on these points.

SECTION I: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OPERATIONS ON THE COLD WAR

This section aims to discuss the historiographical operations on the Cold War. The section is divided into two chapters. Chapter III entitled; ‘Stories of Origins’ will focus on the way in which the historiography of the Cold War defines the boundaries of the Cold War, which occurrences constitute events to be prioritized and which actors to be focused upon. Chapter IV entitled ‘Re/producing the Cold War’ will focus on the literature on Turkey and the Cold War in an attempt to demonstrate the embeddedness of the Turkish story. It needs to be underlined that these chapters are not literature reviews but rather overviews of the literature in order to underline the main structures and abstractions in the stories. The main questions to be asked when approaching these literatures will be:

1. How was the Cold War defined, periodized, and narrated?
2. How the Soviet Union and United States were defined?
3. How was Turkey defined?
4. What was the degree of agency given to Turkey within the narrative?
5. How were the main events of the origins of the Cold War such as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan characterized and narrated?
6. What events were omitted from the narrative?

These chapters will underline two main points. Firstly, that the historiography of the Cold War is rooted in a Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics. Secondly, that the story Turkey gets edited out whereby concepts, events, and identities are naturalized and linearized in order to fit into the story of the Cold War. The next section focuses on problematizing these naturalized concepts, events and identities.

SECTION II: STORIES OF SILENCES

This section aims to underline the ‘process’ of the re/formulation and re/definition of the concepts, events and identities that were naturalized through the historiographical operations on the Cold War. The focus will be on disrupting the linearity of the story of Turkey and underlining that neither Turkey as an object of study nor the concepts of democratization and westernization were static concepts. These were debated upon and re/negotiated, re/formulated and re/defined. The concepts of identity, narrative and frames will be employed in order to elucidate upon the relationship between the Cold War narratives and the (re)formulation, (re)remembering and (re)articulation of national identities. The narratives that exist about the Cold War and the silences within these storylines construct a certain idea of the Cold War that privileges some ideas, policies and comprehensions of the international relations over others. As Barnett states “in order for actors to have a sense of how they should proceed, they must have some understanding of where they have been, and those narrative understandings constitute the cultural stock that individuals use to reason, calculate probabilities and estimate the consequences of their actions for the future”.²⁹ The narratives of the past also condition the present and the future of the actors. The manner in which the Cold War is narrated shapes the definition of the present threats and ‘lessons of history’ that are applied in present policymaking circles. Thus, the continuous references in the “post-Cold War” era to “Cold War” problems and how they were solved and who supposedly won condition the actions considered by the states.

The aim of this section is to problematize and disentangle the logic of the Cold War and how it became established. Searching for alternative stories that can be told will complicate the dominant narratives about the Cold War and provide

²⁹ Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 5:1 (1999), 14

instances of how narratives could have been constructed differently. As Campbell states “telling a story establishes order and meaning. Scripting a narrative, providing a sequentially ordered plot, a cast of characters, identifiable forces, attributable motivations, and lessons for the future, is one of the most common ways we ascribe intelligibility when confronted with the novel or the unfamiliar”.³⁰ Hence the aim is to problematize the sequential order existent in the literature narrating and defining the Cold War by questioning the sequence of events, the cast of characters, the forces and motivations ascribed to the actors in an attempt to bring forth the silences in the narratives of the Cold War

³⁰ David Campbell, *Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 7

CHAPTER I: PROBLEMATIZING HISTORY

I. INTRODUCTION

This is true; so we must repress this savage character, this fury, this ambition, just in case we dream again. And that will happen sooner or later, for we live in such an exceptional world that living is no more than dreaming; and experience teaches me that he who lives dreams what he is until waking. The king dreams that he's king, and he lives under this deception commanding, planning, and governing; and his acclaim, which he receives on loan, is scribbled in the wind and turned to ashes by death. What grave misfortune! To think that anyone should wish to govern knowing that he will awaken in the sleep of death! The rich man dreams of more riches, which only bring him more worries; the poor man dreams that he suffers in misery and poverty; the man who improves his lot dreams; the man who toils and petitions dreams; the man who insults and offends dreams. And in this world, in short, everyone dreams what he is although no one realizes it. I dream that I'm here, weighed down by these chains, and I've dreamt that I found myself in more flattering circumstances. What is life? A frenzy. What is life? A vain hope, a shadow, a fiction. The greatest good is fleeting, for all life is a dream and even dreams are but dreams.³¹

The field of International Relations in the last decades has undergone what has been dubbed as the 'historical turn' or the 'historiographical turn'.³² The aim has been to bring 'history' back in to IR as a way of overcoming the shortcomings of the field since the mis/use of history was identified as one of the persistent problems of the field. Barry Buzan and Richard Little identify five shortcomings;

“presentism, or the tendency to view the past in terms of the present; ahistoricism, or the insistence that there are trans- historical concepts that allow us to identify universal regularities; Eurocentrism, or the privileging of European experience in our understanding of international relations; anarchophilia, or the propensity to equate international relations with the existence of an anarchic system; and state-centrism, or the preoccupation with the state at the expense of other international actors.”³³

³¹ Pedro Calderon de la Barca, *Life is a Dream* [translated by Michael Kidd] (Boulder, Colorado : University of Colorado Press, 2004), 131-2.

³² Stephen Hobden, 'Historical Sociology: Back to the Future of International Relations?', in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, eds. Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Duncan S.A. Bell "International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?", *British Journal of International Relations*, 3:1 (2001): 115-126; George Lawson, "The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, 18:2 (2010): 203-226; Timothy Smith, *History and International relations* (London: Routledge, 1999).

³³ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'World history and the development of non-Western international relations theory', in *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, 197

Three of the five shortcomings; presentism, ahistoricism and Eurocentrism are directly linked to the role history plays in the field. John Hobson in similar vein identifies two main shortcomings; “tempocentrism” and “chronofetishism”. Tempocentric ahistoricism extrapolates the characteristics of the present system and actors “back in time” which “smooths out historical ruptures and social differences”.³⁴ Problematizing this enables a rethinking of the “specific and unique origins of the *modern* international system”.³⁵ Chronofetishism focuses on the present by “bracketing or ignoring the past” and “portray the present as a natural, spontaneous, self-constituting entity that is [...] eternalized”.³⁶

Both discussions underline the mis/use of history as something that needs to be remedied in the field. As a consequence there have been increasing number of works that historicise concepts, events, issues and the field in general. History is being used as an explanatory tool to deepen the understanding within the field yet history as a concept that also needs to be explained and engaged critically is being overlooked³⁷. Even though history has been brought in, it is often overlooked which history is being brought in thus privileging one understanding of history over others as a result of which “the discourse of the historical turn actually runs the risk of facilitating continued hegemony of an ahistorical or at worst anti-historical research culture in IR”.³⁸ History should not be just brought in as an unproblematic concept but rather engaged with critically. As Vaughan-Williams states; “in order to historicize the concepts, logics and theories with which we study international relations it is necessary not to bring ‘history’ but more specifically the ‘problem of history’ into the discipline”.³⁹

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ For works that engage critically with the concept of history; R.B.J. Walker, “History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations”, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 18:2 (1989); David Campbell, “Meta-Bosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War”, *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998): 261-81; Patrick Finney, “Still Marking Time? Text, Discourse, and Truth in International History”, *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001): 291-308; Hidemi Suganami, “Narrative Explanation and International Relations: Back to Basics”, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 37:2 (2008): 327-356.

³⁸ Nick Vaughan-Williams, “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’”, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 34:1 (2005): 133

³⁹ *Ibid.*

The concept of 'history' is not unproblematic and has always been contested and widely discussed. Overlooking these debates privileges one version of the definition of history rather than opening up for discussion its contested nature. The discussions revolving around the 'problem of history' can be divided into three perspectives: reconstructionism, constructionism, deconstructionism.⁴⁰ Reconstructionism argues that primary sources can lead to achieving the Rankean aim of knowing the past 'as it actually happened'. Marwick, one of the leading proponents of reconstructionism, defines history as "a body of knowledge about the human past based on the systemic study of sources".⁴¹ According to this perspective; the past is real and history can correspond to that reality through the use of evidence. As summarized by Elton;

"We are looking for a way to ground historical reconstruction in something that offers a measure of independent security - independent of the concerns of his day, independent of the social and political conditions imposed on him. And the obvious answer to this quest, as it has always been and must continue to be, lies in the sources he has at his disposal".⁴²

Marwick and Elton are one side of the reconstructionist spectrum which also includes practical realists like Peter Novick,⁴³ Joyce Appleby,⁴⁴ Lynn Hunt,⁴⁵ Gabrielle Spiegel.⁴⁶ Both sides of this spectrum aim to reconstruct "historical explanations around the evidence while maintaining a foundational belief in empiricism and historical meanings ultimately deriving from sense experience mediated by their constructed narratives".⁴⁷ Constructionism consists of a wide array of 'schools' "that appeal to general laws in historical explanation".⁴⁸ French Annalists, modernization theory and the Marxist/neo-Marxist approaches are all included under the heading of constructionism. According to constructionism "history can explain the past only when the evidence is placed within a

⁴⁰ Alun Munslow, *Deconstructing History* (London: Routledge, 1997).

⁴¹ Arthur Marwick (1998) "A Fetishism of Documents? The Salience of Source-Based History" cited in Alun Munslow, *The New History* (London: Routledge, 2003), 54

⁴² Geoffrey Elton cited in Alun Munslow, *The Routledge Companion to Handbook to Historical Studies* (London and New York : Routledge, 2005), 217

⁴³ Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

⁴⁴ Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth About History* (New York: Norton, 1994).

⁴⁵ Lynn Hunt, *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989)

⁴⁶ Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing* (New York and London: Routledge, 2005)

⁴⁷ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 20

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

preexisting explanatory framework that allows for the calculation of general rules of human action”.⁴⁹ Deconstructionist history questions the assumption of writing history ‘as it actually was’ and focuses on a postmodern understanding of history.⁵⁰ The main proponents of this perspective are; Hayden White,⁵¹ Dominik LaCapra,⁵² David Harlan,⁵³ Allan Megill⁵⁴, Keith Jenkins⁵⁵, F.R. Ankersmit⁵⁶ among many others. Deconstructionism views “history and the past as a complex series of literary products that derive their chains of meaning(s) or significations from the nature of narrative structure (or forms of representation) as much as from other culturally provided ideological factors”.⁵⁷ This brief sketch⁵⁸ demonstrates clearly how erroneous it is to automatically bring in history as if it was a neutral concept.

Bringing in history into the discussion also needs to mean bringing in the following questions in to the discussion;

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 24

⁵⁰ Hayden White, Dominik LaCapra, David Harlan. Allan Megill, Keith Jenkins are generally classified under ‘deconstructionist history’.

⁵¹ Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) ; *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987)

⁵² Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) ; *History in Transit : Experience, Identity, Critical Theory* (Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 2004).

⁵³ David Harlan, *The Degradation of American History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997)

⁵⁴ Allan Megill, *Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985) ; *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error* (Chicago and London : The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

⁵⁵ Keith Jenkins, *On ‘What is History?’* (London: Routledge, 1995); *Rethinking History* (London: Routledge, 2003); *Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline* (London: Routledge, 2003)

⁵⁶ F.R. Ankersmit, *Historical Representation* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2002); *Narrative logic: a semantic analysis of the historian’s language* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1983) ; *Political Representation* (Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2002) ; *Meaning, truth and reference in historical representation* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2012).

⁵⁷ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 21

⁵⁸ It needs to be underlined the outline provided here and the division of ‘schools’ and ‘approaches’ can itself be contested and was used in order to provide a bird eyes view of the discussions about the nature of history. For further reading see : Michael Bentley, *Companion to Historiography* (London : Routledge, 1997) ; Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century : From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover and London : Wesleyan University Press, 1997) ; Keith Jenkins, *Postmodern History Reader* (London : Routledge, 1997) ; Michael C. Lemon, *The Discipline of History and the History of Thought* (London : Routledge) ; John Lechte, *Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers : From Structuralism to Postmodernity* (London : Routledge, 1994) ; Geoffrey Roberts, *The History and Narrative Reader* (London and New York : Routledge, 2001).

“Who gets to tell the story of the past? What are the implications of where the story starts and stops; which characters and topics are included and excluded; what ‘voice’ is adopted; what metaphors provide structure? ... What dynamic relationship does each of us bring to the process of meaning and representation? Conscious or unconscious decisions about form, voice, and metaphor shape the content of historical stories, and many interpretive differences in historiography (especially in the international field) arise from this ‘content of the form’ and from inescapable issues of subjectivity and partiality”.⁵⁹

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the problem of history and attempt find an answer to ‘what is history?’ The first section will engage critically with the concept of history and attempt to elaborate on questions such as what is history?, can the past be known? Can history ever recover the past? The second section will discuss the role of the narrative and how the past is transformed into history. The third section will focus on Hayden White’s theory and discuss the ways in which historical narratives are constructed by employing a series of strategies. The fourth section will focus on what historiography means and how concepts, periods and historiographical debates should be approached.

II. STORIES OF THE PAST

The first section will elaborate on the question of ‘what is history?’⁶⁰ Is history the writing of the past ‘as it happened’? The primary question of what is history becomes complicated once the question is extended to ask what is the past? Is the past and history the same or are they different? Does the ‘it’ in the Rankean dictum of ‘as it really happened’ actually exist?

In its simplest terms the past is what has happened *and history is a retelling of a story of what has happened*. There are a series of qualifications here:

1. History is not *the telling* of a story but *the retelling*, the past cannot be recreated in its entirety within a story and as such is always incomplete, history can retell a part of the past but never recreate it.

⁵⁹ Emily Rosenberg, ‘Considering Borders’ in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed, M.J : Hogan and T.G. Paterson, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004), 192

⁶⁰ Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History* (New York : Vintage, 1967).

2. History is not the retelling *of the story* of the past but a retelling *of a story* of the past. Since history cannot capture the past in its entirety it is always a partial story of what has happened and is never a final, closed, settled account of the past.

As Paul Veyne states;

“History is an account of events: all else flows from that. Since it is a direct account, it does not revive, any more than the novel does. The actual experience, as it comes from the hands of the historian, is not that of the actors; it is a narration, so it can eliminate certain erroneous problems. Like the novel, history sorts, simplifies, organizes, fits a century into a page. [...]to speculate on the interval that always separates the actual experience and the recollection of the event would simply bring us to see that Waterloo was not the same thing for a veteran of the Old Guard and for a field marshal; that the battle can be related in the first or the third person; that it can be spoken of as a battle, as an English victory, or as a French defeat; that from the start one can drop a hint of the outcome or appear to discover it. [...]Even *if* I am a contemporary and a witness of Waterloo, even if I am the principal actor and Napoleon in person, I shall have only a perspective of what historians will call the event of Waterloo; I shall be able to leave to posterity only my statement, which, if it reaches them, they will call an impression. Even if I were Bismarck deciding to send the Ems dispatch, my own interpretation of the event would perhaps not be the same as that of my friends, my confessor, my regular historian, and my psychoanalyst, who may have their own version of my decision and think they know better than I do what it was I wanted. In essence, history is knowledge through documents.”⁶¹

All the actors involved do not experience events in the same manner. The past does not have clearly delineated beginnings, middles and ends, it does not occur in a linear causal mechanism. It does not exist as a story to be told, the past has to be fashioned into a story. The events and actors of the past are transformed into an easily followable story and it is that story that is history rather than the past itself. This point leads to two further elaborations on what history is;

3. If history is the *retelling of a story* and the past as it was cannot be captured than every retelling is a construct.
4. If every retelling is a construct then this construction occurs not based on recreating the past but according to the questions asked in the present. The retelling of a story necessitates that the past be fashioned into a story with a

⁶¹ Paul Veyne, *Writing History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 4

beginning, middle and end, with answers to questions such as why is this important?

The past is not lived in narrative form, it is written as such. This writing is as much about the facts of the past as about the concerns of the present. The questions the historians direct towards the text are questions conditioned by the present.

5. Because the past is not retrieved the writing of history is oriented in the present and related to the questions we have about the past in the present.

As such, “is it possible that the past unfolded as a particular kind of narrative the first time around and can we recover it more or less intact, or are we only selecting and imposing an emplotment or story line on it derived from our own present? Are stories lived in the past or just told in the present?”⁶² Whatever is lived in the past is not the story told in the present, history is the story of the past told in the present and for the present.

In that sense, the question of ‘what is history’ needs to be extended even further. As discussed, in order to understand what history is, it was necessary to elaborate on its differences with the ‘past’ and the relationship between the past and history and ask the question what is the past? If the past is not retrievable and history is a retelling of the past, the next question becomes why retell the past? It is not only ‘what is history?’ but also ‘what is the purpose of history’ or rather who is history for? Similar to Cox’s oft-cited quote of “theory is always for someone”⁶³ Jenkins states that “History is never for itself, it is always for someone”.⁶⁴

6. History is not only and maybe not even primarily about events, issues, debates and actors of the past but what their story means for the issues, debates, events and actors in the present.

⁶² Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 5

⁶³ Robert Cox, “States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 10:2 (1981): 126-155.

⁶⁴ Jenkins, *Re-thinking History*, 21

As Jenkins states;

“The fact that history *per se* is an ideological construct means that it is constantly being re-worked and re-ordered by all those who are variously affected by power relationships; because the dominated as well as the dominant also have their versions of the past to legitimate their practices, versions which have to be excluded as improper from any place on the agenda of the dominant discourse. In that sense re-orderings of the messages to be delivered (often many such re-orderings are referred to academically as ‘controversies’) just have to be constructed continuously because the needs of the dominant/subordinate are constantly being re-worked in the real world as they seek to mobilise people(s) in support of their interests. History is forged in such conflict and clearly these conflicting needs for history impinge upon the debates (struggle for ownership) as to what history is”.⁶⁵

7. History is not only a construct but also an ideological construct. If it is written always with a purpose and for someone, then the fashioning of the story is determined by the questions and frames necessitated by the purpose of the story.

As such, history is not the past but rather a discourse on the past. Discourses “work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to exclude, by limiting and restricting authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizations and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified”.⁶⁶ As such discourses should be conceptualized as “a system of statements in which each individual statement makes sense, produces interpretive possibilities by making it virtually impossible to think outside of it. A discourse provides *discursive spaces*, i.e., concepts, categories, metaphors, models, and analogies by which meanings are created”.⁶⁷

8. History is a series of discourses that work to define, categorize, periodize, limit, silence and make the past intelligible.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 5:2 (1999): 229

⁶⁷ Roxanne Doty, “Foreign Policy as a Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 37:3 (Sept, 1993): 302

As history is written for some purpose then the transformation of the past into history and the definitions, categories, periodizations and inclusions/exclusions of that written work are there to reinforce, reproduce and reify the discursive spaces of a specific rendering of the past.

9. The past is not what is in contestation but the historiographical renderings of it.

History is a retelling of a story of the past with a purpose in mind that works within already existing discourses about the past. Thus historical debates are not debates about the past itself but rather a debate between the discourses of the past. In that sense, “history results not from the debate about the past reality as such, but from competing narrative proposals about the nature and possible meanings of past events”⁶⁸ and when “a narrative proposal has achieved a more or less universal acceptance (like ‘the Cold War’ or ‘the Industrial Revolution’) it becomes concretized as past reality. *It is no longer a narrative proposal, but has become the past.*”⁶⁹

As discussed so far, history is not the past and its acceptance as being representative of the past is the result of the dominance and acceptance of the discourses of the past⁷⁰. This section attempted to open up the definition of history primarily by underlying the difference between the past and history. Furthermore, only asking ‘what is history’ is not sufficient in questioning the nature of history, what also needs to be asked is ‘who is history for’? The writing of history is always informed by some purpose that conditions the questions the historian asks the past, the text, the archive and transforms the past into history. The next section will elaborate further on how the past is transformed into history.

III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE PAST

⁶⁸ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 69

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ More discussion on historiography and role of debates will be discussed in the fourth section of this chapter

The previous section focused upon answering the question “what is history?” and the way in which the past and history are not the same. This section will elaborate on how the transformation of the past into history occurs. History is written through the narrativization of past events. Narrative “is a discourse that places disparate events in an understandable order”⁷¹ and that order does not exist in the evidence but is imposed upon the events by the historian.

Hayden White in *Tropics of Discourse* reproduces the below list from the *Annals of Saint Gall* chronicling events in Gaul.

- “
- | | |
|------|--|
| 707. | Hard Winter. Duke Gottfried died. |
| 708. | Hard year and deficient in crops |
| 709. | |
| 710. | Flood everywhere |
| 711. | .. |
| 712. | Pippin, mayor of the palace, died |
| 713. |716.717. |
| 718. | Charles fought against the Saxons. |
| 719. | Theudo drove the Saracens out of Aquitaine. |
| 720. | Great crops. |
| 721. | |
| 722. | |
| 723. | Saracens came for the first time. |
| 724. | |
| 725. | |
| 726. | |
| 727. | |
| 728. | |
| 729. | Blessed Bede, the presbyter died. |
| 730. | Charles fought against the Saracens at Poitiers on Saturday. |
| 731. | |
| 732. | ⁷² ” |

The list is of the “past”, those events did happen when the annalist entered them yet it is not a historical account mainly because it does not have a story or a plot. The past events have not been narrativized. Firstly, there is no hierarchy among events. The great crops of 722 deserve an entry equal to that of Charles fighting against the Saracens. Secondly, there is no causality between the events. There is

⁷¹ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 12

⁷² White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 9

no further elaboration on Duke Gottfried dying in 709 such as what were its implications. Thus as White states;

“modern commentators have remarked on the fact that the annalist recorded the Battle of Poitiers of 732 but failed to note the battle of Tours which occurred in the same year and which as every schoolboy knows was one of ‘the ten greatest battles of the world history’. But even if the annalist had known of Tours, what principle or rule of meaning would have required him to record it? It is only from our knowledge of the subsequent history of Western Europe that we can presume to rank events in terms of their world-historical significance”.⁷³

The above lists chronicles a set of events during a given time and place and imparts knowledge about the past. What this list does not do is tell the story of the past; hence it is not history as such. As Oakeshott states; “History is the historian's experience. It is ‘made’ by nobody save the historian; to write history is the only way of making it”.⁷⁴ As such, the events in the chronicle are assigned importance or placed within a causal relationship when the events are narrativized by the historian. Past events do not come with hierarchy of significance or causal relationships inscribed into them, the historian imposes it on them. As Munslow explains;

“All such narratives make over events and explain why they happened, but are overlaid by the assumptions held by the historian about the forces influencing the nature of causality. These might well include individual or combined elements like race, gender, class, culture, whether, coincidence, geography, region, blundering politicians, and so on and so forth. So, while individual statements may be true/false, narrative as a collection of them is more than their sum. The narrative becomes a complex interpretative exercise that is neither conclusively true nor false”.⁷⁵

An example from the Cold War⁷⁶ about the hierarchization of events might put this point in context. A list of events between 1945 and 1950 might look as follows:

- February 1945 - Yalta Conference
- April 1945 - Death of President Franklin Roosevelt

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Michael Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 99

⁷⁵ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 12

⁷⁶ The periodization itself and the events chosen to exemplify the narrativization process are the ones that are accorded significance in the narratives of the ‘Cold War’ and the events are described in the same manner used in the narratives of the Cold War.

- May 1945 - End of World War II in Europe
- September 1945 – Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam an independent republic
- February 1946 – George F. Kennan writes the Long Telegram
- March 1946 - Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech
- April 1946 – NATO Treaty is signed
- July 1946 – Philippines gains independence from the United States
- March 1947 - speech by President Truman announcing the ‘Truman Doctrine’
- June 1947 - Secretary of State George Marshall’s announcement of an economic aid plan
- July 1947 – Congress passes the National Security Act
- September 1947 - establishment of COMINFORM
- February 1948 – Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia
- June 1948 – West Germany is formed
- June 1948 - Berlin Blockade
- August 1949 – USSR detonates first atomic bomb
- October 1949 – Communist Mao Zedong takes control of China and establishes the People’s Republic of China
- June 1950 - Korean War

In order to make these series of events into a story what is necessary is a central subject, a geographical center, and a proper beginning in time. The central subject of these events can be the Cold War or United States foreign policy or US-Soviet rivalry; the geographical center can shift based on which events are included excluded from the story; the story can concentrate primarily on the events in Europe, in South-East Asia, in the Middle East, and a proper beginning in time; it might begin in 1917 with the Russian Revolution, in May 1945 with the end of the Second World War in Europe or in February 1946 with the writing of the George Kennan’s Long Telegram. As can be seen there are a series of choices to be made by the historian when approaching past events and facts.

There is a dual process of exclusion and inclusion of facts whereby the historian imposes their own narrative upon the facts. The exclusion of facts occurs because there is always more facts than can be included in a narrative. Thus all the events

between 1945 and 1946 cannot be included in the story; the historian decides which events to include based on a series of considerations (the central subject, the geographical center, etc) and a series of questions (what happened next; how did it happen; why did events occur in be one way or another). The second process of inclusion occurs because;

“On the other hand, in his efforts to reconstruct ‘what happened’ in any given period of history, the historian inevitably must include in his narrative an account of some event or complex of events for which the facts that would permit a plausible explanation of its occurrence are lacking. And this means that the historian must ‘interpret’ his materials by filling in the gaps in his information on inferential or speculative grounds.”⁷⁷

To take the example of the facts of the period between 1945-1950 again, even though the events might remain the same, there are a series of possible narratives about the period in question depending upon how the hierarchy of significance is allocated;

Narrative 1: End of Second World War, Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, Korean War

Narrative 2: End of Second World War, Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, *Korean War*

Narrative 3: *End of the Second World War*, Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, Korean War

Narrative 4: End of the Second World War, *Marshall Plan*, Truman Doctrine, Korean War

The italics denote the narrative prioritizing one event in the narrative over others as the “turning point”. This alters the rhythm of the story being told. If the narrative characterizes the death of Franklin Roosevelt as a turning point then the story is that of President Truman’s culpability in the start of the tensions with the Soviet Union with the underlying assumption that had Roosevelt been alive this

⁷⁷ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 51

turn of events could have been avoided. If the Marshall Plan is taken as the starting point of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union then not only is the United States designated as having responsibility in the rise of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union but because it is the Marshall Plan that is singled out capitalism and the opening up of markets also becomes an important factor in the story of the evolution of the Cold War. Taking the same period including/excluding certain events the number of possible narratives increases even more;

Narrative 5: End of Second World War, Long Telegram, NATO Treaty, National Security Act

Narrative 6: Yalta Conference, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam as independent republic, Philippines gains independence from the United States, Korean War

Narrative 7: End of World War II, establishment of COMINFORM, communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, Berlin Blockade, USSR detonates first atomic bomb

The narratives include and exclude different events resulting in different stories about the past. The events have all happened, evidence can be found in archives about all these events yet their inclusion/exclusion and the construction of the narratives determine the story being told. Narrative 5 inscribes significance upon events belonging to United States foreign policy, including the NATO Treaty, and the National Security Act within the story constructs the United States as the main agent of the story and the establishment of the national security state an important factor in the development of the Cold War. Narrative 6 focuses on the 'Third World' and includes events that were absent from Narrative 5 whereby the developments in the international system are not solely explained through the United States. Narrative 7 in direct opposition to Narrative 5 establishes the Soviet Union as the main agent of the developments in the international system casting the expansion of communism as the main factor in the Cold War. As White states;

“No such thing as a single correct view of any object of study but [rather] there are many . . . views each requiring its own style of presentation. This [position allowing] us to therefore entertain seriously those creative ‘distortions’ offered by minds capable of looking at the past . . . but with different affective and intellectual orientations. Then we should no longer expect that statements about a given epoch as a complex of events in the past ‘correspond’ to some pre-existent body of raw facts. For we should recognise that what constitutes the facts is the problem that the historian, like the artist, has tried to solve in the choice of metaphor by which he/she orders the world past, present and future”.⁷⁸

Thus, in order to transform the past into history what is necessary is an ordering of events and a plot. As discussed in this section, any series of events can be plotted differently depending on the choices the historian makes. These choices are related to the questions the historian asks to the past and also the explanatory strategies the historian employs in constructing their historical narrative. The next section will elaborate further upon these explanatory strategies mainly focusing upon Hayden White’s work.

IV. CONSTRUCTING HISTORIES

The previous section discussed how the past is transformed into history through ordering and hierarchization of past events. This ordering and hierarchization are initial steps in constructing historical narratives. According to Hayden White⁷⁹, the historian constructs narratives (stories) by employing three main explanatory strategies: explanation by emplotment, explanation by formal argument and explanation by ideological implication. This section will discuss these strategies in more detail and their implications for the narratives being constructed.

⁷⁸ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 47.

⁷⁹ This section focuses on the way in which Hayden White has configured the construction of historical narratives. This was done order to provide a summary of the way in which events in the ‘past’ can be configured into ‘history’ and the myriad of operations necessary for the process. Yet it should be underlined that Hayden White is not the only theorists to provide such a conceptualization and that this section remains a simplification of the way in which narrative comes about. For further see, Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York : Columbia University Press, 2007) ; F.R. Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic : A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language*, F.R. Ankersmit, *History and Tropology : The Rise and Fall of Metaphor* (California : University of California Press, 1994) ; Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol.1-3 (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1990), Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism : Four Essays* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1957) ; Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folk Tale* (Austin : University of Texas Press, 2010) .

Stories are made out of chronicles by an operation that White calls emplotment. Emplotment is “the encodation of the facts contained in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures”.⁸⁰ The emplotment provides the kind of story that the historian is telling. There are four modes of emplotment: Romance, Tragedy, Comedy and Satire. The choice of emplotment is determined mainly by the historian’s conceptionalization of the agent/structure debate: how much the protagonist has power over its environment and how determining the environment is over the protagonist. Romance is a drama of redemption, “of self-identification symbolized by the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it and his final liberation from it” and in that sense it’s a “drama of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue over vice”.⁸¹ Satire is the opposite of Romance in that it’s not a drama of redemption but rather “a drama of diremption⁸²” whereby the protagonist is a “captive of their world and destined to a life of obstacles and negation”.⁸³ Where Romance and Satire are polar opposites in terms of the agency of the protagonist over its environment, Comedy and Tragedy are qualifications on Romance. Both Comedy and Tragedy conceive of a “temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional *reconciliations* of the forces at play in the social and natural worlds”.⁸⁴ The difference is how the reconciliations are played out. In Comedy “such reconciliations are symbolized in the festive occasions which the Comic writer traditionally uses to terminate his dramatic accounts of change and transformation” whereas in Tragedy “there are no festive occasions, except false illusory ones”.⁸⁵

The second step in transforming the past into history is explanation by formal argument that determines ‘the point of it all’ by employing “accepted laws of historical change or human behavior upon which we all draw to explain events”.⁸⁶ Choice of formal argument depends on the way in which the historian conceives of the direction the explanation will take within a spectrum of integrative to

⁸⁰ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 83

⁸¹ White, *Metahistory*, 8

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 158

⁸⁴ White, *Metahistory*, 8

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Munslow, *Deconstring History*, 158

dispersive analysis of past events, acts and actors. There are four formal arguments; Formist, Mechanistic, Organist and Contextualist. Formist argument focuses on describing the uniqueness of past events, acts and actors and identifying their dispersive character. It “considers an explanation to be complete when a given set of objects has been properly identified, its class, generic, and specific attributes assigned, and labels attesting to its particularity attached to it”.⁸⁷ Organicist arguments are integrative whereby past events, acts and actors are considered to be components of a greater whole. This argument takes “the form of a synthesis in which the historian strives to identify the principles by which the different aspects of history can be integrated into a single macrocosmic process of, say, *development*”.⁸⁸ Mechanistic arguments are integrative as well but tend to be reductionist rather than synthetic like the organicist argument because they “search for the causal laws that determine the outcomes of processes discovered in the historical field”.⁸⁹ Contextualist arguments explain past events, acts and actors by setting them within the ‘context’ in which they occurred. The reason for the occurrence of events and acts “is explained by the revelation of the specific relationship they bore to other events occurring in their circumambient historical space”.⁹⁰

The third step in the transformation of the past into history is explanation by ideology. Ideology is an integral component of historical writing because as White states; “commitment to a particular *form* of knowledge predetermines the *kinds* of generalizations one can make about the present world, the kinds of knowledge one can have of it, and hence the kinds of projects one can legitimately conceive for changing that present or for maintaining it in its present form indefinitely”.⁹¹ White identifies four ideological positions: Anarchism, Conservatism, Radicalism and Liberalism. The historian’s position is mainly dependent on how the historian explains change; its desirability and its pace. Conservative and Liberal positions are suspicious of change especially structural transformations of the system yet they both recognize the inevitability of change. Conservatives maintain that

⁸⁷ White, *Metahistory*, 13

⁸⁸ Jenkins, On “What is History”, 159

⁸⁹ White, *Metahistory*, 3

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*; 13

⁹¹ *Ibid.*; 21

piecemeal change should occur according to the ‘natural rhythm’ of society while its structure remains unchanged. They “imagine historical evolution as a progressive elaboration of the institutional structure that *currently* prevails”.⁹² Liberals envision change but one that occurs according to the ‘social rhythm’ of the society, as a process that will come about through education and elections rather than one that will occur immediately to alter the structure of society. Liberal position does “imagine a time in the (future) when this structure will have been improved, but they project this utopian condition into the *remote* future, in such a way as to discourage any effort in the present to realize it”.⁹³ Radicals and Anarchists believe in the necessity of structural transformation. Radicals aim at completely transforming society whereas Anarchists aim at abolishing it. Thus, Radicals “view the utopian condition as *imminent*” whereas Anarchists “idealize a *remote* past of natural-human innocence”.⁹⁴

To sum up; explanation by emplotment determines the kind of story being told, the structure of the plot whether it is Romance, Satire, Tragedy or Comedy. Explanation by formal argument determines the explanatory strategies employed by the historian, the way in which past events, acts and actors are brought together within the story whether it is formist, organicist, mechanistic or contextualist. Explanation by ideological position determines the attitude of the narrative with respect to change whether it is Conservative, Liberal, Radical or Anarchist. White argues that “the types of interpretive strategies identified are structurally homologous. ..Their homology can be graphically represented in the following table of correlations.

Mode of Emplotment	Mode of Explanation	Mode of Ideology
Romance	Formist	Anarchist
Comedy	Organicist	Conservative

⁹² *Ibid.*; 25

⁹³ *Ibid*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Tragedy	Mechanistic	Radical
Satire	Contextualist	Liberal ⁹⁵

White does not of course suggest that such correlations appear in every historical work but rather that there is a recurrence of patterns in the historical work analyzed. White's work brings forth important questions with respect to historical analysis and demonstrates the processes that the past has to undergo in order to become history. As Jenkins states; "The past has occurred. It has gone and history is what historians make of it when they go to work."⁹⁶ Stories of the past with its plot structures, explanatory forces, and ideological implications cannot be excavated from archives, evidences and facts as ready narratives. As demonstrated in this section, the facts of the past as found in archives are turned into histories by employing a plethora of strategies none of which are value-free.

As Munslow states, "history does not pre-exist in any body of facts that will allow unmediated access to *the* real past. History as opposed to the past, is a literary creation because it is always interpreted through textualized relics which themselves are only to be understood through layers of interpretation as the historian's facts".⁹⁷ If history is a literary creation, a construct, a discourse on the past then the meaning of historiography, historiographical debates, periods and concepts also need to be problematized. The next section will elaborate on what historiography means and how historiographical debates should be understood and analyzed.

V. HISTORY AS HISTORIOGRAPHY

This section will focus on the meaning of historiography. Problematizing the concept of history opens up the discussion for what historiography means as well. Thus, this section will focus on the meaning of historiography and the nature and role of historiographical debates, periods and concepts.

⁹⁵ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 70

⁹⁶ Jenkins, *Rethinking History*, 8

⁹⁷ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 33

As argued in earlier sections history and the past are not equal. Past events are transformed into histories through a myriad of strategies such as explanation by emplotment, explanation by formal argument and explanation by ideology. History is a discourse about the past but it is not a static one but rather “a shifting discourse constructed by the historians and that from the existence of the past no one reading is entailed: change the gaze, shift the perspective and new readings appear”.⁹⁸ All the possible readings of the past constitute historiography. In that sense, history is historiography because “historiography is, in its essence, the making of narratives”.⁹⁹ Thus; “history should be seen as what it manifestly is : a written discourse about the past and pre-existing narratives. Strictly speaking, then, there is no history only historiography defined as what we write about the past in order to understand it”.¹⁰⁰ It is because history is historiography that historiographical debates are not about facts of the past but about the interpretations of the past (history). As Munslow states;

“Not only do historians describe what happened, they also debate the meaning of their 'American Revolution' or 'Enlightenment' against that of others in a coherent and plausible fashion in terms that encompass far more than reference to the sources. Unless there is a legitimate debate on the veracity of a particular source as used by an individual historian, what is contested in history are the products of the historians' webs of imaginative connections and their concepts, not just their propositional sentences”.¹⁰¹

The differentiation between history and historiography is made to delimit the writing of history from *history-as-past* concept in that historiography is the history of historical writing and history is the writing of the past. This difference is constituted in order to constitute the past and History as a unified concept. Historiography is based upon the notion that history is a reproduction of the past it works to fill in the blanks of the history already written;

“the basis of research is 'hard' fact derived from the critical sifting of sources, and the purpose of historiography is either to furnish narrative accounts and 'thick descriptions' of documented facts or to submit the historical record to analytic procedures of hypothesis-

⁹⁸ Jenkins, *Rethinking History*, 16

⁹⁹ Munslow, *The New History*, 157

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 164

formation, testing, and explanation. The historical imagination is limited to plausibility filling gaps in the record, and 'throwing new light' on a phenomenon requires the discovery of hitherto unknown information. It does not mean seeing the phenomenon differently or transforming our understanding of it through reinterpretation. Indeed all sources tended to be treated in narrowly documentary terms, that is, in terms of factual and referential propositions that may be derived from them to provide information about specific times and places".¹⁰²

The writing of history and historiography are coterminous in that the writing of history aims to 'fill in the blanks' of the history already written. The historiography of a subject provides the historian with the road map of what has been argued, the interpretations of events and possible future research areas. Historiography thus also disciplines the writing of history in that what is to be written, the 'periods' to be focused upon, the terminology of the interpretations are already determined and the historian only works to fill in the blanks and and/or reinterpret the past. Historiography "makes possible certain researches through the fact of common conjunctures and problematizes. But it makes others impossible; it excludes from discourse what its basis at a given moment; it plays the role of a censor with respect to current - social, economic, political - postulates of analysis"¹⁰³. Historiography constructs the borders of the historiographical debate and centers the understanding of the past to specific concepts, events, actors by privileging them and their interpretations. Furthermore, these debates construct periods and concepts of the past whereby the discourses of the past come to be seen as if they were the past silencing other possible renditions. Thus;

"If a narrative substance becomes widely accepted by the historians it sometimes looks *as if* there really was a Renaissance out there and it has been *discovered*. But all that is actually going on here is the widespread acceptance of a *proposed* way of thinking through an ultimately arbitrary analytical category; nothing else".¹⁰⁴

Ankersmit argues that 'concepts' such as the Enlightenment, Renaissance or the Cold War are not concepts but 'images' or 'pictures' of the past because "such concepts do *not* refer to things in or aspects of the past" but rather "to narrative *interpretations* of the past".¹⁰⁵ Thus "the 'Renaissance', 'the Cold War' and so

¹⁰² Dominik LaCapra, *History and Criticism*. (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1985), 17

¹⁰³ Michel DeCerteau, *The Writing of History* (NY : Columbia University Press, 1988), 68

¹⁰⁴ Jenkins, *Refiguring History*, 50

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 93

on, are constructed or postulated, but have not been discovered in the historical past”.¹⁰⁶ As Ankersmith explains;

“such notions as The Renaissance, etc, should thus be seen as the *analytical* names of narrative substances, and thus, as far as reference is concerned, they must be denied the capacity to refer to anything outside of the text: they refer *only* to *narrative substances*, that is, a set of statements contained by the text. For what prevents such narrative substances from referring outside of themselves is because the Renaissance, say, didn't actually exist to so refer to. Which means that narrative substances are only ever analytically ‘true’ *via* the texts’ internal statements and never externally (synthetically) true because there is no Enlightenment ‘out there’ for them to correspond to *before* the narrative substance creates it as a collective/proper noun for *its* set of statements”.¹⁰⁷

Historiography presents the different views and interpretations about same or similar past events but in doing so distinguishes between history and History. Thus, “although there are multiple interpretations, there is only one (hi)story; although there are partial histories, there is only one Great Story as their large context because there is only one Great past”.¹⁰⁸ As Berkhofer explains; “the Great Story, or what others might call the ‘metastory’ or the ‘metatext’ applies both to the larger context of the partial histories and to the whole past conceived as history that justifies the synthetic expositions of normal historians.¹⁰⁹” Berkhofer gives the example of the blind sages describing the different parts of the elephant but all of them still describing the elephant. The way in which history disciplines the past and constructs the basic tenets of historiography delimits the borders of what History is whereby historiographical debates are conditioned by the assumption that all that can be analyzed is the different interpretations of the elephant, limiting and excluding the possibilities of a myriad of Great Stories.

To conclude, problematizing history demonstrates how the ‘differences’ between history and historiography are constructed in a further attempt to discipline and center the understanding of the past. History is used to order, define, limit the past and in turn historiography is used to discipline history. Opening up the definition of history underlines the fact that both history and historiography are constructs

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.177

¹⁰⁷ Ankersmith *Historical Representation* cited in Jenkins, 52

¹⁰⁸ Robert Berkhofer, *Beyond the Great Story : History as Text and Discourse* (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1995), 56

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*; 38

and as such both constructions are done for a purpose. Problematizing the meaning of history and as a consequence of historiography makes it possible to question the centering effect of history on the past.

VI. DECENTERING HISTORY

This chapter has focused upon the different ways of understanding the past, history and historiography. The problem of history is not one with a straightforward answer, nor is the writing of history solely about collecting facts. Problematizing the concepts of the past, history and historiography aids in decentering the notion of History and the notion of the Great Story. As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate there is more than one possible story about the past and the past itself is not centered. Moreover, transforming the past into histories is not only about transcribing past events, it is a process that involves a myriad of strategies. The problem of history outlined in this chapter needs to be brought in the field of IR in order to open up not only the field's history of itself but also its attempts to decenter IR.

History disciplines the past and the dominant discourses on the past that constitute the historiography of a period, a concept, an event discipline and delimit the boundaries of the field. Unless history itself is problematized, the history IR discusses and uses is one that has been closed off, the boundaries established and already centered. Thus if the field of IR is to be decentered, one of the first steps necessary is to decenter history and problematize why, how and when it disciplines the past. As Munslow states;

“History is no longer defined then by the established categories of analysis - economic structures, competing nationalisms, political and cultural revolutions, the march and opposition of ideas, great men and women, periods of excess and ages of equipoise, republics and monarchies, empires and dynasties, famines and plagues - but instead by how societies interpret, imagine, create, control, regulate and dispose of knowledge, especially through the claims of disciplines to truth, authority and certainty”.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 124-5.

History is a discourse used to discipline the past. It organizes, limits, and defines, the past according to the question of the present. Thus problematizing history means that the field of IR can also problematize these discourses and open up the discussions on the past going beyond the limits imposed on the past. The next section will focus upon the way in which Great Stories of IR have been told and resisted. The discussion will first elaborate on the Great Story of the field of IR and then move to discuss the Great Stories of the main concepts such as international system, sovereignty and security that have defined the field and the ways in which these stories have been resisted. As will be expanded upon these resistances and problematizations of the Great Stories have been through reinterpreting history, past events, acts, actors that have been silenced and/or excluded from the discourses on the past.

CHAPTER II: STORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

“When shall I begin, please your Majesty?” he asked.
“Begin at the beginning” the King said very gravely, “and go on
till you come to the end: then stop”.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Lewis Carrol, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* (Mineola, New York : Dover Publications, INC, 2001),

“Once upon a time, in a far away land...”

The role of stories in our imaginations is not only to tell tales of far away magical lands but also to bring sequential order to events, to define who we are, where we belong and where we intend to go. It is within that tradition of storytelling that every story has a beginning, development and end. Stories present a well-ordered and resolved narrative of events, issues and actors. As discussed in the earlier chapter history is a *retelling of a story* of the past. The past is ordered through narrativization and there are a myriad of possible narratives about any given event, issue and actor. This chapter will focus on the stories of international relations whether it is of the field or of the cornerstones of the field such as the international system, the Westphalian state or security.

The traditional story of IR adheres to the main tenets of storytelling; a meta-narrative of linear progression divided into periods, with a clear beginning, identifiable ‘debates’ that develop the field, and an end? The story of IR is centred upon the ‘three great debates’. It begins at the origins and presents the birth of the field. It was 1919 and the ‘world’ had just come out of a lengthy and devastating war. The field was set up to deal with the main issues that dominated world politics; mainly how to prevent war. But there was a big disagreement between the ‘realists’ and the ‘utopians’. Utopians did not understand that international affairs had to be analysed not as one wished it to be but as it ‘really’ was. This was not a fairytale and wishing for peace and effective international institutions did not change ‘reality’ of power politics and international anarchy. The ‘first great debate’ ended in the mid-1940s with a clear victory for the realists. In the aftermath of a second lengthy and devastating war the realists set out to establish the field of IR analysing the world as it is and attempting to find answer to the age old problem of war. The ‘realists’ were on their way to establishing the field of IR and make it a “science” when they encountered resistance and thus started the ‘second great debate’. The debate was between the ‘traditionalists’ and behaviouralists. The main issue was how will the field of IR analyse the existing international affairs. The traditionalists, as is clear from the name, argued in

favour of traditional methods that would have prevented IR from becoming a science and stop the progress of the field whereas the behaviouralists argued in favour of adopting the methods of 'true sciences' hence elevating the field of IR into a science. According to the story, this debate is won by the behaviouralists and they set out to draw the parameters of the scientific field of IR. The 'third great debate' is also called the inter-paradigm debate because the main issue of contention was more about the priorities accorded to subjects of analysis. This debate ends in what might be termed a draw with a synthesis between the neo-realists and liberal institutionalists. The 'great third debate' sometimes is not taken as the inter-paradigm debate but as the debate between rationalists and reflectivists.¹¹² The reflectivists rejected the very 'reality' upon which the field had been established and challenged the core assumptions of the field. The ending in this version of this story has a strand of the reflectivist group - constructivists - breaking off from the reflectivists in an attempt to find a 'middle ground'¹¹³ and the assumption that the poststructuralist approach can make no claim to scientific inquiry and is best ignored.¹¹⁴

There are several consequences to telling the story as it was outlined above. Firstly, there is the problem caused by the temporal delimitation that silences the discussions that occurred before the 'origin'. As Schmidt has shown starting the field in 1919 results in ignoring a wide variety of discussions on sovereignty and anarchy.¹¹⁵ Secondly, the structure caricaturizes the schools of thought and the wide array of discussions that they started. The realists, idealists, traditionalists are all reduced to one line summaries that obscures the complicated nature of the

¹¹² It should be noted that within classical accounts the three debates structure does not alter. Either the inter-paradigm debate or the rationalist/reflectivist debate is taken but the structure of three remains; the beginning, the development and the end. For an account that deals with four debates see Ole Wæver, "Figures of international thought: introducing persons instead of paradigms", in, ed. Marysia Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-40

¹¹³ For further discussion on the 'middle ground' see: Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Affairs*, 3:3 (1997): 319-363 and Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

¹¹⁴ For a discussion on how the debates in general and especially the discussions on the third debate are used to police what is acceptable IR research see; Steve Smith, "The discipline of international relations: still an American social science", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2:3 (Oct. 2000):374-402.

¹¹⁵ Brian Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998)

discussions. Thirdly, the structure of the debates serves to privilege one theoretical approach over others. Even the naming of the ‘debates’ demonstrated who was doing the defining and the power structures inherent in that endeavor. The ‘utopians’ denotes a group that had impractical and idealistic notions of world politics whereas ‘traditional’ denotes backwardness and resistance to development. Furthermore, in the case of the first debate it is questionable to what extent it took place and to what extent it was part of victors history.¹¹⁶ As Booth states; “The Carr/Davies story was simplified and twisted, and became a myth. It helped create and sustain the view that the academic subject of International Politics was about ‘power politics’ between states and could only be respectably studied from a ‘realist’ perspective”.¹¹⁷ Fourthly, it limits the discursive space for discussing the field.¹¹⁸ As Waever states, “It makes a difference whether one tries to operate in today's IR according to an understanding of this as ‘after the third debate’ or ‘after the fourth debate’”.¹¹⁹ Thus the structure of the ‘great debates’ story, what was included/excluded, who won and lost, the meaning laden names all affect the nature of the discussion on IR.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ For further discussion see; Peter Wilson, “The Myth of the “First Great Debate””, *Review of International Studies*, 24:5 (1998): 10-12, Lucian M. Ashworth, “Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations” *International Relations*, 16:1 (2002), Cameron G. Thies, “Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate”, *European Journal of International Relations* 8:2 (2002), Joel Quirk and Darhan Vigneswaran, “The construction of an edifice: the story of a First Great debate”, *Review of International Studies*, 31 (2005): 89-107; Lucian Ashworth, ‘Where are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?’, *Review of International Studies*, 32:2 (2006): 291-308; Brian Schmidt, ‘Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 42:3 (1998): 433-459; Brian C. Schmidt, ‘On the History and Historiography of International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 3-28; Nicholas Guilhot, ‘The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory’, *International Political Sociology* 4:2 (2008): 281-304; Nicholas Guilhot, ed. *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Brian C. Schmidt, ed., *International Relations and the First Great Debate* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).

¹¹⁷ Ken Booth, “75 Years On Rewriting the Subject's Past - Reinventing its Future”, in Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, 329

¹¹⁸ This is reflected in the TRIP Scholar Survey where the most influential scholars in the IR field in the past 20 years are identified as; Alexander Wendt, Robert Keohane, Kenneth Waltz, Joseph Nye, see Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson and Michael J.Tierney, *Teaching, research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project*. Virginia: The College of William and Mary, 2012, Accessed at: <http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/TRIPAroundTheWorld2011.pdf>, p.49

¹¹⁹ Waever, “Figures of international thought: introducing persons instead of paradigms”, in Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, 9

¹²⁰ Approaching the field in such a deterministic fashion is one of the reasons for the “End of IR theory” debate. If there is no grand debate to define the parameters of the field, then can there be IR theory as there was when the great debates occurred. For further on the issue of ‘End of IR Theory?’ see Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, ‘Special Issue: The End of International

The ‘great debates’ are stories told and retold, myths that have been established, ‘traditions’ invented that have come to define the field. In its attempt to write its own history IR has also constructed it.¹²¹ This approach draws the boundaries of IR discourse¹²² and establishes the hegemony of specific concepts and perspectives and determines the hierarchies within the discursive field.¹²³ The writing of history constructs the past and in that process disciplines it. The ‘traditional’ or the dominant story of IR works to define not only the field but also the important concepts, the evolutions, the schools and perspectives included and

Relations Theory?’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 19:3 (2013): 405-665. The debate had already ignited responses and discussions within the blogosphere before the publication of the special issue; Felix Berenskoetter, “The End of IR Theory As We Know it...” *The Disorder of Things*, 3 August 2012, Accessed from : <http://thedisorderofthings.com/2012/08/03/the-end-of-ir-theory-as-we-know-it/> ; Stephen Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind: What’s wrong with IR scholarship today”, *Foreign Policy*, January 4, 2013, Accessed from: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/04/leaving_theory_behind ; Steve Saideman, “Lamenting the Loss of Light, The Ebbing of Grand Theory and The Decline of Old Boys Network”, January 5, 2013, Accessed from: <http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/01/lamenting-the-loss-of-the-light-the-ebbing-of-grand-theory-and-the-decline-of-old-boy-networks.html> ; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, “I Can Has IR Theory”, *The Duck of Minerva Working paper*, 1:2013, <http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Jackson-Nexon-DoM-WP-1.2013.pdf>. Furthermore, the debate continued within the blogosphere whereby a symposium was held by the Duck of Minerva site; The ‘End of IR Theory?’ Symposium, Duck of Minerva, 5 September – 18 September 2013, Accessed from: <http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/09/special-event-the-end-of-ir-theory-symposium.html>. Another intervention into the debates about the ‘great debates’ was made by Brian C. Schmidt on E-IR: Brian C. Schmidt, ‘The End of Great Debates’, *E-International Relations*, 2 February 2014, Accessed from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/02/the-end-of-great-debates/>.

¹²¹ Waever argues that a dialogical relationship exists whereby ‘the ‘debates’ operate as a dialectic between implicit pictures and articulate self-representations of the discipline. In part, they are implicit operators in (and thereby shape) actual academic practice, in part they are constructed and artificially imposed on much more diverse activities. Each of the debates first emerged as a constellation, an implicit picture. Then, the second step, this constellation was labeled, this reinforced it as a constellation, but also shaped the phase of moving beyond it, because that phase was defined in relation to this picture of the discipline’, in Waever, “Figures of international thought: introducing persons instead of paradigms”, in Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, 9

¹²² This term is adopted from Krishna’s use of IR discourse, ‘I deliberately use IR discourse rather than IR theory, IR literature, or just IR in order to inflect theory, discipline, or any social narrative with considerations of power’, Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations”, in Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*, 106.

¹²³ For further discussion on the discussion of a dominant discourse on IR see; Steve Smith, “The discipline of international relations: still an American social science”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2:3 (Oct. 2000):374-402; Ole Waever “The Sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in international relations”, *International Organization*, 52 (1998): 687-727; Anna M.Agathangelou and L.H.M Ling, “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poiesies of Worldism”, *International Studies Review* 6 (2004): 21-49; John M. Hobson and J. C. Sharman (2005) ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change,’ *European Journal of International Relations* 11(1): 63–98.

excluded.¹²⁴ Despite this hegemonic structure there are sites of resistance where renegotiation of the main concepts and perspectives happen and the hierarchical structure is questioned. There is no one story of IR but a myriad of stories, thus this study does not take the ‘origins’ story as its starting point but treats IR as a discursive space constituted by a number of different stories enabling a broadening of the analytical field beyond the paradigm debates. Looking beyond the ‘origins’ story enables one to access the sites of resistance and engage with the criticism coming from the margins about the hierarchical and Western-centric nature of the debate. There are two levels to this hierarchy; the nature of the field is hierarchic and secondly the debates and narratives of the field produce/reproduce this hierarchy. As Tickner states; “as a social practice IR constitutes a space in which certain understandings of the world dominate others, specific interests are privileged over others, and practices of power and domination acquire a normative form”.¹²⁵ The story of IR is based on a specific understanding of its past yet it is presented as the Great Story of the field. This privileges one understanding of the past over other possible understandings of the past. Thus it needs to be underlined that there is more than one story that can be told about the origins and development of the field. The traditional story of IR is one possible story of the field. There are other possible stories and discursive spaces that resist, question and disrupt the Great Story of IR.

The dominant IR discourse is premised on specific stories of the international system, of Westphalian state sovereignty and of security. These stories constitute the cornerstones of the western-centrism of IR thus discussing the other possible stories of the field is an important step in decentering IR. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the ways in which the dominant and privileged stories of the international system, of the state and of security were disrupted.

II. STORIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

¹²⁴ Agathangelou and Ling, ‘The House of IR’,

¹²⁵ Arlene Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World”, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 32:2 (2003): 300

This section focuses on the stories of the international system and how the Great Story of the expansion of the international system predicated upon a specific understanding of the ‘rise of the West’ and centering of European history has been disrupted. The narrative of the expansion and establishment of the International System is a constitutive part of the discourses of IR¹²⁶. It is a Western centric narrative focusing on the West, its history, its actions, events that shaped it and the manner in which these were exported to the rest of the world¹²⁷. This story is emplotted as a romantic tale of the protagonist (the West in this case) overcoming obstacles and final victory over its circumstances. The predominant understanding of IR is premised on a very limited understanding not only of world history but also European history. Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that this one story is presented as the universal story without acknowledging that there are multiple stories present or that the stories themselves are connected. Focusing on the development of the international system based solely on a certain understanding of European history obscures other stories and voices. Thus the assumption that this is West’s story to tell is a problematic one.

“The present international political structure of the world – founded upon the division of mankind and of the earth into separate states, their acceptance of one another’s sovereignty, of principles of law regulating their coexistence and co-operation, and of diplomatic conventions facilitating their intercourse – is, at least in its most basic features, the legacy of Europe’s now vanished ascendancy. Because it was in fact Europe and not America, Asia, or Africa that first dominated and, in so doing, unified the world, it is not our perspective but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric”.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (Basingstoke : Macmillan Press, 1995) ; Adam Watson ‘European International Society and its Expansion’, in eds, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1984) ; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Analysis* (New York : Routledge, 1992)

¹²⁷ As Buzan and Little state ; ‘the English School assessment is deeply suspect and indeed serves to reproduce a powerful Eurocentric myth that was established in the nineteenth century and then perpetuated in the twentieth century.’, in Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “World History and the Development of non-Western International Relations theory”, in eds., Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya, *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, 199.

¹²⁸ Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ‘Introduction’, in eds., Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. *The Expansion of International Society*, 2.

The above quote from Bull and Watson, the forefathers of the English school¹²⁹, demonstrates the understanding rooted in IR discourse about the development of the international system; that it was West's story to tell ignoring the myriad of ways in which the interaction with the East co-constituted that story. As Seth states; "any satisfactory account of the emergence of the modern international system cannot simply chart how an international society that developed in the West radiated outwards, but rather seek to explore the ways in which international society was shaped by the interactions between Europe and those it colonized".¹³⁰

Furthermore, it needs to be underlined that this Eurocentric account of the international system is constitutive of the field and defines the boundaries of the discourse on IR. The silences and omissions from the story of the development of the international system condition the manner in which concepts of the international, security, sovereignty and democracy are defined. As such retelling the story as it has been reproduces the implicit hierarchies inscribed within the narrative and continues to silence alternative voices. It needs to be highlighted "how some of the critical conceptual binding blocks of IR discourse – sovereignty, property, nationness, and international law, to mention some – were all emergent in the encounter between the West and the third world".¹³¹ The narrative of the expansion of the international society works in many levels; the teleological rise of the West narrative, the unproblematic and linear rendering of European history, the silencing of events, issues and perspectives from the 'expansion' narrative.

¹²⁹ For more on the English school see: Tim Dunne, "The Social Construction of International Society", *European Journal of International Relations*, 1:3 (1995): 367-89; Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004); Andrew Linkater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations : A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006) ; Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzales-Pelaez, eds., *International Society and the Middle East : English School Theory at the Regional Level* (Basingstoke : Palgrave, 2009) ; Cornelia Navari, *Theorising International Society : English School Methods* (Basingstoke : Palgrave, 2009).

¹³⁰ Sanjay Seth, 'Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations', *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 40:1 (2011): 174

¹³¹ Sankaran Krishna, 'Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations', *Alternatives* 26 (2001) : 408.

Stories of international relations, of the international society and IR theory are based upon a story that has Europe at its center, a story that edits out the disruptions and constructs a linear unproblematic tale of the ‘rise of the West’, ‘the expansion of International Society’, ‘the origins of the state system, the ‘establishment of democracy’. The stories might have different titles and might prioritize different aspects; the story of security, the story of the state, the story of the international yet the periodisations, the events and setting is dependent upon a specific understanding of European history. Narratives of international society and its expansion rest upon an implicit and at times explicit reliance on a linear story of the ‘rise of the West’ which has a ‘triumphalist teleology’;

“with Ancient Greece, progressing on to the European agricultural revolution in the low middle ages, then on to the rise of the Italian-led commerce at the turn of the millennium. The story continues on into the high middle ages when Europe rediscovered pure Greek ideas in the Renaissance which, when coupled with the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment and the rise of democracy, propelled Europe into industrialization and capitalist modernity”.¹³²

John Hobson in ‘Eastern Origins of Western Civilization’ problematizes this narrative and demonstrates the ways in which Eastern civilization played a role. His aim is to “counter one of Eurocentrism's most basic assumptions - that the east has been a passive bystander in the story of world historical development as well as a victim or bearer of Western power, and that accordingly it can be legitimately marginalized from the progressive story of world history”.¹³³ Thus; “these two interrelated claims - Eastern agency and the assimilation of advanced Eastern ‘resource portfolios’ via oriental globalisation on the one hand, entwined with European agency/identity and the appropriation of Eastern resources on the other - constitute the discovery of the lost story of the rise of the oriental West”.¹³⁴ As Hobson argues, the questions we ask and the boundaries of the inquiries we set need to be altered. Asking why it was the West rather than the East conditions that the answer “attribute permanent positive characteristics to the West and permanent negative features to the East”.¹³⁵ Thus he proposes asking more “temporally relativist questions” which will not “obscure the alternative Eastern

¹³² John Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10

¹³³ *Ibid.*; 4

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*; 5

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*; 299

story” but rather “bring the East back from the marginalised edge or dark ghetto it was consigned to by the Eurocentric world history”.¹³⁶ Hobson’s work is important in problematizing the linear and teleological ‘rise of the West’ narrative.¹³⁷

Furthermore, the narrative of the expansion itself ignores the perspectives of the states the international society expanded into. As Suzuki states “many non-European states which were incorporated into European International Society in the course of European imperialism did not only witness the norms of ‘toleration’ and ‘coexistence’. They also witnessed the European International Society which often aggressively intervened in their land in order to bring them closer to ‘civilization’”.¹³⁸ In that sense, telling the story of the evolution of the international system without incorporating that it happened at the same time as imperialism and the perspectives of the non-Western states presents an incomplete picture. The reasons why the non-Western states joined the international society was not always as straightforward as accepting Western norms. It needs to be underlined that;

“The outlook of many non-European states on international politics and the reconfigurations of their domestic structures were likely to have reflected the different norms which governed their relations with European powers, as well as their own interpretations, rather than simply reflecting ‘the dominant European standard of “civilization”’.¹³⁹

Joining the international society was also part of a strategy to overcome the insecurities created by the Western states, the treaty system and the fact that relations among ‘civilized’ states was conducted according to different rules.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ It needs to be underlined that the ‘rise of the West’ narrative had been problematized before Hobson within the field of ‘world history’ but Hobson’s work has been crucial in bringing in those perspectives into IR discourse. For works that have problematized the narratives see : Martin Bernal, *Black Athena, I* (London : Vintage, 1991) ; Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony : The World System A.D. 1250-1350* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1989) ; C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 : Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford : Blackwell, 2004) ; Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence : China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2000).

¹³⁸ Shogo Suzuki, ‘Japan’s Socialisation into Janus-Faced European International Society,’ *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 :1 (2005) : 147. Also see : Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire : China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society* (London and New York : Routledge, 2009).

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*; 148

As Ringmar¹⁴⁰ argues the way in which China and Japan had scripted what space meant and how the entities in it were defined structured their understanding of sovereignty and performances within the respective international system. He argues that, it was the Europeans insistence that their relationship be governed according to the Westphalian script that forced Chinese and Japanese systems to rescript their conceptualizations. Despite these rescriptings, the Chinese “never managed to fully switch frames and their mastery of the Westphalian scripts was incomplete at best”¹⁴¹ and because their idea of sovereignty was closer to the one of Western sovereignty “the new Japan that emerged was a more dedicated member of the Westphalian system than Qing dynasty China”.¹⁴² The success of the rescripting was as much dependent on their own conceptualizations of sovereignty than any Western action. As Ringmar states; “The model that had placed the Chinese sun as its symbolic center could not easily be traded in for a model in which China was merely one billiard ball among others following an independent path” whereas “the way the Tokugawa system was performed made it resemble the Westphalian system in a number of respects”.¹⁴³

The linear rendering of the expansion of the international society overlooks two essential points. Firstly, that the international system was also an imperial one. Secondly, that the imperial West was the determinant of the rules of the game. The story of the international system can not only be told through the expansion of the norms and values of the West but the different strategies developed by the Eastern states and how and why they chose to become part of that international system also needs to be told. As Zarakol states;

“outcomes taken to be functionally determined by Western observers are often the result of long considered and contested deliberations by local actors, and what are considered to be domestic failures (by both local and international observers) were often much more contingent on international social dynamics than is usually assumed”.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Erik Ringmar, ‘Malice in Wonderland : Dreams of the Orient and the Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor in China, *Journal of World History*, 22 :2 (2011) : 273-298 ; ‘Inter-Textual Relations : The Quarrel Over the Iraq War as a Conflict between Narrative Types’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 41 :4 (2006) : 403-421 ; ‘Liberal Barbarism and the Oriental Sublime : The European Destruction of the Emperor’s Summer Palace’, *Millennium Journal of International Relations*, 34 :3 (2006) : 917-933 ; ‘Performing International Systems: Two East Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order’, *International Organization*, 66 (2012): 1-25.

¹⁴¹ Ringmar, ‘Performing International Systems’, 17

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*; 17-18

¹⁴⁴ Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 243

Furthermore, the story of the international system is told based on a specific understanding of European history that is itself in need of questioning. As Halperin states; “theories about the structures, processes, and events that define and recur within the international realm are based to a large extent on the history of the European states system and its role in world affairs since the sixteenth century”.¹⁴⁵ She problematizes the myths of European history such as the story of European democracy, revolutions and the industrial revolution. With respect to the industrial revolution she argues that the popular account of the bourgeois revolutions of the middle classes’ “struggle for state power against merchant and financial monopolists” is inaccurate, “it was the aristocracy that led and won the revolt against absolutism both in Britain and elsewhere in Europe” and “the aristocracy remained the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”.¹⁴⁶ She concludes that “political institutions in nineteenth-century Europe were established by elites for the purpose of preserving and extending their social and economic power and, as a result, were continually compromised and undermined by efforts to preserve privilege and to forestall the acquisition of power by subordinate groups and classes”.¹⁴⁷ Thus the story of Europe’s past itself needs to be problematized as it “transforms Europe’s brutal expansion and political-military hegemony into a story of enlightenment and progress”.¹⁴⁸ As demonstrated by Halperin¹⁴⁹ there are more than one possible stories of Europe’s past that can be narrated. Privileging certain events, actors and issues while incorporating ‘European history’ into IR excludes events, actors and issues that do not fit within the constructed narrative.

The processes, structures, and actors privileged by a Eurocentric understanding of the international system delineates events that do not ‘fit’ within the definitions of these structures and actors as not part of the story as with the story of the Concert of Europe that brought peace and stability which “neglects to portray imperialism

¹⁴⁵ Halperin, ‘International Relations Theory and the Hegemony of Western Conceptions of Modernity’, in Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*, 43

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*; 52

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*; 57

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ For further on Halperin’s argument see ; Sandra Halperin, *War and Social Change in Modern Europe : The Great Transformation Revisited* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003).

as a violent process or colonial governance as institutionalized violence”.¹⁵⁰ Characterizing the period from 1815 to 1914 as peaceful requires ignoring a series of wars, mutinies and conquests. But they do not ‘count’ and hence can not disrupt the “Hundred Years Peace” because “wars are defined exclusively as the acts of sovereign powers on each other” and as a result “the Revolt of 1857 that swept across northern India, that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, and that at one point looked likely to bring a forcible end to the British Raj there does not count” rather it becomes “a mere “Mutiny” ..a “domestic” issue by its very definition incapable of altering the Hundred Years’ Peace”.¹⁵¹ A similar construction of a period of peace is made with respect to the Cold War¹⁵² in referring to it as the “Long Peace¹⁵³” focusing on the fact that the two superpowers did not directly engage in war yet it completely ignores the violent independence wars in the Third World.

Events that do not ‘fit’ into the linear narrative and have been edited out in order to center Europe have also been brought into the story. The narrative of the ‘Age of Revolutions’ centers upon the French and American revolutions and ‘Haiti was purposefully forgotten from historical memory as something unimaginable, unintelligible and unthinkable”.¹⁵⁴ Taking the Haitian Revolution out of the narrative of revolutions that paved the way for the establishment of the present understanding of human rights presents it as originating only from the West when “the Haitian Revolution properly belongs to the genealogy of modern conceptions of constitutional power, popular sovereignty and entitlements for the citizenry”.¹⁵⁵

The story of the international system is predominantly told based on a certain retelling of the European past and Western experience. As demonstrated in this

¹⁵⁰ Mark B. Salter, *Barbarians and Civilisation in International Relations* (Sterling, VA : Pluto Press, 2002), 37

¹⁵¹ Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations”, *Alternatives*, 26 (2001) : 404-405.

¹⁵² John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System”, *International Security*, 10:4 (1986): 99-142

¹⁵³ The characterization of the Cold War itself is problematic for the same reason, it characterizes a period solely based on the relationship between two superpowers ignoring other dynamics such as decolonization and the Third World that was an important part of the international system. More on this discussion in Chapter 3.

¹⁵⁴ Robbie Shilliam, ‘Civilization and the poetics of slavery’, *Thesis Eleven*, 108 (2012): 100

¹⁵⁵ Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, “Mind, Body, and Gut! Elements of a Postcolonial Human Rights Discourse”, in *Decolonizing International Relations*, 186

section, the story of the international system is predicated upon a limited interpretation of history which silences a variety of voices and presents a linear unproblematic narrative of European history and the international system. The story of the international system is constitutive of and is constituted by Western-centric narratives of processes, concepts and institutions. One of the main narratives that is interlinked with that of the international system is that of the story of the Westphalian state. Thus the next section will focus on the story of the Westphalian state and Westphalian sovereignty as it constitutes an essential part of the story of international relations.

III. STORIES OF STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY

The previous section discussed the ways in which the story of the international system can be retold in different manners. Since there are a myriad of stories of international system processes, actors, institutions linked to the story of international system also need to be disrupted. The story of the international system and its expansion is told in conjunction with the story of the Westphalian state and Westphalian sovereignty. Together these stories comprise the Westphalian International System that constitutes the cornerstone of the field of IR. This section will discuss the ways in which the story of the Westphalian states and sovereignty has been problematized. The story of the Westphalian state and sovereignty has been disrupted on a number of fronts¹⁵⁶. The first disruption questions not only whether state and sovereignty are Westphalian but also to what extent they are European. The second disruption focuses upon questioning the linear progression of the story especially by underlying the role of imperialism.

The designation of the Treaties of Westphalia as the origins of the state system is considered to be one of the “big bangs”¹⁵⁷ of the field. According to this story it

¹⁵⁶ For in depths analysis of the genealogy of sovereignty see : Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995) and also see Jens Bartelson, *A Critique of the State* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997) for discussion on how ‘critique’ itself can be a constitutive factor.

¹⁵⁷ Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths that Your Teachers Still Tell you about 1648 and 1919”, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 39:3 (2011): 735-758

was with the Treaties of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War that the concept of sovereignty and the international state system became established. This story “is a myth”¹⁵⁸ and as a “typical founding myth it opens up a neat account of how ‘classical’ European system, the prototype of the present international system came about” and “explains the origin of what are considered the main characteristics of that system, such as territoriality, sovereignty, equality and nonintervention”.¹⁵⁹

The Treaties of Westphalia should not be treated as the ‘beginning’ but rather should be “understood within a very complex story of advances, setbacks and messy entanglements of feudal suzerainty with rare elements of what we now call modern state sovereignty”.¹⁶⁰ Problematizing the temporal dimension opens up space for stories of state and sovereignty not limited by the “myth of 1648”¹⁶¹ and makes it possible to tell stories within any time frame before or after Westphalia but the story still takes place in Europe.

A further problematization is of the spatial dimension of the story. Rather than asking, “when was sovereignty” it needs to be asked, “‘where’ was sovereignty? and not simply ‘why’ but ‘how’ was sovereignty”?¹⁶² Thus the linear narrative of origins of state and sovereignty needs to be disrupted as well. Hobson questions this linear narrative by “provincializing Westphalia” and revealing “the manifold Eastern and global forces that informed the rise of sovereignty in Europe”.¹⁶³ He argues that sovereignty originated during the process of “oriental globalization”¹⁶⁴ and “eastern influences played an important role in shaping each of the sources of the sovereign state – economic, geopolitical/military, ideological/discursive and political”.¹⁶⁵ Hobson demonstrates the ways in which situating Europe at the

¹⁵⁸ Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth”, *International Organization*, 55:2 (2001): 251

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*; 266

¹⁶⁰ Cavalho, et.al, “The Big Bangs of IR”, 71

¹⁶¹ Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648 : Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London : Verso, 2003)

¹⁶² John Hobson, “Provincializing Westphalia: The Eastern Origins of sovereignty”, *International Politics*, 46 (2009): 673

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; 674

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*; 682

center of the story silences the influence of the East and how it was co-constitutive in the emergence of state and sovereignty.

The question of ‘where’ was sovereignty still focused on the origins story. Going beyond the origins story Shilliam questions the “historical narrative that assumed an unprecedented transformation of sovereignty from a (putatively) Westphalian territorial principle to a post-Westphalian extra-territorial principle”.¹⁶⁶ Thus he brings forth the story of Marcus Garvey and the UNIA¹⁶⁷ to demonstrate that the linear unproblematised passage from Westphalia to post-Westphalian order in Europe also needs to be problematized. The example of UNIA where “sovereignty was expressed through a political subject that took the form of an impersonal Pan-African collective¹⁶⁸” disrupts the story of the end of Westphalia that has come with the European Union. Shilliam also points out that “a number of trans-national and/or extra-territorial political and intellectual currents drove the political upheavals surrounding World War I”¹⁶⁹ hence problematizing the narrative of the development of the state in Europe and its passage to a post-Westphalian order in the post-Cold War period. Even if these movements were unsuccessful, “rather than being rendered invisible or as curiosities in a uni-linear narrative, the existence of the ‘marginal’ alternatives presented at the *fin-de-siecle* and their cumulative lived experiences should be taken as constitutive of the pre-existing and ongoing multi-linear transformation of sovereignty in the modern epoch”.¹⁷⁰

As with the story of the expansion of the international system, the travels of state and sovereignty cannot be narrated independent of imperialism. Since, “imperialism in its many forms was essential in shaping the character of both Europe and the non-European world; it is their common history”.¹⁷¹ If the state is taken “as an identity or agent, and sovereignty as an institution or discourse” that

¹⁶⁶ Robbie Shilliam, “What about Marcus Garvey? Race and the transformation of sovereignty debate”, *Review of International Studies*, 32 :3 (2006) : 380

¹⁶⁷ Universal Negro Improvement Association

¹⁶⁸ Shilliam, ‘What about Marcus Garvey’, 397

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; 381

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*; 400

¹⁷¹ Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 31 :1 (2002) :113

are “mutually constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation”¹⁷² then “neither state nor sovereignty should be assumed or taken as given, fixed or immutable”.¹⁷³ Neither state nor sovereignty remained fixed as it developed within Europe and neither did it travel in a linear unproblematic manner to the non-Europeans. Imperialism was an important part of the multitude of stories of state and sovereignty in and outside of Europe.

The story of the way in which state and sovereignty expanded to establish the international system assumed not only the uni-linearity of the process but also that it happened in an unproblematic manner. It also assumed that the decolonization process happened within the contours of international law ignoring that the story of international law and the codification of the rights of states and the extent of their sovereignty was also shaped by imperialism. As Anghie argues; “sovereignty is formulated in such a way as to exclude the non-European; following which, sovereignty can then be deployed to identify, locate, sanction and transform the uncivilized”.¹⁷⁴ The story of the manner in which sovereignty and state travelled is predicated on a story of international law that is itself Eurocentric and its decisions with respect to who gets to be a state and who has sovereignty privileges the European definition and imposes the ‘ideal’ set in Europe to be the aim. The “sovereignty doctrine expels the non-European world from its realm, and then proceeds to legitimise the imperialism that resulted in the incorporation of the non-European world into the system of international law”.¹⁷⁵ As a result of these dynamics, telling the story through the prism of international law and standards established by European states turns the story of the decolonization process and the post-colonial state to one of its lack, weakness, and failure. Thus, the post-colonial state is always in a process of trying to fulfill the main tenets of international law that will enable its joining of the Westphalian international system.

¹⁷² Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, “The Social Construction of state sovereignty”, in eds., Biersteker, Thomas and Cynthia Weber, *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*; 11

¹⁷⁴ Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 311

¹⁷⁵ Antony Anghie, “The Evolution of International Law: colonial and postcolonial realities” *Third World Quarterly*, 27:5 (2006): 739

The multitude of stories of decolonization and post-colonial state formation cannot be told without pointing out that, “sovereignty regimes reflect historical distributions of power and subjectivity within the international order and corresponding symbolic and material economies”.¹⁷⁶ In that vain, Grovogui brings forth the story of Namibia’s decolonization demonstrating how, “the UN debate concerning Namibia was driven primarily by the desire of Western nations to maintain the existing hierarchies of the international order and the attempt by Third World nations to subvert those structures”.¹⁷⁷ Through the story of Namibia, Grovogui challenges the story of the “failed state” by looking at “who failed the ‘failed state’”?¹⁷⁸ Focusing upon the power structures of the international system and the socio-historical context of the post-colonial state reveals a myriad of stories about state and sovereignty. As Bayart states;

“The passage to the State is neither in any way inevitable (the Igbo in the east of Nigeria have adopted another type of political organization, in spite of their degree of economic development and their entry into a prosperous commercial space), nor irreversible (the Kingo kingdoms and the Mandigo Empire in Mali have given way to segmentary societies). The oscillations are cumulative and belong to the *Longuee Duree*.¹⁷⁹”

Bringing in the stories of Eastern agency and demonstrating the ways in which state and sovereignty were (re)produced, negotiated and practiced in different contexts problematizes the linear narrative. The story of Westphalian state and sovereignty silences these stories and overlooks that “colonization did not radically weaken their ability to pursue their own strategies to produce their own modernity”.¹⁸⁰ On the contrary, there exists a plethora of stories with respect to how state and sovereignty were produced and how the international system is imagined as a result of the multitude of strategies adopted and the different ways in which relationships were defined with European states.

¹⁷⁶ Siba N. Grovogui, “Regimes of Sovereignty: International Morality and the African Condition”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 8:3 (2002): 328

¹⁷⁷ Siba N. Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 184.

¹⁷⁸ Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton, “Historicising the Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences?”, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:1 (2002) : 55-80.

¹⁷⁹ Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa*. (Polity Press, 2009), 16

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*; 20

To sum up, the story of Westphalian state and sovereignty has been challenged temporally and spatially problematizing not only the designation of Westphalia as a starting point but also Europe. Furthermore, the linear narrative of the development and ‘export’ of state and sovereignty have also been disrupted pointing especially to the manner in which imperialism and the power structure of the international system have been a formative part of the story. One of the central components of the story of the Westphalian international system is security. The story being that the international system is comprised of like units without any authority to dictate their actions the primary concern of the states within the system is ensuring their own survival hence establishing order and security. The next section will discuss the ways in which the story of security has been problematized.

IV. STORIES OF SECURITY

The story of security in the Westphalian international system was predicated upon the state and its survival, it was a story told mainly focusing upon military affairs of the Westphalian state. This story has been challenged mainly through the widening/broadening debate trying to bring in actors other than the state and concerns other than military ones into the narrative.¹⁸¹ What is broadly termed as ‘critical security studies’ includes within itself an array of approaches and perspectives to the main discussion points of security studies.¹⁸² The conventional narrative of critical security studies presents a map of the field spanning from Wales (Aberystwyth/Welsh School,¹⁸³) to Copenhagen (Copenhagen

¹⁸¹ Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

¹⁸² Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction* (NY: Routledge, 2010).

¹⁸³ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*. (London: UCL Press, 1997); Ken Booth, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed., (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne, 2005)

School/Securitization Theory¹⁸⁴) and to Paris (Paris School)¹⁸⁵. The CASE¹⁸⁶ (Critical Approaches to Security in Europe) collective argues “there is enough common ground between the researchers to facilitate constructive debate and to develop new conceptual tools and empirical research from the initial works”.¹⁸⁷ Thus the answers each approach gives to the main questions asked by the field of security studies differs with respect to which actors are privileged, which sectors are focused upon and the juxtaposition of the internal/external threats.

An important aspect of the widening/broadening debate is taking the individual as the referent object and not the state as ‘as states are unreliable providers of security’.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, within this understanding of security the state is approached with caution and security of the individual is prioritized.¹⁸⁹ By privileging the individual, this approach also focuses upon their emancipation. Booth argues that; “security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order. produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security”.¹⁹⁰

The use of the concept of emancipation has been criticized because it is;

¹⁸⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998)

¹⁸⁵ Didier Bigo, ‘Security and immigration. Towards a Critique of the governmentality of Unease’, *Alternatives* (Special Issue) 2002: 63-92; Didier Bigo and R.B.J Walker, ‘Security and Migration’, *Alternatives*, 27:1 (2002): 1-92.

¹⁸⁶ The CASE collective has been criticized for not including other critical and marginalized voices within their debate. For the criticism see: David Mutimer, ‘My Critique is Bigger than Yours: Constituting Exclusions in Critical Security Studies’, *Studies in Social Justice*, 3:1 (2009): 9-22; Andreas Behnke, ‘Presence and creation: A few (meta-)critical comments on the C.A.S.E manifesto’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:1 (2007) : 105-111; Mark Salter, ‘On exactitude in disciplinary science: A response to the networked manifesto’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:1 (2007): 113-122; Christine Sylvester, ‘Anatomy of a footnote’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:4 (2007): 547-558. For C.A.S.E Collectives response to the criticism see CASE Collective, ‘Europe, knowledge, politics: Engaging the limits: The CASE Collective responds’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:4 (2007): 559-576.

¹⁸⁷ CASE Collective, ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto’, *Security Dialogue*, 37 (2006): 450

¹⁸⁸ Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, *Review of International Affairs*, 17 :4(1991) : 319

¹⁸⁹ Wny Jones argues that; ‘Even if a very narrow, military understanding of security is applied, it is apparent that the arms purchased and powers accrued by governments in the name of national security are far more potent threats to the liberty and physical safety of their citizens than any putative external threat. When a broader definition of security that includes non-military threats is applied, it is clear that many states are deeply implicated in the creation of other forms of insecurity for their own populations, for example. in such issues as food and environmental security’ in Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 99.

¹⁹⁰ Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, 319

“an idea derived from the European Enlightenments. In this literature, the agent of emancipation is almost invariably the West, whether in the form of Western dominated international institutions, a Western-led global civil society, or the 'ethical foreign policies' of leading Western powers ... Even when the concrete agents of emancipation are not themselves Westerners, they are conceived of as the bearers of Western ideas, whether concerning economy, politics or culture”.¹⁹¹

Securitization theory on the other hand defines security as the construction of an issue in discourse as a threat. An issue or an event is not in and of itself included within the definition of ‘security’ but rather through its construction through a speech act. Thus, “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act.”¹⁹² The issue is ‘securitized’ when a political actor speaks of it as constituting an existential threat.¹⁹³ This extends the story of security beyond military affairs and enables an opening up of space where issues such as migration can also become part of the story. Securitization theory though explanatory in many ways has been criticised and expanded upon over the years. The main shortcomings of the theory are caused by the ‘narrowness’¹⁹⁴ of its assumptions. Alternatively, this narrowness can also be seen as the dominance of specific conceptualizations that leads to the privileging of certain dynamics, actors and voices over others.

The reliance on ‘speech act theory’ privileges certain forms of communication over others. What happens when other mediums of communication are utilised?¹⁹⁵ What happens when speaking security itself might put the speaker in danger or when the avenues for voicing security concerns are not open. As

¹⁹¹ Barkawi and Laffey, ‘The postcolonial moment in security studies’, 350

¹⁹² Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in ed., Ronnie Lipschutz, *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 35

¹⁹³ Buzan explains this process as; ‘The quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to address some objective threats that ‘really’ endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather it is to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.’ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 26.

¹⁹⁴ Matt McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 14 :4 (2008): 583-587.

¹⁹⁵ The focus in this section is on the ‘security as silence’ aspect of the debate but there have also been works that have pointed out and analyzed the importance of visual communication such as images. For further on this subject see; Michael C. Williams (2003) ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,’ *International Studies Quarterly*, 47:4 (2003) : 511-32.

Hansen's work focusing on the honour killings in Pakistan has shown, 'security as silence' might mean that "the potential subject of security has no, or limited, possibility of speaking its security problem"¹⁹⁶ and speaking of its security might aggravate the situation when for example "discursively acknowledging the rape, the woman in question runs a risk of being penalised herself".¹⁹⁷

The designation of when securitization occurs, the securitizing move, privileges dominant narrative of events and obscures the process of discursive constructions, historical narratives, socio-political conditions that constitute the space within which the 'move' is taking place. Thus as Bigo states; "securitization results from power positions, not from individuals creating new frames, new roles for differences and repetitions in different context; it results from struggles inside institutions and between institutions for what is to count as the legitimate truth".¹⁹⁸ The move itself conveys part of the story of how an issue became securitized. Securitization then should be situated in a longer time frame taking into account power relations, context and historical conditions. Focusing on the 'end' result of how the move happened obscures the conditions that enabled such a securitizing move. Why was an issue securitized and not others? Which actors did the securitizing move? Where there other voices silenced beforehand? Why did their attempts not succeed? Moreover, the focus on the 'move' itself imposes linearity to securitization in two respects. It obscures interactions between the securitizing actor, the issue, the marginalized voices and how the process redefines and reconstitutes each one.¹⁹⁹

The third privileging occurs with respect to Western centric conceptualizations of securitization. Wilkinson argues that securitization theory is limited by a 'Westphalian straitjacket' because of its reliance on "Euro-American assumptions

¹⁹⁶ Lene Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29 (2000): 294

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Bigo, 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', 74

¹⁹⁹ As Huysmans states, it 'leads to a downplaying of the internal relationship between a process of securitization and a process of identification of both agents (the self-understanding of state and society) and system (the specific organization of the relationship between these agents). (Securitization) ... simultaneously constructs the identity of the referent object (society, nation) and the agents speaking for that object (governments, bureaucrats, social movements, etc).' Jey Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:4 (1998) :494

about concepts such as society, identity and the state, combined with the presumption of Western democracy and primacy of the speech-act” which means that “particularly in a non-Western setting, security dynamics are edited and Westernized through the application of the theoretical framework”.²⁰⁰ Thus the manner in which concepts such as identity, society and politics is conceptualized is based on a Western bias. Furthermore, Wilkinson also criticizes the ‘speech act’ approach because it presupposes a democratic system of government where free speech is possible. But in non-Western settings speech might not always be possible because;

“significant sections of the population may not be afforded the ability to express societal security concerns actively (censorship, imprisonment, threats) or passively (political/social disenfranchisement). In such cases, other forms of expression may - or may not - be used to express security concerns: physical migration or protest actions, for example”.²⁰¹

This is another manifestation of the ‘silence as security’ dilemma or the issue of other forms of political communication.²⁰² Moreover, concentrating on ‘security studies’ within the prism of widening/broadening debate overlooks that what is being widened and broadened is an understanding of security derived from Western centric understanding of world politics and hence it might widen and broaden but it does not question the concept itself. Thus the discursive space of security studies that has formed around the discussion of specific questions, such as “whether to privilege the state as the referent object, whether to include internal as well as external threats, whether to expand security beyond the military sector and the use of force, and whether to see security as inextricably tied to a dynamic of threats, dangers and urgency”²⁰³ obscures how “the competing paradigms and

²⁰⁰ Claire Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Usable Outside Europe?’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:1 (2007): 22

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*; 12

²⁰² It should be noted that the assumptions that lead to the Western (free speech) non-Western (other forms of communication or even silence) dichotomy is also a Eurocentric bias and also a reaffirmation of the Westphalian straitjacket. Firstly, there is the assumption that the ‘form of government’ of a state directly correlates to the nature of a society where they are congruent with each other. There might be sub-societies or supra-societies (different spaces beyond the state) where free speech is not possible. Political, social and economic disenfranchisement is not only a condition of non-Western societies. Secondly, these non-democratic or disenfranchised spaces might not be able to join in the dominant debates and express their security concerns through protest actions; London uprisings or the Swedish uprisings.

²⁰³ Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security*, 10

divergent political persuasions that characterise contemporary security studies occupy a shared Eurocentric historical and geographic terrain”.²⁰⁴

As Bilgin argues; “the *historical absence* of non-Western insecurities has been *constitutive* both of the discipline and of subjects and objects of security in different parts of the world.”²⁰⁵ This historical absence cannot be remedied only through including the non-Western or making the non-Western more present, it needs to go “beyond adding and stirring”.²⁰⁶ In other words, it needs to be shaken, not stirred. Thus the task is to “uncover how security studies’ peripheral insight into non-Western insecurities has been constitutive of security in theory *and* in practice”.²⁰⁷ One way of achieving this is to render problematic the narratives that constitute security studies and inquire into the ways in which they have been constitutive of non-Western conceptions and narratives of security.

Barkawi and Laffey criticize “security studies’ reliance on histories and geographies which reproduce Eurocentric conceptions of world politics”²⁰⁸ which “presuppose and reproduce, separately and together, a specific set of historical periodisations and spatial assumptions”.²⁰⁹ They define historical periodisations as “the taken-for-granted chronologies of key actors, central processes and significant events that structure the field”.²¹⁰ Based upon this understanding the Cold War “is seen as one of ‘East-West’ struggle that is, between competing coalitions organised around the US and USSR”.²¹¹ Furthermore, this historical periodisation is coupled with a spatial assumption that narrates world politics as “happening almost exclusively in Europe, or latterly in the Northern hemisphere”.²¹² These historical periodisations and spatial assumptions that narrate world politics in a Western-centric manner need to be disrupted. The stories of security though widened and deepened have nonetheless mainly

²⁰⁴ Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘The postcolonial moment in security studies’, *Review of International Relations*, 32 (2006): 334.

²⁰⁵ Pinar Bilgin, ‘The ‘Western-centrism’ of Security Studies: ‘Blind Spot’ or Constitutive Practice?’, *Security Dialogue*, 41:6 (2010): 616

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*; 617

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*; 618

²⁰⁸ Barkawi and Laffey, ‘The postcolonial moment in security studies’, 331

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*; 334

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² *Ibid.*

remained centred. As Honke and Muller state, “while there has been a growing interest in postcolonial approaches within the field of international relations as a way of moving beyond the limits and problems of dominant western-centric approaches to global politics [...] this has been less visible within the subfield of security studies”.²¹³ As discussed in this section, though the dominant story of security has been disrupted, there are still many hegemonic discourses of security and of security studies that need to be questioned.

As the previous sections discussed dominant stories of the international system, of sovereignty and of security have been disrupted to varying degrees, the non-Western story remains centred within the Great Story of IR. The next section will problematize the way in which non-western stories are embedded into these stories of IR.

V. EMBEDDING NON-WESTERN STORIES

The previous sections outlined the Great Story of IR whether with respect to the field, the international system, Westphalian sovereignty or security. Furthermore, these sections presented the different ways in which these Great Stories that constitute hegemonic narratives of the field were challenged through the presentation of alternative stories. Thus the previous sections demonstrated that there is no one great story of the field, of the international system, of Westphalian sovereignty and of security. Despite these disruptions to the Great Story of IR, non-Western stories remains centered within the dominant stories of IR, of the international system, of Westphalian sovereignty and of security. This section will present an overview of the centering of the story of Turkey. An important component of decentering IR has been to look at the myriad of other possible stories that could be told. These possible stories demonstrate that the hegemonic Great Story need not be the only way to approach the concepts, institutions, processes and history of the field. Outlining these discussions brings forth another important component in decentering IR. If there are many possible stories how is the hegemonic one reproduced in such a manner to continue to silence alternative

²¹³ Jana Honke and Markus-Michael Muller, ‘Growing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice’, *Security Dialogue*, 43:5 (2012) : 383

stories? The example of Turkey is used in order to demonstrate the way in which the Great Story of IR is reproduced and the process of centering is not only one of imposition but also one of complicity.

Turkey's reproduction of Western narratives can be understood as part of its 'postcolonial anxiety'. Krishna defines 'postcolonial anxiety' as;

“social constructions of the past, present, and futures for state elites and educated middle classes in the third world are mimetic constructions of what supposedly already happened elsewhere; namely, Europe or the west. The story of what once happened in Europe constitutes the knowledge that empowers state elites as they attempt to fashion their nations image of what are considered successful nation-states. Premised on this narrative of what once happened ‘out there’ postcolonial elites attempt to remake the recalcitrant clay of plural civilizations into lean, uniform, hypermasculine and disciplined nation-states”.²¹⁴

Turkey's reproduction of Western narratives is a result of its 'postcolonial anxiety' and its postcolonial condition needs to be problematized in order to decenter Turkey from the Westerncentric IR discourse. Taking the periodizations, categories, narratives that have travelled, been adopted, negotiated as unproblematic truths is a condition of postcoloniality. Postcoloniality is “a global phenomenon of interactions based on unequal power relations in an era that goes beyond the world of colonialism, but that has been (and continues to be) decisively shaped by the logic of coloniality”.²¹⁵ It is the 'geopolitics of knowledge' that underlines this condition of postcoloniality that this thesis aims to disrupt and question. As Mignolo states;

“Western people have disciplines and Eastern people have cultures to be studied by Western disciplines. The West was, and still is, the only geo-historical location that is both part of the classification of the world *and the only perspective that has the privilege of possessing dominant categories of thoughts from which and where the rest of the world can be described, classified, understood, and ‘improved’*”.²¹⁶

A look at the way in which the reproduction of Western narratives, concepts and theories has been analyzed within the context of Turkey can better illuminate this point. In her analysis of 'securitization studies' application to Turkey, Bilgin has

²¹⁴ Sankaran Krishna *Postcolonial Insecurities : India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood* (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xix

²¹⁵ Walter Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America* (Malden MA : Blackwell, 2005), 69

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*; 36

found that the texts firstly “underscore the appropriateness of current policymaking” and secondly “locate(s) Turkey in Europe by way of highlighting how it presently exhibits a ‘proper European way of behavior’”.²¹⁷ These strategies she argues have to be analyzed based on the “specific historical and political context from where it emerged and to where it travelled” rather than “being explained away as an instance of international relations’ ethnocentrism or as an outcome of peripheral international relations scholars’ socialization”.²¹⁸ The question is can they be separated from each other? Bilgin overlooks that the ‘specific historical and political context’ that facilitated the emergence of these strategies is linked to the ethnocentrism of international relations. They are not separate but rather mutually constitutive. The historical, social and political contexts of ‘adopting’ or ‘translating’ Western security narratives into non-Western settings’ is influenced by the hierarchical structure of these narratives. It is because these narratives occupy a dominant place within the hierarchical structure that the non-Western ‘chooses’ to adopt or translate them. Thus the production of texts that code security in terms of “utilizing securitization theory as a Western European security theory in explaining Turkey’s dynamic” in order to “underscore(s) the significance of what has been achieved and assures audiences that the future promises well”²¹⁹ is informed by an understanding of security that situates Turkey within the “Eurocentric historical and geographical terrain”. It is because of the reproduction of the historical and geographical assumptions of Western centric security conceptualisations that the historical, social and political context creates the space for producing such texts. This reproduction is the result of having ‘adopted’ and ‘translated’ Western security narratives in the past again as a result of historical, social and political reasons.

It should be underlined that “policymakers or scholars in non-core settings were no mere vessels but also merchants of the increasing production and consumption of ‘standard’ notion of security”.²²⁰ The reproduction of Western centric narratives was not only about the dominance of the West, it was also about a specific

²¹⁷ Pinar Bilgin, “The Politics of studying securitization? The Copenhagen School in Turkey”, *Security Dialogue*, 42:4-5 (2011): 408

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*; 409

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ Bilgin, ‘The ‘Western-centrism’ of Security Studies’, 618

narrative of the state, of security and of the international system that the Turkish state wanted to produce and reproduce. Thus, the narratives of the state, of security and of the international system are all interrelated and mutually constitutive of each other. In order to understand, how Western centric narratives travelled into the Turkish context, the historical, social and political context of these definitions and how they were negotiated between the dominant and alternative narratives needs to be brought forward.

Thus the next chapter will focus on re-reading of the way in which the story of the Cold War has been narrated. Furthermore, it will discuss how Turkey has been narrated within that story. The aim is not to present a definitive account of the period but rather to re-read it in order to destabilize the linear narrative. The first chapter entitled 'Discussing the Origins' will focus specifically on the 'Cold War' literature and outline the historiographical debates. The second chapter will focus on the literature on Turkey to demonstrate how the 'narrative substances' established by the 'Cold War' literature are reproduced. This will demonstrate the way in which the security narratives of the West are reproduced within the 'Non-West' perspectives of the Turkish academia.

The discussions within these chapters will demonstrate the ways in which the Great Stories of IR based on a specific understanding of history based on the Western experience are reproduced in non-West context underlying the fact that bringing forth non-Western perspectives themselves is not sufficient in decentring IR. What further needs to be done in questioning the power relationships and postcolonial anxieties that produce those perspectives.

SECTION I: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OPERATIONS ON THE COLD WAR

“Historiography presents itself as a discourse which ‘understands’ its other – the chronicles, the archives, the movement: it is the discourse whichauthorises itself to say what the other signifies without knowing it. Through ‘citations’, through references, through notes and through the whole apparatus of permanent referral to a primary language (what Michelet called ‘the chronicle’), it sets itself up as *knowledge of the other*. It is constructed according to a problematic of judgement or *citation*, at once capable of ‘summoning’ a referential language to function as reality and empowered to judge that language on the strength of its own knowledge”.²²¹

²²¹ Michel De Certeau, *The Writing of History* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1975), 111

This dual construction (construction dedoublée) that de Certeau explains is at the centre of the historiographical operation. It produces objects but it is also limited by them. The production of objects happens within already set parameters. Thus;

“a particular study will be defined by the relations that it upholds with others that are contemporaneous with it, with a ‘state of the question’, with the problematic issues exploited by the group and the strategic points that they constitute, and with the outputs and divergences thus determined or given pertinence in relation to a work in progress”.²²²

The historiographical operations on the Cold War present a similar picture. This section will focus on the way in which the ‘writing’ and the ‘making’ of the Cold War as a historiographical terrain configured events, accorded different degrees of importance to certain actors and structured the narrative. The dual function of historiography is present in the discussions surrounding the Cold War because there are many Cold War(s), but they operate within the same Cold War. The terrain of the Cold War is preconfigured and the roads one might take and the stories of the Cold War one might tell are possible itineraries within the same terrain. The terrain itself (the Cold War) does not alter but there are different possible routes that can be taken and as such there are many possible stories of the Cold War. Rigney discusses the pre-configured nature of ‘received events’ with respect to the French Revolution as follows;

“It is a ‘site to be visited’ or, if the nominal reference is to be expanded into a narrative account, it is a pre-arranged itinerary marking out the recommended scenic route (and the beaten track) from one major point of interest to the next – the Jeu de Paume (20 June 1789); the Taking of Bastille (14 July 1789); the abolition of feudal privileges (4 August 1789); the women at Versailles (5-6 October 1789); the Flight to Varennes (20-22 June 1791); the crowd’s invasion of Tuileries (20 June 1792); the Storming of the Tuileries on 10 August 1792; the execution of Louis XVI (21 January 1793); and so on through the fall of the Girondins (2 June 1793), the *Terreur*, the trial and execution of Danton (13-16 Germinal an 11, 2-5 April 1794), and the fall of Robespierre on 9 Thermidor an 11 (27 July 1794)”.²²³

Thus, despite all the different ways in which the French Revolution might be narrated and differences “in the degree of detail with which they treat particular episodes and in the particular links they establish between them, each one is structures around these canonical events, these areas of common historical account”.²²⁴ The Cold War(s) are based upon a similar narrative base which

²²² *Ibid.*, 64

²²³ Ann Rigney, *The Rhetoric of Historical Representation : Three narrative histories of the French Revolution* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990), 37

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 37

determines the boundaries of the Cold War. There are different itineraries that might be followed but the main sites to be visited are already inscribed into the very concept of the Cold War. Thus, one stops by Yalta, Potsdam, Poland, events in Eastern Europe in general, Turkey, Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. Yet, the time one spends in each stop differs according to the narrative configuration of the writer. As such, the master event and the narrative schema is already preconfigured when discussing the Cold War. It is within this schema that the historiographical operation takes place. The particular frames employed, the degrees of importance accorded to an event, how an 'event' is constituted as an event and the degrees of silence will determine the form of the content. In that sense, just like the French Revolution, the Cold War is also part of the 'cultural code'.²²⁵ As such, "the commonplace of the revolutionary ship provides each writer with an empty frame or narrative grid, which can be filled in by different actors, depending on the particular configuration of the Revolution: the significant roles are already marked out, the historian only has to give them a figurative manifestation".²²⁶ The frame of the Cold War is the terrain upon which the historian navigates and the different accounts of the Cold War(s) is mainly based upon the prioritization of events and different actors. All accounts of the Cold War might visit Yalta and Potsdam but the manner in which the events are categorized within the narrative schema might be different. Were they when the Soviet Union showed its intentions, was the United States being idealistic, was the balance of power in Europe the reason for the failure of the talks. Is the Marshall Plan the main stop of the story or is it the events in Poland? Which actor's motives and actions are seen as the drivers of events? Which factor is narrated as a central factor, economic determinants or the security dilemma of the international system.

As such, the 'Cold War' serves to enable certain actions over others and prioritize certain actors over others. The main narrative terrain upon which the 'Cold War' is built is a Western-centric one. As Andrew Hammond states "the art of understanding a historical period exclusively through the Western experience of that period partakes in the same hegemonic Euro-Americanism that defined the conflict itself, privileging a limited range of subjectivities and relegating all others

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 39

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 46

to insignificance”.²²⁷ In that sense, the ‘Cold War’ story is reflective of the subjectivities and priorities of a Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics. The ‘Cold War’ is a specific construction of a crisis serving a specific purpose with respect to the narrative of American foreign policy and the international system. As Weldes states “the dominant discourse in security studies embodied a “Cold War narrative” in which drama and meaning derived from an unending, but constantly shifting clash between two global empires, and from the repeated introduction of new technological possibilities and threats into the story line”.²²⁸ In that respect, “if all representation is political, then all historical writing on international relations conveys and perpetuates assumptions about their nature and the desirable conduct of policy which contributes, albeit differently, to making ‘some policies likely and others unlikely’”.²²⁹ There have been various studies that have analysed the language formations in historical texts and conducted poststructuralist analysis with historical perspectives such as the works of Frank Castigliola, David Campbell and Jutta Weldes.²³⁰

An example of these arguments and the manner in which analysis will proceed is provided in Jutta Weldes’ book *Constructing National Interests: The US and the Cuban Missile Crisis*²³¹ where she demonstrates that the “Cuban Missile Crisis” is one possible way of characterizing the events – a characterization that is reflective of a certain narrative of events; the Western-centric narrative. But there are other ways to define and periodize it. The Soviets define it as the Caribbean Crisis and the period of the crisis is not 13 days like in the American story but longer including within it the economic blockade of Cuba and the Bay of Pigs. When the story is presented not in 13 days but starting from when Cuba became

²²⁷ Andrew Hammond, *Cold War Literature: Writing the global conflict*, ed., (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 1

²²⁸ Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security,” in *Cultures of Insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger*, eds., Jutta Weldes et al. (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 327

²²⁹ Finney, “Still ‘marking time’?,” 304

²³⁰ Frank Castigliola, “Unceasing Pressure for Penetration : Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,” *The Journal of American History* 83 :4 (Mar., 1997): 163-183; Frank Castigliola, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance,” *Diplomatic History* 21:2 (Spring 1997): 163-183; David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) and Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The US and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

²³¹ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*

“communist” then the events take on a different meaning because U.S. attitudes towards Cuba become part of the factors to be considered as leading to the crisis. As such the “missile” crisis becomes a culmination of U.S. attitudes towards Cuba and the deployment of missiles becomes a strategy designed to protect Cuba from U.S. invasion rather than a Soviet ploy to invade the United States. There are two points to underline. Firstly, the interactions between the narrative of events and the theories extrapolated from them. Secondly, the construction of the linear story and the silencing of events that do not fit into that progressive tale. The Cold War and the specific example of the Cuban Missile crisis become tools used to explain, sustain, and reproduce a certain idea about the interaction of states and how to approach international crises. The Cuban Missile crisis is one of the main “case studies” employed when discussing concepts central to international relations theory such as deterrence and rational decision-making. Graham Allison’s study *Essence of Decision* considered to be one of the cornerstones of comprehending decision-making in international relations is based on a series of conclusions extrapolated from the Cuban Missile Crisis but those are conclusions that can only be drawn if that account is based on American experiences of the event.²³² These accounts and the theories derived from them based on the agency of the great powers create, sustain and reproduce tropes, lessons, theories and concepts that define the field. The possibility that there are other accounts that could present one with different tropes, lessons and concepts is overlooked.

The second point to underline is that the Cuban story characterizes the events as the October crisis. The narrative is placed in a longer time frame situating it as the continuation of U.S. imperialist actions starting with the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Platt Amendment. Within that story it is the sovereignty and independence of Cuba that is constantly threatened by the United States. Hence, the missiles are a tool for Cuba to protect her sovereignty against an imperialist America that has attempted to invade her. Thus, as can be seen, the name given, the time frame, the periodizations, the events included and excluded from the story alter the message of the story considerably. Yet, today it is the Cuban Missile Crisis that we write of, speak of and even make movies of such as *13*

²³² Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment,” 334-336.

*Days*²³³ because it is part of the dominant narratives of the Cold War shaped by the American story. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the 13 days time frame fits into the general Cold War narrative perfectly. It comes right after the Berlin crisis between Khrushchev and Kennedy and is the forerunner of detente both superpowers having come “eyeball to eyeball”. But the other stories do not fit perfectly into the Cold War narrative. The October Crisis is not a Cold War story but a story of U.S. imperialism and it is in many ways continuing still. The Cuban Missile Crisis has become this thing that is talked about and written about, why it happened is widely discussed, what its results were but its not questioned as a manner of describing and understanding the events under scrutiny; it is the Cuban Missile Crisis and it lasted 13 days. The same manner of comprehending events is also true of the Cold War.

As Benedict Anderson states with respect to the French Revolution,

“the overwhelming and bewildering concatenation of events experienced by its makers and its victims become a “thing” – and with its own name – The French Revolution. Like a vast shapeless rock worn to a rounded boulder by countless drops of water, the experience was shaped by millions of printed words into a “concept” on the printed page, and, in due course into a model. Why “it” broke out, what “it” aimed for, why “it” succeeded or failed, became subjects for endless polemics on the part of friends and foes, but of its “it”ness, as it were, no one ever after had much doubt”.²³⁴

The Cold War is treated in the same manner. There are countless explanations as to why it occurred, why it ended but it is not questioned. The Cold War is taken as a pre-given concept that does not need definition because its definition, periodization is already determined. Hence works on the Cold War are done within these pre-given conditions. These supposedly pre-given conditions are provided by the American story as the story on the origins of the Cold War has traditionally concentrated on American foreign policy conceptualizations based upon a Eurocentric interpretation of World politics.

The Cold War narrative is based upon a certain understanding of the international system which is embedded within power relations. IR discourse in general is based on “abstraction” which Krishna explains “is never innocent of power: the

²³³ *Thirteen Days* (2000) New Line Cinema

²³⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London; New York: Verso, 1989)

precise strategies and methods of abstraction in each instance decide what aspects of a limitless reality are brought into sharp focus and what aspects are, literally left out of the picture”.²³⁵ As such, the Cold War is one of the abstractions used within IR literature to simplify and explain international relations. It is a uniform story with the American choices, preferences and perceptions being the central actor. But the Cold War is not equal to American foreign policy and there are stories, perceptions and experiences left out that could add to the meaning. This is not to claim that no other story has ever been told other than the American one. The “pericentric” tradition in Cold War historiography has brought forward alternate stories of the Cold War concentrating upon the Soviet story or the British story among others. Nonetheless, these stories have all followed the main dynamics set up by the dominant American narrative. International relations narrative is based on the experiences of the “West” and as such its products are stories of their development. It is not that the other story does not exist but that the Western experience is presented as the template to be followed. Hence the “alternative” British and Soviet stories do not in essence tell a different story but attempt to embed their stories into the American/dominant one.

This section is concerned with the historiographical operation on two levels. The first level, which will be covered in Chapter 3, is the writing and making of the Cold War historiography. What are the main sites to be visited, how are they accorded different priorities, characteristics and purposes? Thus, the focus is on the possible Cold War itineraries within the master event of the Cold War. The second level, which will be covered in Chapter 4, is how these historiographical operations are reproduced in the Turkish context. The sites to be visited, the actors to be mentioned, the ‘events’ constructed are configured and ‘grasped together’ in a similar fashion to that of the Cold War historiographical terrain. That this reproduction takes place also means editing out ‘events’, ‘actors’, and ‘sites’ that do not fit into the narrative terrain preconfigured by the historiographical operations on the Cold War.

The next chapter entitled ‘Discussing the Origins’ focuses on the way in which the origins story has been narrated. Furthermore, the chapter aims to provide an

²³⁵ Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” 403

overview of the main ‘historiographical schools’ on the origins of the Cold War and borders of the debate. The main questions to be asked when approaching Cold War historiography will be:

- 1) How was the Cold War defined, periodized, and narrated?
- 2) How the Soviet Union and United States were defined?
- 3) How was Turkey defined?
- 4) What was the degree of agency given to Turkey within the narrative?
- 5) How were the main events of the origins of the Cold War such as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan characterized and narrated?
- 6) What events were omitted from the narrative?

It needs to be underlined that the next two chapters are not ‘literature reviews’ or a mapping out of the ‘state of the art’ but rather the mapping out of the narrative structures, historical terrains and dominant ways of narrating the Cold War. Thus, neither chapter claims to provide an exclusive account of the literatures on the Cold War. As Munslow states, “all debates in history – who started the Cold War, how successful were the Chartists in achieving their aims to what extent was the recession of the American frontier culturally significant in American history? – are debates between competing narrative interpretations”.²³⁶ As such, it is not the past itself that is under discussion in the historiographical debates but the historical discourse on the past. The following chapters aim to demonstrate the ways in which the sites are constructed, the terrain is drawn and the borders of the debates established.

²³⁶ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 173

CHAPTER III: DISCUSSING THE ORIGINS

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to bring forth the contours of the historiographical terrain, narrative configurations, and the way ‘events’ were constructed and ‘grasped together’. How were the actors characterized, which actors were prioritized over others and how was the story configured. As such, the focus of this chapter is not to discuss the ‘past’ events but rather the narratives of these events and rather than look at whether or not the narratives are representative of the past it aims to look at the historical discourse of past events. The chapter is divided according to traditional divisions of Cold War historiographical schools.²³⁷ Thus, “because the character of historical interpretation resides in its narrative structure, historical knowledge is generated by constant debates between narratives (interpretations) rather than the primeval, unscripted and uncontextualized traces of the past”.²³⁸

²³⁷ It should be noted that the classical division of Cold War historiography like the division of IR theory is in many respects artificial and a tool in reproducing a certain narrative of the Cold War and the international system. It is employed here for reasons of simplification and with the aim to organize the works in a recognizable manner. Nevertheless, the constructed nature of the divisions and the manner in which they themselves are a part of the dominant narrative should not be overlooked.

²³⁸ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 173

A review of Cold War literature presents certain obstacles mainly because of the question of how to periodize the literature.²³⁹ There exists a conventional approach, which is; traditionalists, revisionists, and post-revisionists. Yet this classification obscures the differences that exist within the respective “schools”. Although both Louis J. Halle²⁴⁰ and George F. Kennan²⁴¹ are classified as traditionalists and identify the Soviet Union as the aggressive actor, their characterization of American policy differs. The “realist” tradition represented by Kennan argued that American foreign policy was naïve before and it was only with the Soviet threat and onset of containment that American foreign policy became cognizant of the realities of power politics. The other group within the traditionalist presented the Cold War within the dominant narrative of American foreign policy. The “revisionist” school is also far from being a unified school. The two best-known representatives of the school; Gabriel Kolko²⁴² and William Appleman Williams²⁴³ differ on their evaluation of the roots of American foreign policy. Even though both authors concentrate on economic factors as the driving force behind American foreign policy Kolko defines economic factors based on the material needs of the domestic capitalist system whereas Williams defines it as an extension of ideology and culture. The post-revisionists school is even more varied than the previous schools because of their aim to bridge the gap between “traditionalists” and “revisionists”, and present a complex, multi-dimensional and multi-causal explanation to the origins of the Cold War. In doing so, the “school” represents a spectrum of interpretations ranging from those closer to the “traditionalists” and others closer to the “revisionists” schools. John Lewis Gaddis²⁴⁴ and Melvyn P. Leffler²⁴⁵ represent these two ends of the spectrum.

²³⁹ For a more detailed discussion of the schools see; Anders Stephanson, “The United States,” in *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: international perspectives*, ed, David Reynolds (New Haven; London: Yale University Press 1994), 23-52.

²⁴⁰ Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967).

²⁴¹ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1950).

²⁴² Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) ; Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row 1972) and Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990).

²⁴³ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Delta, 1962).

²⁴⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

²⁴⁵ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

Towards the end of the 1980s²⁴⁶, amidst the discussions about how the Soviet Union collapsed, two new schools of interpretation appeared with respect to the origins of the Cold War. The first, pericentrism, aims to bring in the different stories of the Cold War rather than just concentrate upon the American narrative. The second is neo-traditionalism, a school of interpretation that is in many respects a continuance of the traditionalist school. These two “schools” are not easily divisible since authors such as Vojtech Mastny²⁴⁷ are usually classified as post-revisionist, can also be considered a pericentrist²⁴⁸ since he presents a Soviet narrative of the origins of the Cold War and a neo-traditionalist since his narrative of events ascribes more to the traditionalist characterization of the Cold War. The third is the post-structuralist²⁴⁹ and cultural interpretations²⁵⁰ that attempt to look at the interactions of American foreign policy from a completely different perspective. The aim of the chapter is to underline how the different schools operate within the same great story of the Cold War even though they represent different trajectories of the Cold War.

These schools look at the same period but with differing perspectives they analyse different actors, forces, and events leading to incongruence among them. As Musnlow states,

“Every historical interpretation is just one more in a long chain of interpretations, each one usually claiming to be closer to the reality of the past, but each one merely another reinscription of the same events, with each successive description being the product of the historian's imposition at the levels of the trope, emplotment, argument and ideology”.²⁵¹

²⁴⁶ Steven Hurst, *Cold War US Foreign Policy: Key Perspectives* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 26

²⁴⁷ Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity: the Stalin years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

²⁴⁸ Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 24:4 (Fall 2000): 567-591.

²⁴⁹ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998)

²⁵⁰ Frank Castigliola, “ ‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War,” *The Journal of American History*, 83:4 (1997):1309-1339 and Emily Rosenberg, “ ‘Foreign Affairs’ after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics,” *Diplomatic History*, 18 :1 (2007): 59-70

²⁵¹ Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, 35

As such, the differing schools all claim to represent the “truth” and the “past as it really happened”, yet all of them employ discourses, ideological characterizations and theoretical generalities on the stories they tell. As such, the aim is not to present an exhaustive literature review but discuss the ways of speaking about the Cold War prevalent in the literature, to underline the historical interpretations, inscriptions of events, privileging of actors and configuration of the narrative terrain. As a result this chapter concentrates on the works generally considered to be central to Cold War historiography.

II. TRADITIONALISTS – ORTHODOX

This part focuses on the ‘traditionalist’ or ‘orthodox’ school within the historiographical tradition of the Cold War. The school has two strands. The first is based on a classical narrative of history of American foreign relations and the second digressing from that narrative by inserting within it realist conceptions. The “traditionalist” school is based on common conceptions of history, United States and the Soviet Union. The traditionalist account presents a normative account of events based on explicit delineations of good/evil, moral/immoral and right/wrong. Secondly, the narrative fits into the general understanding of American foreign policy whereby the isolationist, anti-imperialist and idealistic United States is pulled into European affairs in order to protect the world against the Soviet menace. As Hurst states;

“traditionalism is better understood as an extension of the prevailing pre-Second World War historiography of American foreign diplomacy. That historiography was remarkably consensual and at the heat of that consensus was a celebratory, even triumphalist, interpretation of American foreign policy to that point”.²⁵²

The ‘traditionalist’ school has three main characteristics that need to be underlined. Firstly, traditionalist accounts concentrate mainly on the decision-makers of the time and their motivations specifically the executive branch. The social, economic, and cultural forces that defined the society, the institutions and the decision-makers is largely ignored as well as the structure of the international system. Secondly, United States foreign policy is narrated as being passive until it

²⁵² Hurst, *Cold War US Foreign Policy*, 26

is called upon to defend freedom and democracy. Hence, the United States is presented as reacting to events that occur in Europe and Asia rather than being an integral player. This presentation absolves the United States from any agency in creating the situations and crises of the post-World War II period. This leads to the third characteristic; that the Soviet Union holds all responsibility for the onset of the Cold War. Once the United States is narrated into the story as a passive actor that does not play an active role in the shaping of events, the Soviet Union becomes the country all agency and active pursuit of goals is attributed to making it responsible for igniting crises and conflicts where more would have existed otherwise.

Herbert Feis²⁵³ in his work *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950*, published in 1970 is representative on the traditionalist school. His presentation of events ascribes to the conventional American foreign policy interpretation. Feis concentrates on Poland as the evidence of Soviet intentions in a larger scale. He states; “The future and fate of Poland were of genuine and deep concern to the British and American governments. Of all the ploys by which the Soviet Government brought its neighbours into subjection, Stalin’s distortion of promises given regarding Poland was to hurt the most”.²⁵⁴ This statement brings forward many of the assumptions that guide Feis’s study; that Britain and America were guided by benign motivations based on moralistic ideals whereas the Soviet Union used “ploys” and “distortions” to bring Poland into “subjection”. This narrative presents America as not part of the events that occur but a bystander as the Soviet Union acts to alter agreements and subjugate states. This is further evident when he states that “Truman and his advisers sought settlements which corresponded to principles and aims that soared beyond the ordinary satisfactions and rewards of victory. They wanted to transmute the wartime alliance with the Russians into a lasting working accord for peace”.²⁵⁵ This statement describing the Potsdam conference presents the United States as the selfless country that only aimed to cooperate, no other purpose, interest or goal is attributed to the United States. Feis states that “while the United Stateswas

²⁵³ Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: the onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970).

²⁵⁴ Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, 23

²⁵⁵ Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, 43

coming to the support of the Greek and Turkish governments, the Communists, Russian and local, expelled from power all political leaders in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria whom they thought unfriendly”.²⁵⁶ The differences in characterizations of action is evident in this statement whereby the United States “comes to the support” of Greek and Turkish governments whereas the Soviet Union “expels from power” unfriendly leaders.

The narrative of world politics as an extension of the Western experience is further evident in Feis’s treatment of Turkey. His account of the events in Turkey is entitled “The encounter over Turkey” implying an encounter of the great powers; an arena over which they clash and Turkey itself is not given much agency with respect to the ensuing events. He argues that, “the encounter between the West and the Soviet Union over Turkey had been looming since the end of the war”.²⁵⁷ With respect to the Potsdam meeting and the Soviet demands for access to the Straits, Feis presents the United States as attempting to placate the Soviets in the spirit of cooperation, when he states that, “the American Government, however, had tried to satisfy the reasonable element in Soviet aspirations – that it be assured of unhindered and secure access through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean and the seas and lands”.²⁵⁸ Thus, the United States tried to concede the “reasonable elements” and salvage cooperation. In sum, Feis’s narrative presents a traditional story of American foreign relations and embeds the Cold War as the latest stage of the United States being called upon to restore peace in Europe. As a consequence, the United States is an actor that reacts to the situation rather than one who plays an active role in creating it.

Louis J. Halle’s book *Cold War as History* represents to the second strand in the traditionalist school. Halle argues that “the gigantic power of Russia had been contained or balanced” but “what the situation of Europe represented, in the years from 1945 to 1947, was a crisis in the balance of power”.²⁵⁹ According to this narrative, the Cold War grew out of a vacuum in the balance of power after the Second World War. Halle presents an analysis of European history by stating,

²⁵⁶ Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, 173-174

²⁵⁷ Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, 178

²⁵⁸ Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, 179

²⁵⁹ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 2

“since the end of the eighteenth century four great wars had been fought to maintain or resolve the European balance of power. The fourth was the Cold War, which began almost immediately after World War II”.²⁶⁰ This narrative situates the Cold War at the center of the story whereby it is a culmination of a specific understanding of European history. This puts the Cold War in a continuous line going back to the eighteenth century, making it part of the linear story of power politics and balance of power. By locating the sources of the Cold War in balance of power, Halle proceeds to explain history of American foreign relations in a traditionalist manner by stating that “the American people, shaped by their long-tradition, could not accept considerations of power politics as reasons for going to war”, hence they always looked for moral justifications. Even though, Halle characterizes American foreign relations as based upon isolationism and moralism in tandem with the traditionalist perspective, he categorizes this tendency as being naïve subscribing to the realist view. He states that “in 1917-1918, the United States, morally and psychologically unequipped to do so, came into the war at the eleventh hour, to restore the balance of power, while pretending that it was doing something altogether different and nobler”.²⁶¹ Thus, the United States foreign policy actions were always reticent towards power politics whether after the First World War or during the Second World War and “the lesson would finally be learned only in 1947, when at last the United States, now grim and realistic, would abandon its isolationist policy and all its outworn traditions in order to meet the challenge of Stalin’s Russia”.²⁶²

According to Halle, the roots of the Cold War could also be found in the *unrealistic* policies of the United States. An example he provides is the policy of “unconditional surrender” whereby the trajectory of events could have differed if only America could have concluded a peace treaty with Germany under a new government and ensured the establishment of a balance of power but instead it had insisted on unconditional surrender. He argues, “the decision to eliminate German power from Europe, rather than make such a peace, is what laid the foundations of the Cold War”.²⁶³ It was this naiveté of American foreign policy to

²⁶⁰ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 2

²⁶¹ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 26

²⁶² Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 26

²⁶³ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 36

expect that the Soviet Union could be integrated into the international system the United States envisioned. As Halle states, “it is really not conceivable that rulers in Moscow, with a thousand years of desperate struggle for survival behind them would have abandoned power politics after the War and cooperated in the organization of a post-war world that represented the ideals of Anglo-Saxon political philosophy”.²⁶⁴ This characterization of events assumed that the international system that was to be established by the United States and the Soviet Union had to act within the boundaries set for it. This narrative of the extent to which Soviet Union could “make demands” about the organization of the international system is a narrative continuously employed in the literature designating the Soviet Union as the one who had to demonstrate restraint about the extent to which the boundaries of the international system could be altered.

With respect to Eastern Europe, Halle presents a traditionalist perspective. Poland is again at the cornerstone of the narrative. Halle describes Soviet attitude and policies in the following manner; “Having subscribed to the “Declaration on Liberated Europe”, but having his triumphant military forces in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, Stalin proceeded with the necessary degree of ruthlessness, to eliminate from public life of those countries the elements that were not ‘friendly’”.²⁶⁵ His narrative of Eastern Europe does not distinguish among the different states, the different policies applied there and furthermore, he does not ascribe any agency to the Eastern European states. A similar approach is present with respect to his treatment of Turkey. Although no substantive discussion of the crisis exists Halle does discuss Turkey in the context of the general European condition. He states, “the approaching crisis in Greece and Turkey was, then, merely the symptom of a far wider crisis in Britain and throughout Europe. Britain could no longer continue its rescue operation in Greece and Turkey because it stood in need of rescue itself”.²⁶⁶ Thus, Turkey is presented as an actor in need of rescue but the details of what is being rescued from the domestic context of Turkey are not provided.

²⁶⁴ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 76

²⁶⁵ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 70

²⁶⁶ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 113

The division of Europe is attributed solely to the Soviet Union. Halle discusses the Marshall Plan as a vehicle to “rescue” Europe and states that “the Marshall proposal, and its eager acceptance in London and Paris, confronted Moscow with the final decision whether to join the West or to fight it”.²⁶⁷ Soviet Union’s negative response meant, “Europe was finally divided.”²⁶⁸ The Marshall Plan, in itself, is not seen as an active foreign policy endeavour that prompted a response from the Soviet Union but rather the Soviet Union becomes the actor that “divides” Europe by responding to the Marshall Plan. On the question of inevitability, Halle’s stance is that “the range of choice was small, the element of predetermination large”.²⁶⁹ It was in the nature of the Soviet Union to act according to power politics especially since the balance of power was not restored immediately after the war. The only logical deduction within this narrative is for America to restore the balance of power and contain the Soviet Union. According to Halle, “the continuing expansion of Russia at the end of World War II alarmed the Western nations, impelling them to draw together for a common resistance. So, the retirement of the United States into its own hemisphere, which had just begun, was halted and reversed”.²⁷⁰ The United States was inclined to return to its isolationist ways after the war and only reversed that policy once it comprehended the expansionist “designs” of the Soviet Union. Thus, “when the West rallied under American leadership to halt that expansion it was acting in its own legitimate defence rather than in a spirit of aggression”.²⁷¹

To conclude, traditionalist accounts configure the events of the Cold War in such a way that situates Poland and Eastern Europe as the catalysis of the ‘origins’. Privileging the events in Eastern Europe ascribe agency to the Soviet Union as the actor that was offensive. Furthermore, the story of United States foreign policy is depicted in a traditionalist fashion. United States foreign policy is configured to underline the naiveté and isolationism of the United States and it was in effort to restore the balance of power in Europe that US involves itself in European affairs. This narrative fits into a traditional narrative of European history whereby the

²⁶⁷ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 130

²⁶⁸ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 135

²⁶⁹ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 76

²⁷⁰ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 145

²⁷¹ Halle, *The Cold War as History*, 416

developments starting from 18th century onwards can be told in a linear manner as progressing towards US hegemony in order to solve the issue of balance of power within the international system. The next section focuses on the ‘revisionist’ school which reverses many of the main arguments of the ‘traditionalist’ school especially with respect to the story of American foreign policy.

III. REVISIONISTS

Revisionist school appeared in the 1960s with the new left historians and their criticism of the Vietnam War. Revisionism is not only directed at interpretations about the origins of the Cold War but is also a re-interpretation of the traditional history of American foreign relations. Revisionists are not a unified school but there are certain characteristics that are shared by its representatives. Firstly, these works focus on the centrality of economic factors in determining US foreign policy. Second, contrary to the traditional history of American foreign relations, US foreign policy is not characterized as isolationist or idealist but rather as expansionist. Thirdly, whereas traditionalists presented the United States as a passive actor, revisionists characterize it as playing an active role in shaping the circumstances of the post-world war II international system. Fourthly, these works are united in their criticism of United States foreign policy and fifthly, revisionism inverts the traditionalist argument as it locates the responsibility of the Cold War mainly with the United States.

William A. Williams is one of the best-known revisionists and in his work *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* he presents a narrative that challenges not only the traditional account of the Cold War but also American foreign policy in general. According to Williams, the origins of the Cold War can be found in the contradictions existing within American foreign policy that is the “conflict within and between America’s ideas and practice”.²⁷² Thus, contrary to the traditionalists the reason for the onset of the Cold War can be found in America’s actions, which is not narrated as being passive but rather as an actor actively shaping events. Furthermore, he does not concentrate solely on the post-world war II period but

²⁷² Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 13

presents a linear analysis of American foreign policy locating the roots of the contradictions that led to the Cold War in the past. It was in the 1890s during the economic crisis “when Americans *thought* that the frontier was gone, they advanced and accepted the argument that new expansion was the best, if not the only, way to sustain their freedom and prosperity”.²⁷³ Hence, “in response to the crisis of the 1890s, Americans developed a broad consensus in favour of an expansionist foreign policy as a solution to their existing troubles and as a way to prevent future difficulties”.²⁷⁴ Williams argues that Spanish-American war was mainly motivated by these considerations after which with the Open Door Policy the aim became “to establish the conditions under which America’s preponderant economic power would extend the American system throughout the world without the embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism”.²⁷⁵ According to Williams, “when combined with the ideology of an industrial Manifest Destiny, the history of the Open Door Notes became the history of American foreign relations from 1900 to 1958”.²⁷⁶ This narrative present American foreign policy as a linear story of economic expansion and engulfs the Cold War into the story making it yet another expression of American foreign policy objectives. As such, the revisionist perspective also presents a linear story much like the traditionalists. Thus, even though the root causes of American foreign policy making is inverted and an alternative interpretation is narrated, the narrative itself remains Western-centric in that the main catalyst for explaining world politics remains the West. Contrary to the traditionalists who had presented a passive United States, the revisionist perspective presents a passive Soviet Union. The Soviet Union becomes the actor who has to react to the dynamic and aggressive foreign policy pursued by the United States. The “Russian expansion” into Eastern Europe is narrated within this perspective of ensuring the continuance of Open Door policy whereby “such protests were not prompted by the fear that Russia was about to overwhelm Europe or the world in general, but rather by the traditional outlook of the open door and the specific desire to get the Russians out of Eastern Europe”.²⁷⁷ The narrative presented by Williams is the

²⁷³ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 26

²⁷⁴ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 29

²⁷⁵ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 37

²⁷⁶ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 39-40

²⁷⁷ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 165

story of the Open Door policy adopted by American policymakers coupled with their belief in Manifest Destiny induced them to act in a manner that limited the choices available to the Soviet Union.

Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, though revisionists, part with Williams in locating the sources of the Cold War. Kolko defines American foreign policy objectives as “to sustain and to reform world capitalism,” thus, “in the name of future peace, therefore, the United States committed itself to the reconstruction of pre-war world capitalism - to the elimination of trade and financial barriers, exclusive trading blocs and restrictive policies of every sort”.²⁷⁸ According to this narrative, the existence of the Soviet Union and communism was not the primary concern of the United States. As Kolko states,

“the United States entered the post-war world circumscribed by itself, by the heritage of the depression, the limitations and logic of its domestically oriented capitalism, and the structural conditions the war created and thrust upon it. These factors would have existed regardless of the status of the Left in the world, the problem of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the colonial systems, and the like, but they only helped to color the specific nature of America’s response to a complicated world it was determined, in any event, to reform and guide in ways compatible with American requirements and interests. That the United States would have thrust outward after the war, with something like its poorly fitting synthesis of moralism, charity, calculation, and need, was certain”.²⁷⁹

This narrative presents structural conditions of the international system and the capitalist system within it creating the circumstances for the United States to intervene. Hence, the domestic capitalist system of the United States necessitated reforming the international capitalist system in order to survive. The Soviet Union and communism were not necessary conditions for United States intervention into the international system rather they were only influential in determining how the United States would intervene. These assumptions lead Kolko to make an unorthodox definition of the Cold War, which is “an egregious term that burdens one’s comprehension of the post war era with oversimplifications and evokes the wrong questions that unfortunate phrase describes United States – Soviet diplomacy in the narrowest context”²⁸⁰ and causes one to overlook “the larger, more significant context for understanding post war history in the entire globe and

²⁷⁸ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 11-12

²⁷⁹ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 26-27

²⁸⁰ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 6

the revolution, the counterrevolution, and the great often violent, interaction between the United States, its European allies, and the vast social and economic transformation in the Third World that is the defining fact of our world”.²⁸¹ Thus, the boundaries of the ‘Cold War’ definition are not opened but rather subsumes it under a never-changing dynamic whose origins are the West.

In the post-World War II period America intervened to restructure the international economic system that ran into problems in Eastern Europe because “the security interests of the Soviet Union clashed with the restorative policies of the United States”.²⁸² This is when the Soviet Union enters the story, not as the quintessential, antithetical enemy of freedom and democracy but as a state who had security interests in an area United States wanted the international economic system to encompass. Hence, the struggle was not caused by Eastern Europe, Soviet Union or communism but rather it was the requirements of the international system yet “American policy merely fitted the Soviet problem into much larger context, a framework which would have existed apart from anything Russia might have done”.²⁸³ Contrary to the traditionalists, within this narrative the active actor is the United States. It is the aims and objectives of American foreign policy that direct and structure the post-world war II international system and as a result, the Cold War, and the American-Soviet hostility is its own making. As Kolko states, “the so-called Cold War, in brief, was far less the confrontation of the United States with Russia than America’s expansion into the entire world – a world the Soviet Union neither controlled nor created”.²⁸⁴

With respect to the Turkish episode, Kolko provides a historical context discussing the nature of Turkey’s neutrality during World War II and states that “Turkey’s hostility long preceded the discussion of the future of the straits at the end of the war”.²⁸⁵ In reference to the Potsdam meeting Kolko discussed America’s positive attitude toward changing the Montreux Convention and

²⁸¹ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 6

²⁸² Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 31

²⁸³ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 31

²⁸⁴ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 31

²⁸⁵ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 242

presents how events became more heated after the August 1946 Russian proposal when

“Truman and his cabinet regarded it as a trial balloon warranting the strongest response for fear that Russians might precipitate armed conflict with Turkey. The sharp American reply in effect made it possible for the Turks to refuse any changes in the *status quo* and concessions to Soviet interests. For now they insisted that both Britain and the United States, even the UN, share in any changes that might be effected. What the Americans once recognized as legitimate Soviet interests they now denied altogether”.²⁸⁶

Kolko differs from most accounts of the Cold War in designating Turkey some agency. Although the extent of is limited, it is nonetheless acknowledged that Turkey had policies, aims and interests, which it was trying to pursue in this period. The Truman Doctrine is narrated in a manner that puts the general thrust of American expansion into the world whereby for Kolko it “involved not just the middle east but the future of Europe, the prospects for attaining American goals in the world economy, the best means of containing Russia and the Left and the very efficacy of American diplomatic strategy since the end of World War II”.²⁸⁷ Contrary, to traditional accounts of American foreign policy and the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine “represented not a departure from the preceding thrust of American foreign policy, but rather its logical conclusion”.²⁸⁸

To conclude, for Kolko, American aims, interests based on its capitalist system drove it to expand and reformulate the capitalist system. The Soviet Union was a passive and unwilling actor within this scenario because of its security interests that the United States could not accommodate. Thus, “even if the Soviet Union had not existed, the condition of the Third World and America’s response toward it after 1945 would scarcely have been different – for Washington’s goals predated the war and even 1917 itself. It would be extremely difficult to identify areas in which greater Soviet collaboration would have altered the outcome of America’s fundamental problem”.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 244

²⁸⁷ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 332

²⁸⁸ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 332

²⁸⁹ Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 714

Both traditionalism and revisionism present the United States and Soviet Union as one-dimensional actors with mono-causal interests. As a consequence, the comprehension of the Cold War becomes confined to either/or dichotomies influenced by ideological interpretations of American foreign policy. Furthermore, they both work within the main contours defined by the Western-centric narrative. The Cold War is about what it means for US foreign policy; is it economically expansionists: is it a naïve state that was called upon a moral mission. The narrative configurations within the story of the Cold War alter depending on which interpretation of American foreign policy is adopted. As such, the terrain of the Cold War does not alter but rather than events in Poland and Eastern Europe, the revisionists focus on the Marshall Plan. Moreover, the narrative schema privileges the ‘economy’ and economic interests as the main driver of the interests of the actors. As such, the root cause of the Cold War becomes the economic expansionism of the United States. This privileging is situated within a greater narrative of United States foreign policy and a retelling the story of its engagement with world politics.

IV. POST-REVISIONISM

Post – revisionism became influential towards the end of the 1970s and represented a conscious effort by its representatives to extract ideology from the narrative and present an ‘objective’ analysis of the period. Furthermore, they present a multi-causal, multi-dimensional explanations for the origins of the Cold War. They agree with the revisionists that economic interests play a role but they accuse the revisionists of providing mono-causal, reductionist explanations. As such, they insert into the discussion factors other than economy such as the domestic political process, public opinion and the international system constructing a story of many dimensions. Despite this intent, the post-revisionist school encompasses a wide range of perspectives within itself. There are wide ranges of works whereby one end of the spectrum attempts to integrate certain aspects of revisionism in a manner that downplays their main arguments and justifies the assumptions of traditionalism. The other end of the spectrum accepts many of the assumptions of revisionism but also depassivizes the Soviet Union.

Hence, an amalgamation of traditionalist and revisionist perspectives can be located in the post-revisionist school.

The post-revisionist school is generally brings a systemic analysis of the Cold War. These works emphasize the anarchic structure of the international system, balance of power and the security dilemma in the post-world war II period. There is a reversal of the traditionalist account in conceding that the Soviet Union acted based on national security perceptions rather than being directed by the all-encompassing dictates of communism. Despite a reversal of traditionalist precepts, there also exists a reversal of revisionist approach by presenting the Soviet Union as an active actor because post-revisionists concede that even though acting on national security concerns the Soviet Union was nonetheless a threat and/or was perceived to be a threat by American foreign policymakers. Thus, one end of the spectrum considers Soviet search for security a danger that needed to be dealt with. The other side of the post-revisionist spectrum considers that at certain moments within this time-frame there did exist opening that could have led to alternative outcomes making the Cold War not inevitable. Furthermore, in contrast to the traditionalists, post revisionists do not consider U.S. foreign policy makers to be idealist isolationists, but rather realist individuals who comprehended and tried to advance American interests. Still, there does exist different levels of consciousness that is attributed to American foreign policy makers. Certain post-revisionists like Melvyn Leffler²⁹⁰ argue that a clear-cut national security conception and definition of aims and interests had been mapped out before being confronted with the post-World War II international system whereas others such as Bruce Kuniholm²⁹¹ argue that American foreign policymakers devised a strategy in response to Soviet actions. Hence, it was more filled with uncertainty and fear than a previously conceived and timely executed plan.

The authors who best represent the two spectrums of the post-revisionist school are John Lewis Gaddis and Melvyn P. Leffler. John Lewis Gaddis in his seminal

²⁹⁰ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*,

²⁹¹ Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1980).

work *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* published in 1972. Although as stated the aim was to balance the traditionalist and revisionist interpretations of the origins of the Cold War, his interpretations are closer to that of traditionalist than revisionists. Gaddis refers, in traditionalist fashion, to Soviet ideology as “a hostile ideology”.²⁹² He states further that; “the Grand Alliance, like other conditions in world history was held together primarily by hatred for a common enemy”.²⁹³ With respect to US foreign policy plans, he does not present a uniform establishment, when he states that “the State Department’s briefing book papers on Germany, prepared for the President’s use at Yalta, stressed the importance of prevailing each occupying power from following unilateral policies,” thus decisions were not made “by the time of Germany’s surrender, the United States still had not decided between repression and rehabilitation as the best way to prevent future aggression”.²⁹⁴ The duality within the policy-making is underlined when he states “Washington officials knew what they wanted in Eastern Europe; maximum possible self-determination for the people of that region without impairing the unity of the Grand Alliance. Unfortunately, these two goals – both fundamental elements in the American programs for preventing future war – conflicted each other”.²⁹⁵ Furthermore, he states that “it seems likely that Washington policy-makers mistook Stalin’s determination to ensure Russian security through spheres of influence for a renewal effort to spread communism outside the borders of the Soviet Union. The Russians did not immediately impose communist regimes on all the countries they occupied after the warBut the Soviet leader failed to make the limited nature of his objectives clear”?²⁹⁶ The narrative provided here is of a dynamic relationship, the Soviet Union is presented as having legitimate security concerns and the United States is presented as eventually deciding on the policies to follow with respect to the Soviet Union. As such, it is not a one-dimensional depiction of actors or events. Yet, as in the traditionalist literature, the narrative about the ‘limits’ that the Soviet Union could not or rather should not alter is present. As such, the narrative presents a western-

²⁹² Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 31

²⁹³ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 105

²⁹⁴ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 131

²⁹⁵ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 133

²⁹⁶ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 355

centric narrative that remains within the same narrative terrain of the Cold War and understanding of world politics.

Turkey is inserted into the narrative as a demonstrative example of how American foreign policy makers determined and clarified their policies in reaction to Soviet actions. According to Gaddis, the Soviet note to Turkey in August 1946 was interpreted “as the culmination of a long effort by Moscow to establish naval bases in Turkey, a development which they feared might make that country a Soviet satellite”.²⁹⁷ As such, he states that; “the episode was significant, though, for it showed that the Truman Administration was now willing to risk war if necessary in order to block further Soviet expansion. Washington officials now agreed, for the most part, on the need for a firm policy”.²⁹⁸ On the issue of inevitability and the assigning of blame for the origins of the Cold War, Gaddis argues “the power vacuum in central Europe caused by Germany’s collapse made a Russian-American confrontation likely, it did not make it inevitable”.²⁹⁹ Gaddis puts the impending American-Russian rivalry in the context of the nature of the international system. The systemic analysis is present in this account whereby the power vacuum created after the Second World leaves the two great powers in a security dilemma and the story of the Cold War is one that is about the restoration of balance of power and solving the security dilemma. According to this narrative, “The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union”.³⁰⁰ The external situation was the structural condition of the international system that left the two great powers Soviet Union and United States facing each other. This narrative configuration continues in the trajectory of the ‘traditionalist’ and ‘revisionist’ analysis in the privileging of a specific understanding of European balance of power story.

²⁹⁷ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 327

²⁹⁸ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 337

²⁹⁹ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 359

³⁰⁰ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 361

Melvyn P. Leffler³⁰¹ represents the other end of the spectrum in post-revisionist school. His book *Preponderance of Power* diverges with Gaddis's account on several points as will be discussed. Leffler concentrates on concepts such as correlations of power, national security and geopolitics to explain the actions of the United States. Thus, according to Leffler,

“Neither the Americans, nor the Soviets sought to harm the other in 1945. But each side, in pursuit of its security interests, took steps that aroused the other's apprehensions. Moreover, the protests that each country's actions evoked from the other fuelled the cycle of distrust as neither could comprehend the fears of the other, perceiving its own actions as defensive. Herein rests the classic security dilemma”.³⁰²

For Leffler, the main roots of the Cold War can be located in the security dilemma created by the structure of the international system. Within that system “U.S. officials defined their national security in terms of correlations of power. American officials believed that they had to relieve the problems besetting the industrial democracies of Western Europe, integrate former enemies like Germany and Japan into the international economy if they failed in these tasks, the correlation of power in the international system would be transformed. The Soviet Union would grow stronger, the United States weaker”.³⁰³ Further he states that; “their overriding priority was to prevent a totalitarian adversary from conquering or assimilating the resources of Europe and Asia and using them to wage war against the United States, as the Axis powers had done during World War II”.³⁰⁴ Leffler further stressed that “the most important National Security Council (NSC) papers of the Truman administration incorporated a geostrategic vision. National security was interpreted in terms of correlations of power. Power was defined in terms of the control of resources, industrial infrastructure and overseas bases”.³⁰⁵

With respect to Turkey, Leffler presents an administration that had not taken a firm stand immediately; but at the end the power considerations led them to conclude that “if the Russians established themselves there, it was believed they

³⁰¹ For a more recent analysis of the Cold War by Melvyn P. Leffler see: Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States and the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008).

³⁰² Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 99

³⁰³ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 10

³⁰⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, “The emergence of an American grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I, The Origins*, ed, Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 77

³⁰⁵ Leffler, “The emergence of an American grand strategy,” 77

would then seek additional bases in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas because the Dardanelles would not be protected from modern air power without them”.³⁰⁶ Turkey itself and the domestic conditions of the country and its specific relationship with the Soviet Union are not discussed. Leffler embeds the Turkish episode within the larger narrative of the security dilemma the great powers found themselves in;

“if at the end of the war the Soviets were probing to enhance their position in the Middle East, which they were, then the Americans, too, were marking off areas of vital interest and calculating their prospective enemy’s vulnerabilities as well as their own requirements. These actions did not mean that Washington or Moscow or London sought or even expected a showdown. Each government was probably acting defensively but the cumulative effect, was to trigger a spiralling crisis of misperception and mistrust”.³⁰⁷

According to this narrative, “American fears did not stem from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note. The real problem was that there loomed gaping vacuums of power in this part of the world. In fact, Turkey’s geopolitical importance was directly related to the evolution of U.S. strategic concepts”.³⁰⁸ It is thus, geopolitical considerations and the security dilemma within which the United States and Soviet Union that constitutes the underlying causes of the Cold War. Despite the systemic determinants, Leffler does ascribe agency to the actors for even though the security dilemma existed ever since the end of the Second World War, it took time for the Cold War to get started. According to Leffler, Cold War begins in 1946 “when U.S. officials defined the Soviet union as the enemy” rather “than focus on the popular desire for reform and recovery throughout Europe, rather than emphasize the indigenous source of civil strife in Asia, and rather than identifying with revolutionary nationalism in the Third World, they latched onto an interpretation of international developments that placed blame and responsibility on the Kremlin”.³⁰⁹

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are present in the narrative as examples of hardening the perspective towards the Soviet Union. The policies themselves were not directly about the Soviet Union, as Leffler states,

³⁰⁶ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 78

³⁰⁷ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 81

³⁰⁸ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 124

³⁰⁹ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 100

“no one feared Soviet military aggression. But the long-term balance of power seemed imperilled by the exchange crisis in Europe, imminent economic disarray, and the prospective proliferation autarkical arrangements, and the anticipated capacity of European communist parties to capitalize on these circumstances. In June 1947 the United States launched the Marshall Plan to arrest an impending shift in the correlation of power between the United States and the Soviet Union”.³¹⁰

In Leffler’s analysis, the United States is the actor that acts is to rectify the correlations of power, and the Soviet Union, similar to the revisionist narrative, reacts to these actions. Unlike the revisionists, Leffler does not completely passivize the Soviet Union. He concedes that the Soviet Union gave reasons to American policymakers to doubt their intentions when “Soviet leaders forced unpopular and repressive governments on Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria”, “that Soviet commissars imposed unfair economic agreements even on friendly governments like the Lublin Poles; and that Soviet armies lived off the land, ravished the countryside, brutalised the people, and seized part of the industrial infrastructure of former enemy states”.³¹¹ Yet, Leffler also concedes that there were also signs that alternatives were possible since “free elections were held in Budapest and then throughout Hungary; Soviet troops were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia; a representative government was installed in Austria”.³¹² As such, it was which side of the picture one wanted to concentrate upon that was influential in determining the course of events and American policy-makers concerned with correlations of power and fearing the worst chose to concentrate on the latter. Even that was not a predetermined disposition according to Leffler’s narrative as he cites Bohlen, Robinson, Davies and Wallace and the alternative paths they proposed. As such according to Leffler, America’s Cold War strategy evolved in time based on past experiences and necessities of balance of power rather than being predetermined and inevitable. As he explains “The strategy evolved from vague talk about an open and international organization to more concrete ideas about the need to rebuild western Germany, reconstruct Western Europe, and rejuvenate Japan”.³¹³ But once these priorities were set other concerns appeared since “West Germany, Western Europe, and Japan could not prosper and

³¹⁰ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 163

³¹¹ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 51

³¹² Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*

³¹³ Melvyn P. Leffler, “The emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I, The Origins*, ed, Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 87

could not be secure if the periphery gravitated into the hands of revolutionary nationalists and Communists”.³¹⁴ In order to realize their aim of rehabilitating Western Europe and Japan American policy-makers had to ensure that areas their economies depended upon were not unstable either.

In conclusion, the alternative paths could not be taken, not because the United States was convinced of the expansionist inclinations of the Soviet Union or consciously wanted to “pick a fight” but because “the Americans were caught in the classic security dilemma whereby the steps deemed essential to promote their own security clashed with the security imperatives of the adversary”.³¹⁵ The narrative configurations of the events altered and different priorities were ascribed to actors yet the main Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics remained. It was the story of a European balance of power that needed to be maintained and the power vacuum that appeared after the Second World War leaving two superpowers face to face. As such,

“The Cold War was the legacy of World War II. That conflict deranged the international system, altered the balance of power in Europe, shattered colonial empires, restructured economic and social arrangements within nations and bequeathed a legacy of fear that preordained a period of unusual anxiety and tension”.³¹⁶

V. THE “NEW” COLD WAR HISTORY?

The literature becomes harder to distinguish towards the late 1980s. There are three main reasons for this complication. Firstly, the “end” of the Cold War paved the way for a new “school” that is an offshoot of the traditionalist wing of the post-revisionists; neo-traditionalism. The act of writing about the “Cold War” after the fact has demonstrated certain common characteristics mainly because of the interpretations on how it ended. The destruction of an “ideology”, “system of government” and the end of the Soviet Union is taken as vindicating many of the arguments put forward by Kennan in his infamous Long Telegram. As Gaddis argues;

³¹⁴ Leffler, “The emergence of an American grand strategy,” 87-88

³¹⁵ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 504

³¹⁶ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 513

“On February 22, 1946, sick in bed from the rigors of a Moscow winter and irritated as usual at the Department of States, Kennan summoned his secretary, Dorothy Hessman, and dictated an unusually long telegram. That document has a better claim than any other to having laid out the path by which the international system found its way from the trajectory of self-destruction it was on during the first half of the twentieth-century to a trajectory that had, by the end of the second half, removed the danger of great power war, revived democracy and capitalism, and thereby enhanced the prospects for human liberty beyond what they had ever been before”.³¹⁷

The view that US foreign policy during the Cold War was a success is a prevalent one that is affected by the manner in which the conflict is perceived to have come to a conclusion which also affected the conceptualization of the international in the post-Cold War period. Hence, the analysis of this “new school” will attempt to demonstrate “how the narrativization of events into stories with moral purposes partake in the constitution of realities that have political effects, even as those narratives claim the status of dispassionate and descriptive observer”.³¹⁸ Secondly, towards the end of the 1980s post-revisionist school led the way also for the pericentrist school. Pericentrist school appeared towards the “end” inserting into the literature the British story.³¹⁹ Deighton inserts Great Britain in to the narrative about the origins and underlines that ‘British decision-makers assessed early on that they would have to base postwar foreign policy both on the threat from Communist ideology and on the consequences of the arrival of the Soviet Union as the new great power on the world stage’.³²⁰ In line with the post-revisionist and systemic explanations Deighton underlines that the main priority was not Communism or the Soviet Union but ‘to maintain Britain’s place as a major global and imperial power in a rapidly changing period of fresh ideological and power political challenges’.³²¹ Hence, she argues ‘that this priority would still have existed in Britain even if the soviet Union had withdrawn from active international politics’.³²² Thus adding Britain into the narrative does not alter the

³¹⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, “After Containment: The Legacy of George Kennan in the Age of Terrorism,” *The New Republic*, April 25, 2005, 31.

³¹⁸ David Campbell, “Contra Wight: the errors of a premature writing,” *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1999): 320

³¹⁹ Anne Deighton, “Britain and the Cold War,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I, The Origins*, ed, Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 112-132.

³²⁰ Deighton, “Britain and the Cold War,” 112

³²¹ Deighton, “Britain and the Cold War,” 113

³²² Deighton, “Britain and the Cold War,” 113

main assumptions of the story but adds another actor into the equation. The story of the origins remains the same. Since the end, the story has been extended to Africa, Asia, Middle East and Eastern Europe. Yet pericentrism does not constitute a separate school of the origins of the Cold War because even though the focus shifts the central parameters of the narrative schema are reproduced for other stories. There are many Cold War(s) within the Cold War schema but the structure of the story and the configurations, prioritizations and what counts as ‘events’ does not alter. That is why, Vojtech Mastny, though presenting a pericentrist account of the Cold War focusing on Russia also reproduces the traditionalist assumptions on the origins of the Cold War.

The end has created a separation of intent between the previous schools and the present literature. Knowing how the “conflict” ended affects our perceptions of what it meant. Yet with respect to the origins these three factors even though complicating the literature do not actually constitute a “New Cold War History” since the main narratives and characterizations of the previous schools are reproduced.

This part of the chapter will proceed not in clear cut order of the schools since as mentioned even though new approaches have come forth, the parameters of the discussion have not altered. As such the three tendencies are interrelated not only with each other but also with the schools elaborated upon in the first section of the chapter. The pericentric tendency made its appearance primarily with respect to the role of Great Britain. In that sense, the appearance of pericentrism should not be clustered into the end of the Cold War movement, since it started towards the end of 1970s and early 1980s, as an offshoot of the post-revisionist aim to complicate the understanding of the Cold War. Hence, in 1981, Terry Anderson, argued, what would become the main basis of pericentrism that “in the examination of the cold war, however, most historians have promoted what could be called the superpower thesis. They have scrutinized Soviet-American relations but have tended to reflect the third member of the wartime Grand Alliance”.³²³ Despite an attempt to insert another actor into the story contra pericentrists after

³²³ Terry Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-1947* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981), viii

the end, the justification lies in Great Britain's status as a great power. Anderson states that "many historians have either forgotten or neglected that during the war and until the Truman Doctrine of 1947 there was not just two nations fighting for control and influence in the post-war world, but three, and until the second half of 1946, Britain – not the United States – was Russia's primary adversary".³²⁴ As such, the main questions he asks does not alter from established schools like "how much responsibility – whether credit or blame – should the British bear for this change in American policy".³²⁵ In that sense, as he states: "my thesis is most similar to post-revisionism".³²⁶ Furthermore, as will be seen, he is closer to the post-revisionism that shares more assumptions with traditionalism than revisionism.

According to Anderson, British policy towards the Soviet Union was a continuation of century long policies towards the continent and Russia, therefore, differed from that of the United States. British policy blended Churchill's intense anti-communism with his nation's traditional plans for dealing with the Continent. British policy also reflected the efforts of nineteenth-century leaders from Castlereagh to Salisbury to ensure that no nation dominated the Continent. After the defeat of the Third Reich – as in 1815 after the collapse of Napoleonic France – Russia must be prevented from ruling Europe".³²⁷ Thus, Britain's relations with Russia are inserted into the narrative of European history where great-power politics is based on maintaining the balance of power. This narrative presents Great Britain and United States as being in disagreement on how to approach the Soviet Union. It was only with time that American attitude changed and became more in line with British policies. This change according to Anderson was induced by the actions of the Soviet Union; whereby "Russian behaviour appalled American diplomats in Eastern Europe, Iran and Korea and outraged a public that had hoped for a world based on Wilsonian ideals".³²⁸ Yet, Anderson also argues that Britain played an important role in convincing the Americans. He states that; "British diplomacy, during the first three months of 1946 was a catalyst – Bevin's

³²⁴ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, viii

³²⁵ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, ix

³²⁶ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, ix

³²⁷ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, 10

³²⁸ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, 116

stand in the U.N.O and Churchill's address accelerated the evolution of the administration's new attitude toward Russia".³²⁹ Even though, Russian actions convinced U.S. policymakers that "Wilsonian ideals" could not be sustained, Britain was also a factor in convincing the Americans on how to approach the Soviets.

The underlying assumptions presented by Anderson displays similarities with "traditionalist" accounts whereby America pursuing "Wilsonian ideals" has to react to external factors. The main difference in this narrative is that the United States does not only react to Soviet actions but also to British ones. Hence, the general American foreign policy conception of a United States inclined towards cooperation and idealism also exists within this narrative when Anderson states; "the Truman administration had accepted old-world tactics for the new atomic age and now was supporting a balance of power between East and West. In both diplomatic and military strategy the United States was cooperating with Great Britain to form a policy that would later be labelled containment".³³⁰ Within this narrative America becomes an unwilling actor that had to be convinced to abandon its Wilsonian ideals and play the game of balance of power by the quintessential player of the game that had maintained the balance of power in Europe for over a century. Discussion of the Truman Doctrine is discussed under the heading "Shifting the Burden" embedding the narrative of balance of power and America replacing Britain as the country responsible for maintaining it. Anderson argues, "the Truman Doctrine set forth a policy advanced by Great Britain. The United States adopted an approach in Greece that the British had employed since 1944. The administration also accepted Churchill's conviction, first expressed in 1943, that the post-war menace was Russia".³³¹ Thus, Britain had commenced policies later adopted by the Americans and was influential players at the onset of the Cold War.

The main works representing the onset of the pericentrism by bringing in Great Britain into the narrative of the Cold War also demonstrated that the main contours of "traditional" Cold War historiography are not abandoned. As such,

³²⁹ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, 117

³³⁰ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, 141

³³¹ Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, 179

along with the pericentrist tendency neo-traditionalism also appeared. Britain is narrated as the representative of old Europe that aids America in realising the realities of balance of power politics. As Anderson stated,

“the United States tried to ignore ideological differences, pre-war relations, the Katyn Forest massacre, the Warsaw uprising, the constant warnings from American and British diplomats and looked forward to a universal organization that would maintain one world – an impossibility. The Soviets were different – a fact too often ignored in Washington”.³³²

The traditional interpretation of American foreign policy as being based on Wilsonian ideals is reproduced in these narratives. Furthermore, this narrative fits into the traditionalist perspective of Cold War historiography whereby America is a passive actor that has to react to Soviet expansionism. Great Britain is incorporated to the story as an active actor that assists the United States in her transformation from a passive actor to an active actor to redress the issue of balance of power. Secondly, in attempting to bring in agency to other actors, these works actually reify the “Cold War” as an entity and establishes the time period in a manner that subsumes other possible narratives. Even though bringing in other states into the story of the Cold War extends the landscape of the story, the time frame and characterizations themselves are not questioned resulting in a process whereby other stories such as Britain and her Empire become part of the Cold War storyline. As such, bringing Great Britain into the story reproduces the boundaries of the ‘state of the art’. Furthermore, it continues the tradition of presenting a certain understanding of European history. Thirdly, this narrative presents European history as a linear story that can be reduced to balance of power politics and Russia as a continuous entity whose “aims” have not altered. Within this European history stretching back to the 19th century Great Britain is presented as the balancer of continental Europe ensuring that no one power dominates the continent. As a consequence relations with the Soviet Union and the Cold War become another stage in the balance of power politics of the European state system.

Another actor whose existence has become more central within the Cold War story was the Soviet Union. Even though traditionalists had given the Soviet

³³² Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War*, 181

Union an active role in the making of the Cold War, it was a one-dimensional role that did not attempt to grasp the political system of the Soviet Union or the decision-making process. Furthermore, the revisionists had presented a multi-dimensional Soviet Union with multiple interests but as a passive actor. Hence works by Vojtech Mastny and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pelshavok represented important breaking points with respect to understanding the Soviet perspective of the Cold War.

Vojtech Mastny's book *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity* is a book that is both neo-traditionalist and pericentrist. He focuses on the Russian story and the reasons behind the policies they pursued and adopted. According to Mastny, Stalin's motivation was the attainment of security and "he tried to accomplish what he wanted with rather than against his powerful Western allies, whose support, or at least acquiescence, he deemed indispensable for achieving the kind of security he craved".³³³ Mastny argued that "what went wrong at Yalta was the way how the participants badly misjudged each other's intentions."³³⁴ In the chapter entitled "the Unwanted Cold War" he states that "the forthcoming Cold War was both unintended and unexpected; it was predetermined all the same".³³⁵ Though as the title suggests Stalin is not portrayed as wanting a Cold War, the Cold War is an inevitable event nonetheless because even though Stalin showed restraint at times "in other places the post-victory euphoria made the Soviet ruler less resistant to the imperialistic temptations he had earlier not allowed his subordinates. He attempted to intimidate Turkey to cede to the Soviet Union territory in the Caucasus and military bases on the Balkan Sea straits".³³⁶ Even though the "crisis" with Turkey is mentioned as an example of how Stalin lost the trust of the West, the events are not elaborated upon and Turkey is narrated into the story as a passive actor without any agency.

With respect to the Marshall Plan, Mastny states that it left Stalin in a quandary because "the project was deeply subversive of Stalin's hegemonical concept of

³³³ Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity: The Stalin years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 21

³³⁴ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 22

³³⁵ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 23

³³⁶ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 23

international order, aimed at ensuring his country's security at the expense of all others".³³⁷ As such, "he had the unenviable choice of either risking the intrusion of Western influences within his sphere of power, or close insulating the sphere, thus precipitating against his will the division of the Continent into hostile blocs".³³⁸ Soviet Union's response to the Marshall Plan is determined by domestic politics. As such, in postrevisionist fashion, Mastny does not only focus upon the international system or the balance of power but the decision-making process and the domestic forces within the Soviet Union. As he states

"in the course of the forty year contest, domestic considerations determined Soviet international behaviour far more than most contemporaries, misled by the Kremlin's not having to account for its action to anyone, were prepared to believe. As long as Stalin was in charge, those considerations were more general than specific – his need to maintain his autocratic power and an economy that would sustain it".³³⁹

Mastny locates the origins of the Cold War within the Soviet Union and argues that "the roots of the conflict were domestic and ideological. Rather than sharing with his people relief at the end of their wartime suffering, Stalin saw a threat to his tyranny in their expectations of a better life. He needed to justify it by convincing them that they remained surrounded by enemies".³⁴⁰ Despite the restraints showed at times in an effort to maintain the alliance the Cold War was still inevitable because the Soviet Union necessitated an enemy. Mastny's narrative presents a story whereby the Cold War grows out of the sense of insecurity felt by Soviet leaders as a consequence of which they took "greater risks whenever they saw the correlation of forces turning in their favour. In estimating their own strengths and the weaknesses of their adversaries, they were prone to miscalculation. They were enhanced by their ideological preconceptions, which postulated the ultimate victory of their system".³⁴¹ In addition to arguing that the Soviet search for security was rooted in domestic factors, Mastny also stresses that it was the changing balance of power in the international system that caused the Soviet system to attempt to expand into areas such as Turkey and Iran.

³³⁷ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 27

³³⁸ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 27

³³⁹ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 191

³⁴⁰ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 24

³⁴¹ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 191

Mastny, as opposed to traditionalists, does not present a one-dimensional Soviet Union intent on conquering the world, and brings forth domestic politics and the decision-making process within the Soviet Union that was generally ignored. Nonetheless, the narrative does present some of the assumptions of traditionalism, when Mastny states that “the inside evidence of Moscow’s capabilities and intentions no longer leaves a doubt that its leaders never wanted to overstep its limits.”³⁴² But he continues by stating, “this is not to say that the threat the West perceived was an empty one”.³⁴³ Since, Stalin would attempt to expand when he saw an opportunity, it was Stalin and the Soviet Union that was expansionist “attempting to overstep its limits” that jeopardized cooperation. This statement is a demonstration that the Soviet Union had acted too aggressively based on the “limits” established by the West. This is a theme that is present both in traditionalist and post-revisionist schools. The underlying assumption of this assertion is that the international system was to be set up by the United States as the new hegemon and the Soviet Union could act only within the boundaries set forth by the hegemon. As such, the Soviet Union had to know the “limits” within which it had to act. This narrative elevates the United States to the status of the rightful party by virtue of being the designer of the international system and the Soviet Union becomes the actor that threatens the international system.

To conclude he states that “if the empire Stalin created was in fact every bit as evil as suspected, and much more, than those who waged the Cold War against it need not apologize for the effort”.³⁴⁴ Such a perspective is prevalent, as will be seen, within the neo-traditionalists who wrote after the “end” and knowing it justify the actions of the United States. Within this narrative Cold War becomes necessary to counter the Soviets and the only question to be asked is “whether they did the best they could”.³⁴⁵ Hence, the villain and the hero of the story are clearly delineated and the only question remaining is how successful were the hero’s actions.

³⁴² Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 191

³⁴³ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 191

³⁴⁴ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 194

³⁴⁵ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet insecurity*, 194

So far the discussion on pericentrism has been with respect to the works focusing on great powers. An important development in this tendency was the increasing works on Central and Eastern European states that attempted to recount the story of the region and countries narrated as the main contention of great power politics. Vesselin Dimitrov, in *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and Communism in Bulgaria 1941-1948* criticizes how "Eastern Europe has tended to be perceived as a hapless victim of great power politics and the destruction of democracy in the region had therefore been seen as a product of Soviet policy".³⁴⁶ Dimitrov argues, "there was no *single* Soviet foreign policy. Soviet policy was driven by contradictory impulses and was often uncoordinated, in both conceptual and institutional terms. It aimed both at promoting the interests of the Soviet Union, sometimes defined rather broadly, and the minimization of the possibility of conflict with the capitalist powers".³⁴⁷ Thus, according to this narrative Stalin did not have an established, planned road map on how to proceed with respect to Eastern Europe and "allowed various options to be played out and whilst retaining ultimate and discretionary control, did not wish to commit himself to any particular blueprint".³⁴⁸ These assumptions create an area whereby the actions of domestic actors can also have a determining influence on the course of events. Thus, there were also choices made by Eastern European countries, domestic rivalries, ideological conflicts that played themselves out. As such, "for the Eastern European countries, the onset of the Cold War meant not only that they found themselves in the zone of influence of one of the great powers, but also that they experienced a revolutionary transformation of their national political, social and economic systems. It was in Eastern Europe that the link between the international and the domestic aspects of the Cold War, and the underlying ideological nature of the clash between liberal democracy and communism become most apparent".³⁴⁹ It was all not about Stalin's aims and Western efforts to counter them, as opposed to traditionalists, or Western efforts to expand economically contra revisionists. It was also about the historical conditions of Eastern European states, their social and economic fabric and the

³⁴⁶ Vesselin Dimitrov, *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet foreign policy, democracy and communism in Bulgaria, 1941-48* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3

³⁴⁷ Dimitrov, *Stalin's Cold War*, 193

³⁴⁸ Dimitrov, *Stalin's Cold War*, 181

³⁴⁹ Dimitrov, *Stalin's Cold War*, 3

manner in which their domestic issues played out. Gunter Bischof in *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55, The League of the Weak* also argued in support of bringing into the account of the Cold War the domestic conditions of Austria to comprehend how superpower relations played out in the country. He argues that the new Cold War history has “started to look at the Cold War as more complex international arena in which the superpowers organized imperial structures in which the metropolises frequently had a difficult time keeping their charges/puppets in line”.³⁵⁰ Bischof concentrates on the role Austria played as a weak power in manipulating the superpower game. Bischof defines the Cold War as “a high stakes gamble across the globe for geostrategic advantages based on exaggerated security demands. The US and USSR held mirror “enemy images” of each other”.³⁵¹ Washington’s struggle for “preponderance of power” was mirrored by the Kremlin’s “revolutionary-imperialist paradigm”.³⁵² Bischof’s definition is rooted in Melvyn Leffler and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov’s respective analysis of American and Soviet perceptions and definition of interests. His focus on geostrategy demonstrates a commonality with post-revisionism in its reliance on neo-realism to explain international system of the period based on an understanding of security dilemma and geostrategic considerations. Bischof also draws from earlier pericentrist works by periodizing 1945-46 as the Anglo-Soviet Cold War over Austria. As Bischof states “the official British mindset perceived Soviet expansionism into Central Europe as a continuation of its *unilateral* actions in Eastern Europe which needed to be contained. For the British, Austria became a crucial threat and stopping communist expansion”.³⁵³ According to this narrative, “London’s Cold War with Moscow was sparked before the hot war ended”.³⁵⁴ Hence, Americans were presented as actors that need to be convinced of Austria’s worth in countering the Soviet threat. With respect to this assumption, Bischof is in line with the pericentrists that tell the British story by adhering to certain traditionalist assumptions about American foreign policy making.

³⁵⁰ Gunter Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: the leverage of the weak* (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1999), 1

³⁵¹ Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War*, 4-5

³⁵² Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War*, 4-5

³⁵³ Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War*, 35

³⁵⁴ Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War*, 35

Bischof includes Austria within the narrative as an active actor who aided Britain in convincing the Americans. As he argues, “the Austrians were astute in utilizing superpower ideological antagonisms to their advantage by frequently raising the spectre of imminent communist takeover in Vienna. It brought Western political and economic support”.³⁵⁵ Austria created a narrative about itself as a victim, as a country who resisted the Nazis and Austrian statesman “pleaded for financial relief for Austria, again coupled with the threat that, unless help was forthcoming, Austria might be driven into the hands of the Soviets,” whereby “perfecting [the] game of playing off East against West”.³⁵⁶ As such, he brings into the story domestic factors of Austria and how they were a factor in convincing the “isolationist” Americans to give more attention to Austria. This narrative reinforces the traditional perspective on American foreign policy. Furthermore, the reasons behind why Austria chose to be aided by America are not discussed. In an attempt to break the dominant, one-dimensional analysis of the Cold War as a great power conflict, Bischoff reproduces a one-dimensional analysis of Austrian history embedding it into a Cold War narrative of attempting to cooperate with America and not pondering whether or not alternative narratives existed at the time.

Amidst the plethora of works embedding national stories into the Cold War narrative, the end of the cold war also paved the way for a neo-traditionalist perspective. The most renowned neo-traditionalist is John Lewis Gaddis. His book entitled the *Cold War: A New History* starts with a moral judgement on the era that demonstrates the manner in which neo-traditionalists view the Cold War. He states that “the world, I am quite sure, is a better place for that conflict having been fought in the way that it was and won by the side that won it”.³⁵⁷ Hence, the determining factor of how it ended or is perceived to have come to a closure is an important part of what Gaddis perceives to be the Cold War. He argues that “for all its dangers, atrocities, costs, distractions, and moral compromises, the Cold War – like the American Civil War – was a necessary contest that settled fundamental issues once and for all. We have no reason to miss it. But given the

³⁵⁵ Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War*, 3

³⁵⁶ Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War*, 73

³⁵⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), xi

alternatives, we have little reason either to regret its having occurred”.³⁵⁸ Defining the results of the Cold War in such a manner predetermines the manner in which the origins of the Cold War will be identified. If the world is a better place for it having occurred and fought in the manner that it was and especially because of the way it ended then the world is by default a better place because the United States decided to contain Soviet expansionism. The core arguments of the traditionalist school are present in the narrative provided by Gaddis. According to Gaddis, “Stalin’s goal ... was not to restore a balance of power in Europe, but rather to dominate that continent as thoroughly as Hitler had sought to do. Unlike Hitler, however, Stalin followed no fixed timetable. He had welcomed the D-Day landings, despite the fact that they would preclude the Red Army from reaching western Europe anytime soon”.³⁵⁹ Furthermore, he argues that “Stalin’s was, therefore, a grand vision, the peacefully accomplished but historically determined domination of Eastern Europe. It was also a flawed vision, for it failed to take into account the evolving post-war objectives of the United States”.³⁶⁰

A similar narrative is presented in his previous book *We Now Know* where he asks the question “did Stalin therefore seek a Cold War?” and answers by stating that ‘the question is a little like asking ‘does a fish seek water?’ Suspicion, distrust, and cynicism were not only his preferred but his necessary environment”.³⁶¹ According to this narrative, the question of inevitability is answered in the positive whereby Stalin himself is found culpable for the origins of the conflict. As such for Gaddis;

‘one has to wonder whether the Cold War really began in 1945. For it was Stalin’s disposition to wage cold wars: he had done so in one form or another throughout his life, against members of his own family, against his closest advisers and their families, against old revolutionary comrades, against foreign communists, even against returning Red Army war veterans who, for whatever reason, had contacts of any kind with the West in the course of defeating Nazi Germany”.³⁶²

As a consequence, it was in the nature of Stalin to wage cold wars and it was inevitable that he would do so with respect to the West as well. This perspective

³⁵⁸ Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, xi

³⁵⁹ Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, 14

³⁶⁰ Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, 14

³⁶¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: rethinking Cold War history* (Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 25

³⁶² Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 22-23

brings back the basic assumptions of traditionalism and reproduces the Cold War having had the hindsight of the end of the Cold War. The pericentric and neo-traditionalist approaches to explaining the Cold War are both different tellings of the revisionist and traditionalist schools. The actors are increased within the story but the story itself does not alter.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has attempted to present a bird's eye view of the main currents and discussions in Cold War historiography. It is not an exhaustive coverage of the literature nor does it aim to be. The works discussed constitute the main pillars of the historiographical discourse on the Cold War and are also constitutive of Cold War narrative configurations. The double movement of the historiographical operation on the Cold War moves to create the 'Cold War' but is also constituted and limited by the borders established during that operation. The aim as such is not to discuss all the works in Cold war historiography or to present a classical literature review but to identify the narratives about the United States, Soviet Union, foreign policy and the international system prevalent in the literature.

The origins of the Cold War as shown in this chapter have been interpreted in a myriad of ways. The schools diverge on which actor has none agency hence responsibility (was the Soviet Union the sole responsible or the United States), which events were more defining (was the Marshall Plan the trigger or the coup in Czechoslovakia), which factors played an important role (were the Soviet Union and/or United states motivated by economy, ideology or national interests). These schools approach the fact of the "Cold War" with its established perimeters, characterizations and periodizations and attempt to analyse why it came about. The differences are in the way they define the international system, the state, how national interests are formed and to what degree individuals played a role but all of these schools accept and reproduce the "Cold War" as unquestionable. The schools ascribe to the main Western characterizations and periodizations. Even if the revisionists and post-revisionist accounts treat the Soviet Union as a multi-dimensional actor the story is predominantly told from the perspective of the

United States, through concepts prioritized by the West, and periodizations that are embedded into the Western historiography. The differences in the narratives between the traditionalist and revisionist schools is based primarily on their differing interpretations of American foreign policy. Their understanding of the Cold War is directly linked to their understanding of American foreign policy. Thus, the narrative configuration of the Cold War are directly linked to Eurocentric conception of world politics. It fits within the narrative of European balance of power political history. The pericentric school attempts to break through this dominance by telling the stories of the other countries involved such as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France exploring their histories and ascribing them much more agency. These narratives are embedded into the Western narrative rather than question it. Furthermore, in pericentrist accounts the idea of an already defined international system is present. There is a eurocentrist international system that is taken as a given and Soviet Union's actions are analysed within it. Hence, the recurring theme that the Soviet Union acted compulsively with Turkey and pushed the limits that had been established by the Anglo-American narrative of the international system.

This chapter has provided the main boundaries of the narrative terrain when discussing the 'Cold War'. The next chapter will analyse the main narratives that permeate the Turkish story of the Cold War and how they enable Turkish stories embedded into the main Cold War narrative.

CHAPTER IV: RE/PRODUCING THE 'COLD WAR'

I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the ways in which the narrative configuration of the Cold War was reproduced in the non-Western context. The previous chapter outlined the historical operations over the Cold War. Three points need to be underlined with respect to the narrative configurations. Firstly, that the narrative schema of the Cold War is based on a Eurocentric conception of world politics. Secondly, the different interpretations on the Cold War still tell the story of American foreign policy. It is the different interpretations of American foreign policy that are reflected in the different schools of 'Cold War' historiography. Thirdly, even though the "pericentric" tradition concentrating on the stories of other actors has been able to bring forth their experiences but only at the expense of embedding these stories into the Cold War narrative. These studies as discussed in the previous chapter narrate how these states played a role in the coming about of the Cold War and do not use these stories to challenge the main narrative of the Cold War. As it gives agency to the actors it also takes it away from them. These states become crucial actors in the Western-centric story but unable to have a meta-narrative story of their own. These points demonstrate the necessity for decentering history and historiography in order to decenter the field of IR. These understandings and narrative configurations are not only reproduced and become defining features at the center but are reproduced in the non-western context as well. Thus, an important part of decentering the manner in which knowledge is produced and disseminated is to focus on the non-Western context and ask how

are the narrative configurations and historiographical operations reproduced in the non-Western context.

This chapter will focus upon Turkey's historiography on the Cold War and how it has reproduced the historiographical operation on the Cold War. This historiographical operation is not only reproduced as a result of imposition of the West but was also a result of the way in which these operations were part of the westernization and democratization narrative that were embedded into the Western-centric story. Thus, it needs to be underlined that this editing out was not forced but was readily accepted as it fit the 'western' and 'democratizing' idea of Turkey that was being re/produced. This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part will provide an outline that will help contextualize the idea of Turkey that was being re/defined and re/produced. The next section will proceed to the historiographical analysis. This section is divided into four parts; Turkish foreign policy, relations with the United States, Straits Issue, and the Cold War. The Turkish foreign policy section will analyze the literature on general Turkish foreign policy in order to ascertain the dominant understanding of Turkish foreign policy. How is Turkish foreign policy conceptualized, how are its "interests" and "threats" to it defined within the literature. The second section concentrating on relations with the United States and on the manner in which the United States and Turkey's relations with it have been narrated in the literature. The third section discusses the way in which the Straits Issue has been narrated. Straits issue is an integral part of the "Cold War" narrative of the Turkish story and as such how it is defined and understood is a central part of the manner in which Turkish foreign policy was narrated. The last section focuses on how the Cold War has been narrated. This section demonstrates how the narratives of the previous sections come together to embed Turkey's story into the American narrative. The Cold War narrative, the U.S. alliance narrative and Straits narrative reifies Turkey's dominant narrative of westernization, democratization and modernization.

II. CONTEXTUALIZING 'TURKEY'

In order to comprehend the discussion on Turkish foreign policy a brief introductory discussion on Turkish domestic context is necessary. Most accounts of Turkish historiography take the year 1923, the establishment of the Republic, as a demarcation line that underlines the advent of a new era. As a consequence, the pre-1923 is an era of corruption, backwardness and decadence that is left behind with the establishment of the Republic. This insistence on a break has come under increasing criticism and continuities with the Ottoman Empire are being underlined. As Poulton states;

‘this transformation can be seen as having occurred over a longer period than the Kemalists claim, and there were fairly solid antecedents to many of Kemal’s sweeping reforms. Additionally, despite Kemal’s version, there were strong links between him and the previous Young Turk regime since he had been a trusted CUP member. This continuity is further illustrated by the fact that 85 percent of the Ottoman Empire’s civil servants and 93 per cent of its staff officers retained their positions in the new republic’.³⁶³

Nonetheless, 1923 is still a demarcation line for any analysis of continuity or change. As Aykut Kansu states;

‘Ignoring the first two decades of the twentieth century helps the conventional historiography to maintain the myth of the creation of modern Turkey in the 1920s. [This] perpetuated the belief that it was the First World War that finally terminated the centuries-old Ottoman Empire. Thus, the end of the First World War, which for reasons specific to Turkey came not in 1918 but in 1923.... because, for 'objective' reasons as well, a convenient demarcation line for the current periodization of Turkish history. In this 'normal' division of periods in Turkish history, 1923, thus, easily becomes an accepted date for both the pro and con arguments for the continuity *versus* discontinuity thesis’.³⁶⁴

Hence, even though discussion has begun on the issue of to what extent the establishment of the Republic can be considered a clean break the literature is still determined by classifications, categorizations and characterizations that form the dominant narrative of the development of the Turkish state. How this narrative formed and established itself is an important point because it also influences the narratives of foreign policy and the embeddedness into a Eurocentric conceptualization of foreign policy.

The road that would be taken was far from being certain when the War of

³⁶³ Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and crescent: Turkish nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (New York: NYU Press, 1997), 88

³⁶⁴ Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1997), 6

Independence ended and the decisions; political battles and the ensuing clashes were decisive in formulating the nature of the state and definition of the nation.³⁶⁵ Hence, the declaration of the Republic on 29 October 1923 was taken when the more ‘conservative’ elements of the Independence War such as Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Adnan (Adivar) and Kazim (Karabekir) were not in Ankara. Even though they protested afterwards mainly arguing that establishment of a Republic and a democracy were not essentially the same,³⁶⁶ they had been left with a *fait accompli*. There were different opinions and views for the future of the newly established state that competed. One of these factions established the Progressive Republican Party in 1924. Even though there was no difference between the Progressive Republican Party and the Republican People's Party with respect to secularism and nationalism they did differ in their endorsement for more ‘decentralization, separation of powers and evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.’³⁶⁷ The life-span of the opposition party was short due to the manner in which the government reacted to the rebellions.³⁶⁸ As a response to the rebellions, the government passed the Law on the Maintenance of Order establishing martial law but the measures taken went beyond suppressing the rebellions and extended to other areas such as closing down periodicals and newspapers. These events also led to the closing down of the Progressive Republican Party. The situation got more complicated when a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal was discovered and although their direct involvement could not be proven, members of the PRP were arrested.³⁶⁹ The suppression of the Kurds, the elimination of the opposition and the establishment of the radical and revolutionary laws paved the way for the establishment of a reactionary, highly authoritarian government with an extremely censored definition of secularism and nationalism that established the dominant narrative for decades to come. Mustafa Kemal provided the main story of the Turkish republic in his 36 hours speech *Nutuk* where he presented a narrative of events from 1919 to 1927. More importantly, *Nutuk* was “a vindication of the

³⁶⁵ Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet* (Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 1994); *İlk Meclis'in Vekilleri: Milli Mücadele Döneminde Seçimler* (Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 2010); *Tek Parti'nin Yükselişi* (Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 2012); *Tek Parti'nin İktidarı: Türkiye'de Seçimler ve Siyaset* (1923-.1946) (Istanbul:İletisim Yayınları, 2013).

³⁶⁶ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 167

³⁶⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 168

³⁶⁸ Seyh Said

³⁶⁹ For more on the period see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925* (Leiden: Netherlands, 1991)

purges of 1925-26 and criticizing the former leaders of the PRP is the main theme' where the narrative 'presents them throughout as doubters, incompetent and traitors, and depicts himself as the one who led the movement from the outset'.³⁷⁰ The periodizations used in the narrative demonstrate this point more clearly. Mustafa Kemal takes May 1919 when he arrived in Anatolia as the starting date for the commencement of the Independence Struggle which integrates him as the central character to the story leaving out the important roles played by personalities such as Kazim Karabekir before and after. Hence, according to this presentation of events the Independence struggle starts with Mustafa Kemal in 1919 and the events, resistances and policies beforehand are ignored. Furthermore, the congress of 1927 where Mustafa Kemal delivered his speech was called the 'Second congress of the RPP' even though it was not. It was called the second because the RPP adopted the Sivas Congress in 1919 as its first congress embedding the Party within the independence struggle and associating itself with that period completely.

The 1927 Congress established the dominant narrative of the history of the Independence and establishment of the Republic. Furthermore, in the 1931 Congress the main ideological components were outlined as: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism. The one-party state was officially declared. Secularism was not only interpreted as a separation of state and religion but as the complete control of religion by the state. With respect to nationalism, a series of national myths were created in the 1930s in an attempt to construct a national identity.³⁷¹ Statism was a policy that aimed to establish the predominance of the state in the economy. Revolutionarism aimed to continue change in an evolutionary manner. Populism was a concept that stressed national unity and solidarity that "entailed a denial of class interests (according to Kemalism, Turkey did not have classes in the European sense) and a prohibition of political activity based on class."³⁷² These determining precepts formed the

³⁷⁰ Zurcher, *Turkey: a modern history*, 175

³⁷¹ These myths were 'Turkish historical thesis' and 'Sun-Language Theory'. More on these myths and policies to construct a national identity see: Senem Aslan, "Citizen, Speak Turkish : A Nation in the Making," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13:2 (2007): 245-272; Yilmaz Colak, "Language Policy and Official Ideology in Early Republican Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40:6 (Nov. 2004): 67-91 and Ahmet Yildiz, *Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyebilene* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2000).

³⁷² Zurcher, *Turkey: A modern history*, 182

basis of Kemalism and even though it does not form a coherent, well defined ideology; it does form the basis of the identity upon which the Turkish state and Turkish statesmen acted. As Poulton states; “In this ideology “Turkish nationalism” as defined by the Kemalists was seen as a monolithic solution to all social, political, economic and cultural problems. Competing variants of “nationalism” - whether pan-Turkist or Islamic in inspiration - were proscribed”.³⁷³ It should be underlined that this identity is constantly reproduced and redefined and does not remain stable across time and space.

This narrative provides an important understanding of the state and the nation that was defined in the early years of the Republic. The historiography has embedded these principles of Kemalism within the narrative making the Independence War as always being about the establishment of a Turkish nation state and Mustafa Kemal and his entourage aiming to establish a modern, western and secular state. As Kansu states;

“In Kemalist ideology, Atatürk and the Republican People's Party are portrayed as modernizers and 'revolutionaries' who provided for the political, social and economic development - or, even, transformation - of Turkey'. Furthermore, 'all political struggle between the Kemalists and their opponents in the 1920s is portrayed as a struggle between the forces of modernity as against those of religious reaction’”.³⁷⁴

Although these narratives and principles have increasingly been challenged in the past years,³⁷⁵ during the period 1945-50 their dominance was unquestionable. Hence, the first point to underline about the period 1945-50 with respect to domestic politics is the fact that the state and government was governed by many of the same leaders that were present in the establishment of the dominant narrative and Kemalism such as President İsmet İnönü. Despite this, the period also witnessed drastic changes in the political system of Turkey. The period with respect to domestic politics is generally characterized as ‘Transition to Democracy’.³⁷⁶ Even though the notion of democracy can be questioned it was a period of change where there was a transition to multi-party politics. Yet the periodization of 1945-1950 overlooks that criticism with the policies of the

³⁷³ Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf*, 102

³⁷⁴ Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, 7

³⁷⁵ Mete Tuncay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 1923-1931* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981); Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Disi bir İnceleme* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993)

³⁷⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey : A Modern History*

government and state reforms had existed beforehand- Influential personalities such as Celal Bayar, Tevfik Rustu Aras, Riza Soyak had started meeting and discussing their criticisms of the government. The criticisms became more overt after the end of the war when on the 7th of June (1945) a list of demands were presented by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Koprulu called the “Statement of Four”. The demands were mainly the democratization of the system. This statement was followed by a debate in the press that was started by Fuat Koprulu and Adnan Menderes who were criticizing the policies of the government. When the People’s Party to which they were apart of asked them to retract their statements, Koprulu and Menderes refused and were expelled from the Party. Celal Bayar handed his resignation not long after and on 7 January 1946, Bayar, Menderes, Koprulu and Koraltan announced the formation of the Democrat Party. Even though this move and the process of liberalization that started after the war signalled the emergence of a democracy it should be underlined that Celal Bayar announced the formation of the new Party only after getting the approval of Inonu and the programme of the new party did not demonstrate considerable differences from that of the People’s Party especially with respects to the main tenets of Kemalism. The programme demanded the achievement of ‘democracy’ but “it was not widely different from the platform of the People’s Party, offering more a difference of emphasis than a complete alternative”.³⁷⁷

The 1946 elections witnessed a myriad of political parties not just the Democrat Party and People’s Party. The Turkish Socialist Party and the Socialist Workers and Peasant Party of Turkey also participated in the elections but did not win any seats in the Parliament. The People’s Party won 395 seats and the Democrat Party won 66 seats. The ensuing debates centered on whether or not the People’s Party had tampered with the election process and the Democrat Party and the People’s Party started to argue bitterly in and outside the Parliament each side accusing the other of ‘leftist sympathies’ and ‘treacherous intentions’ which resulted in a deadlock of the political system. Inonu intervened with the 12 July Declaration where he stated that;

³⁷⁷ John M. Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the formation of the multi-party system, 1938-1950* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 142

‘The opposition will be secure and accept that the ruling party does not have intentions of stifling it. The ruling party will accept that the opposition is not thinking of anything but its legal rights....To overcome problems I want the sincere assistance of the administration and opposition leaders directing our political life. In my opinion the one and a half year experiment we have passed was difficult and sometimes disappointing; but it also has assured the success of all hopes for the future. It is the obligation of both the ruling and opposition parties to protect and develop these conditions....An opposition party working with a legal political party’s methods must be assured that the ruling party will work under the same conditions’.³⁷⁸

The July Declaration calmed down the political scene and brought forth the differences within the Democrat Party. Kenan Oner, Fevzi Cakmak and Hikmet Baydur left the Democrat Party and set up the Nation Party in July 1948. The programme of the Nation Party demonstrated a greater difference with the People’s Party and “advocated the replacement of statism with economic liberalism, better relations with Muslim countries and the end of government interference in religious affairs”.³⁷⁹ The discussions surrounding Turkey receiving aid from the Marshall Plan demonstrate the manner in which the parties situated themselves. The main issue of contention between the People’s Party and Democrat Party was not whether or not Turkey should receive the aid but that the People’s Party was not being convincing enough. Hence, no real difference existed with respect to the assumption that a closer relation with the West and especially the United States was necessary.³⁸⁰

The signing of the Treaty of Economic Assistance created criticisms mainly because the Treaty established guidelines about how the aid should be spent. The Nation Party protested to the close relationship with America on nationalist grounds and argued that national sovereignty was being threatened and capitulations were being brought back. The most ardent criticisms came from intellectuals such as Sabahattin Ali who stated, “the major powers are intriguing to divide up the small nations. This is the way to a third world war. Against this the small nations must unite to create a balance against the major states”.³⁸¹ The

³⁷⁸ Vanderlipple, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 150

³⁷⁹ Vanderlipple, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 175

³⁸⁰ For more information on the period 1945-50 domestic politics see: Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Cok Partiye, 1944-1950* (Ankara, 1990) and Kemal Karpaz, *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959)

³⁸¹ Sabahattin Ali, *Markopasa Yazilari ve Otekiler* (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, 1998), 120

Socialist Parties had already been closed down in 1946 and those intellectuals branded as ‘leftists’ and who openly criticized the foreign policy decisions of the government came under increasing pressure. In March 1947 students at Ankara University burned copies of MarkoPasa and in 1948 Professors Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi Berkez and Behice Boran were tried for threatening national security and spreading communist ideas. The intellectuals mostly left the country or were pushed to the fringes of the political arena.³⁸²

As a consequence, the political space and the opinions voiced within it became increasingly limited and the difference among the parties was nearly impossible to find. The main narratives and ideological tenets continue to dominate Turkish politics. One exception was the manner in which the issue of religion had become part of the political debate. One reason for it was the demand coming from the populace and the parties used this demand as a tool to acquire votes but also religion was seen as a way to counter godless communism. Despite this the issue of secularism was unchallenged; it was rather the extent of the control that was being discussed rather than the underlying assumptions of the Kemalist ideology. Hence, the main tenets of Kemalist ideology were being discussed and modified such as statism (a more liberal economic stance was being adopted) and secularism (the state would still control religion but there would be more options such as religious education in schools) but no other alternative narrative or worldview was allowed.

III. NARRATIONS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

This section will provide an overview of Turkish Foreign Policy literature concentrating on how it deals with the Cold War, what the dominant narratives, ways of talking about, characterising and comprehending the period of 1945-1950 is. The aim is to establish the general narratives about Turkish foreign policy; what are the dominant ways of explaining it, which motivations are attached to it. This will demonstrate how the Cold War story could be embedded into the narrative of Turkish foreign policy. The agency of Turkey is overlooked and it is

³⁸² For more information on these events see: Mete Cetik, *Universitede Cadi Kazani: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi ve Pertev Naili Boratav'in Mudafasi* (Istanbul: 1998); Ugur Mumcu, *40'larin Cadi Kazani* (Istanbul: 1990) ; Hasan Ali Yucel, *Davam* (Ankara, 1947).

narrated as a tool in the great power game as the Cold War explanation of bipolarity is entrenched reifying Turkey's quest for democratization and westernization. There is no Cold War literature *per se* within the Turkish foreign policy literature. The literature can be classified into three. First ; the general Turkish foreign policy works that deal with the period in passing embedding the events within the general narrative of Turkish foreign policy concentrating mainly on the continuity of the process of westernization and modernization. Hence, the period 1945-50 becomes a road towards completing Turkey's 'inevitable' modernization that had commenced on 1923 with the establishment of the Republic. Second, the regional or bilateral works that concentrates on relations with the United States, Soviet Union, the Middle East or Europe. These works touch upon the period as demonstrating the nature of the relations with the state or region under scrutiny. As such the period becomes an example of how close relations were established or why relations could not be maintained. The third is the Cold War related books that concentrate on specific events within the mentioned time-frame. Although these works do manage to avoid generalizations that exist in the prior two 'schools', they nonetheless reinforce the general narratives about Turkish foreign policy and the Cold War.

This section will not analyse all the works on Turkish foreign policy but will rather provide an overview of the main characteristics and narratives prevalent in the literature. The dominant narratives of this literature as will be underlined below are the 'realistic' nature of Turkish foreign policy; the continuity of the Russian threat dating back to the 19th century, the westernization/modernization narrative whereby Turkey's alliance with the 'West' is portrayed as a fulfillment of its destiny and fundamental aims; and the lack of choice available to Turkey given the bipolar structure of the Cold War. These are the main narratives of Turkish foreign policy as will be seen in the next section. Furthermore, these narratives reify the dominant Cold War explanation that was embedded into the Turkish foreign policy. As such, the Eurocentric conception of world politics and the international is reproduced in these narratives.

Yasemin Celik's book *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* is representative of general foreign policy works that also discuss the period. Celik argues that "in the

aftermath of World War II and the formation of a bipolar international system, foreign policy decision-making in Turkey became largely defined by the role that Ankara played in the international system”.³⁸³ She presents a systemic analysis whereby the actions, foreign policy decisions of the actor are determined by the nature of the international system and she argues that “the structure of the international system was such an important factor in determining Turkish foreign policy, changes in this structure were bound to alter the way in which Turkey interacted with other states”.³⁸⁴ Conceptualizing Turkish foreign policy decision-making in a manner directly linking it to the nature of the international system prescribes a certain degree of inevitability. Actions were determined by the international system hence no room for manoeuvre existed. Furthermore, Celik defines the international system in such a way that precludes any choice on Turkey’s part when she states that “The United States had emerged from World War II as the strongest major power, and the Soviet Union soon became its ardent enemy. It was becoming clear to many nations in the world that they could not maintain cordial relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union now that the world had been divided into two opposing camps”.³⁸⁵ The Cold War is presented as a fact of life that does not require much debate in and of itself. It happened, it started and Turkey found herself in it. No further discussion is presented on how it occurred or commenced, rather the bipolar structure presenting no choice to any nation in the world becomes established. According to this definition “Turkey did not have a great deal of choice as to which side it should ally with because Joseph Stalin’s desire to establish control over the Turkish Straits as well as his claims to the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan soon after the end of the war convinced Turkish politicians that their neighbor to the northwest was not only hostile but expansionist as well”.³⁸⁶

The narrative of the Turkish predicament is one of inevitability for according to the manner in which events are presented Turkey did not have a choice but to align with the United States and the West. This becomes an inevitable deduction

³⁸³ Yasemin Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), xi

³⁸⁴ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 151

³⁸⁵ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 35

³⁸⁶ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 35

once the only definition provided for the Cold War is of a bipolar structure that one had to choose sides in, and the Soviet Union is defined as having expansionist aims towards Turkey, the obvious choice became the United States. According to this narrative, “Turkey would only be able to avert Moscow’s demands if it formed in close alliance with the only other superpower, the United States”.³⁸⁷ Celik defines foreign policy in Turkey as being based on realism and continuity and argues that “decision-making in Turkey had been defined by continuity and consensus: despite bitter partisan fights among politicians on domestic issues, there had been an implicit agreement that international commitments extend beyond change in party government”.³⁸⁸ The conclusions that can be drawn from the above arguments is that the Cold War started and Turkey acted in a ‘realistic’ fashion in concluding an alliance with the West.

William Hale in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* discusses the main characteristics of Turkish foreign policy starting from the Ottoman period. He argues that “Ottoman statesmen had evidently recognized that the empire could not win a war for territory with the major European powers unless it was supported by one or more of the others” and “had to consider how to exploit the international situation to their advantage”.³⁸⁹ As a consequence, Ottoman statesmen either had “to avoid both conflicts and form alliances relying on the workings of the balance of power to pressure the status quo” or “could try to negotiate a reasonably stable alliance with one or more of the European powers”.³⁹⁰ Ottoman statesman decided to enter into an alliance and “Russia was identified as the most serious foe, since it was best placed to launch a land invasion of Ottoman territory, had an assured interest in gaining control of or at least free passage through the straits, and presented itself as the patron and protector of the Sultan’s Orthodox Christian subjects”.³⁹¹ Hence, starting in the 19th century Russia is located as the enemy and one against whom alliance will be formed.

³⁸⁷ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, xii

³⁸⁸ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, xiv

³⁸⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*. London; Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 19

³⁹⁰ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 19

³⁹¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 20

With respect to the Second World War, Hale argues that “Turkey remained *de facto* neutral power throughout the war, resisting pressure from both the Allies and Germany to join the war on their side”.³⁹² According to this narrative, “a crucial concern for Turkey was the policy of the Soviet Union and its relations with the belligerents”³⁹³ which was exasperated with Operation Barborossa whereby Britain and the Soviet Union became allies. Hale discusses the “Straits question” and provides examples from the Yalta and Potsdam conferences whereby Britain had agreed to Soviet suggestions on the necessity to change the Montreux Convention.³⁹⁴ He states that “Western opposition to Stalin on this issue did not explode at the first post-war meeting of the “Big Three”, held at Potsdam”.³⁹⁵ Yet, he does not discuss how policymakers in the United States and Britain changed their minds. According to this narrative, Turkey “was virtually bound to seek a place in the Western alliance”³⁹⁶ because “it was directly threatened by the Soviet Union”.³⁹⁷ Turkey’s actions are given inevitability within this narrative whereby “for the Turks, the most important feature of the post-war world, was its bipolarity, and the fact that the United States and Soviet Union were the only two players who really mattered. Hence, Turkey was unable to play one European power off against another in a fluid and usually temporary pattern of alliances and rivalries. In effect, the range of Turkey’s options was far more limited than it had been during the early period. It could not opt out of the Cold War”.³⁹⁸ Hale’s narrative ascribes inevitability to Turkey’s positioning within the Cold War because of the bipolar structure of the conflict as a consequence of which Turkey’s manoeuvring was limited. Furthermore, the narrative does not base itself on a theoretical explanation but a general narrative of events.

Bozdaglioglu in *Turkish foreign policy and Turkish identity* adopts a constructivist approach to analysing Turkish foreign policy. He argues that Turkey “constitutes a unique case study to assess the validity of the constructivist perspective” since “Turkey holds a special place in the international system because “it is on the very

³⁹² Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 79

³⁹³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 84

³⁹⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 100-101

³⁹⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 112

³⁹⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 110

³⁹⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 110

³⁹⁸ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 109

borderlines between “North versus South” and “East versus West” and among different civilizations: the Muslim, Middle Eastern and the Western”.³⁹⁹ Such a narrative reinforces Turkey’s exceptionalism narrative because of its geopolitical location.⁴⁰⁰ The aim of the work as stated is to uncover why Turkey “throughout its history, fully identified itself with the West”.⁴⁰¹ This approach attempts to question the basis of the Turkish identity that was constructed after the Turkish War of Independence based on a specific understanding of modernization that “was a project of embracing and internalizing all the cultural dimensions that made Europe modern”.⁴⁰² The definition of the national identity in that manner manifested in the foreign policy aims of the new state as the aim to become part of the European civilization. As a consequence, “for Turkish political leaders, being accepted as European had an utmost importance because it would confirm the success of Kemalist reforms”.⁴⁰³ It is within this framework that Bozdaglioglu discusses relations with the United States and the Cold War by stating, “after Atatürk’s death in 1939, his successors took further steps to make Turkey an actual ally of the West. This process began in 1939 with the tripartite agreement between Turkey, Britain and France, developed further after World War II when Turkey joined NATO, the Council of Europe and other Western organizations”.⁴⁰⁴ Hence, the events that led to the onset of the Cold War and Turkey’s alliances are seen to be the natural expressions of the Westernization project that Turkey had embarked upon at its inception. Furthermore, he argues that Turkey’s “alliance” continued even when Turkey’s “national interests” were perceived to be at stake and “uncompromising devotion to the West and Western institutions persisted even when the advantages and disadvantages of these institutions to Turkey’s national interest were seriously questioned in the country”.⁴⁰⁵ Even though “the strong anti-West campaign in Turkey in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter was soon followed by demands that Turkey should revise its foreign policy” and “that Turkey should withdraw from NATO and pursue a

³⁹⁹ Yucel Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: a constructivist approach* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 4

⁴⁰⁰ Lerna Yanik, ‘Constructing Turkish ‘exceptionalism’: Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy’, *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 80-89.

⁴⁰¹ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 3

⁴⁰² Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 29

⁴⁰³ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 164

⁴⁰⁴ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 52

⁴⁰⁵ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 61

“neutral” foreign policy”,⁴⁰⁶ she did not completely abandon the “alliance” but “tried to diversify her foreign policy only *within* the Western camp. As a result, Turkey intensified her relations with the European Union. There was consensus among the major Turkish political parties that while in power, none of them would consider to cut off Turkey’s relations with the United States and NATO”.⁴⁰⁷

According to this narrative, Turkey’s national identity is predicated on an understanding of modernization interchangeably linked to Westernization and its foreign policy is a manifestation of this will to emulate and integrate with the “West.” Hence, the choices available to Turkish statesmen had been defined and limited by the manner in which the Turkish nation had been conceptualized as a result of which Turkey’s alliance with the “West” was inevitable because the over-arching guiding principle of Westernization was a determining factor. Such a narrative ascribes continuity to Turkish foreign policy making whereby the aims and motivations have not altered and rather than explain how such an identity has been maintained for over half a century, it is taken as a constant that can not be challenged. Were there alternatives to these dominant conceptualizations? Bozdaglioglu argues that aspirations to establish a “Western” identity had been adopted by the policy-making elite of the newly established Turkish republic. Yet, he does not discuss whether at the origins of this process alternative identities and conceptualizations of the nation existed and why and how they lost the battle to establish dominance.

What this narrative edits out is the competing Westernizations, modernizations and democratizations and the continuing debate within the domestic context defines the international. Within Bozdaglioglu’s narrative the story of the origins is a one-dimensional tale of Westernization, which he starts in the Ottoman Empire “when European started to defeat the Ottoman army, Ottoman statesmen sent missions to Europe and opened embassies in various Western capitals in order to understand the West’s military superiority”.⁴⁰⁸ This engagement with the West “increased in the second half of the nineteenth century and by the end of the century, many Western laws and practices had been adopted and a basically

⁴⁰⁶ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 63

⁴⁰⁷ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 66

⁴⁰⁸ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 4-5

secular education system was established”.⁴⁰⁹ As such, “The Kemalist revolution that began in the 1920s was the radical and inevitable result of these modernization and Westernization efforts that the Ottoman Empire had been undergoing for almost a century”.⁴¹⁰ Yet, the Kemalist project differed from the Ottoman one because “the Kemalist reforms sought to completely abolish the old ones. It was not confined to only science and technology; it aimed at creating a new state, a new society, and an individual in line with those of the ‘West’”.⁴¹¹ To sum up;

“For the Kemalist elite there existed only one civilization, and it meant European civilization. If Turkish society was to modernize, it would do so in every aspect of social, political and cultural life. The most important implication of this thinking was the exclusion of Islam from the definition of the state. In the Ottoman Empire, Islam was the basis of state legitimacy and the source of individual identification. The republican elite – in their efforts to create a national and secular state, sought to cut the ties linking the society and individual to the Ottoman past and the Islamic Eastern civilization by completely discarding Islam from the public sphere. There was only one civilization, which was superior to Eastern civilization, and Turkey had to be a part of it in order to survive. This policy in turn led to the suppression of other identities, mainly ethnic and religious, and exclusion from the political process”.⁴¹²

Yet this exclusionary process is not discussed, and the narrative proceeds on the assumption that westernization became the dominant agent of identification. According to this narrative, challenges to the dominant identity in the form of Islamism appear in the 1960s, which rise to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s in tandem with the disintegration of the Soviet Union creating divisions within the society that manifested itself with debates about national identity and foreign policy. Bozdaglioglu states “the debate revolved around national identity, the definition of national interest, and the kind of political, economic, and social system that Turkey should adopt. In the course of these debates, basic decision regarding Turkey’s foreign policy (defense and national security) became inextricably intertwined with the national identity of Turkey”.⁴¹³ According to this narrative, alternative conceptions of Turkish identity and foreign policy making appeared whereby

⁴⁰⁹ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 5

⁴¹⁰ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 5

⁴¹¹ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 5

⁴¹² Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 5

⁴¹³ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 7

“the Kemalist elite, Turkey should stay with the West and try to gain recognition as a European state. For Islamists, Turkey cannot be a part of Europe because it belongs to a different civilization. Instead, Turkey should ally with other Muslim countries in the Middle East. Nationalists, on the other hand, argue that Turkey, without a radical departure from its West-oriented foreign policy, should pay more attention to the Turkic republics and play a leadership role in the region”.⁴¹⁴

Bozdaglioglu presents these “alternatives” as self-exclusionary and diametrically opposed to each other. Furthermore, he does not provide an explanation as to how various alternatives might have existed in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. These periods are, in this narrative, unquestionably defined by the westernization and modernization project. The Cold War itself becomes a manifestation of a foreign policy orientation rooted in modernization. Furthermore, the Cold War becomes a vehicle for Turkey’s acceptance by the West whereby “it was in the context of the Cold War that Turkey was able to establish close relations with the West”.⁴¹⁵ As a consequence, Turkey’s role as a ‘Western’ state is questioned once the Cold War ends both internally and externally. Bozdaglioglu ascribes to a traditionalist narrative of Cold War periodization whereby the period of the ‘Cold War’ as accepted, 1945- 1990, is a period where the main assumptions of westernization, modernization and alliance with the United States are not radically questioned. The period is taken to be unproblematic with respect to identity of Turkey as a nation-state and as an actor in the international system. This changes with the ‘end’ when the balance of power alterations in the international system force Turkey to enter into a process where it has to redefine its national identity and foreign policy aims to reflect the realities of the newly emerging international order.

Bozdaglioglu’s analysis of Turkish foreign policy can be characterized as a “genealogy of continuity” whereby he brings forward the discourse of westernization, modernization and Turkey’s ‘exceptional’ status in the international system as a country who inhabits a space at the intersection of North/South and East/West divisions. This narrative obscures the ruptures, divisions and alternatives that existed within the time-frame under consideration and presents a linear story of Turkey’s alliance with the West. The ‘Cold War’ is

⁴¹⁴ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 7

⁴¹⁵ Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 6

presented as a period where Westernization, Turkey's orientations, its motivations are hardly criticized. The same is valid for when Bozdaglioglu discusses how westernization became the dominant identifier for Turkey, he does not discuss the alternatives of this identifier and whether or not the alternatives being silenced meant their non-existence or them being pushed to the fringes.

Bostanoglu presents an analysis of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey- U.S. relations based on critical international theory mainly based on the works of Robert Cox in *The Politics of Turkey-US Relations*. She adopts Cox's definition of hegemony as "a value system that permeates the entire international system" and is maintained by "legitimizing practices and ideologies".⁴¹⁶ According to Bostanoglu, post-Second World War period can be best comprehended as America's establishment of hegemony whereby the "administration had determined that American aims for a global role were threatened and declared the Soviets and communist parties who started expansionist policies in Eastern Europe as enemies of humanity".⁴¹⁷ It was not communism *per se* that was their concern but "they made war with communism the centre of U.S. policies in order to get what they wanted from Congress and the allies".⁴¹⁸ With respect to the Truman Doctrine, Bostanoglu states, "even though the Truman Doctrine was about containing the Soviet Union, economic considerations also played a role".⁴¹⁹ Bostanoglu's arguments about the Cold War and policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are based on a revisionist, specifically the Kolko variation, analysis of the Cold War. Hence, for Bostanoglu, "Yalta, is where U.S. and Soviet Union divided the world into their hegemonic zones".⁴²⁰

With respect to Turkey, Bostanoglu states "in this period, Turkey assumed a pivotal role in US policy to contain the Soviet Union, and assumed her role in US hegemonic system with the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan".⁴²¹ Thus, within the hegemonic system that America was establishing Turkey was a willing

⁴¹⁶ Burcu Bostanoglu, *Turkiye-ABD iliskileri politikasi: kuram ve siyaset* (Kizilay, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1999), 190

⁴¹⁷ Bostanoglu, *Turkiye-ABD iliskileri politikasi*, 238

⁴¹⁸ Bostanoglu, *Turkiye-ABD iliskileri politikasi*, 238

⁴¹⁹ Bostanoglu, *Turkiye-ABD iliskileri politikasi*, 243

⁴²⁰ Bostanoglu, *Turkiye-ABD iliskileri politikasi*, 331

⁴²¹ Bostanoglu, *Turkiye-ABD iliskileri politikasi*, 331

participant because “Turkey identified her interests with the Cold war and with being on the US camp. The basis of her diplomacy from the Truman Doctrine to participating in the Korean War, from recognizing Israel to entering NATO, was a willingness to demonstrate her loyalty to the US alliance system”.⁴²² One of the main reasons for this compulsion to side with the West was “the internal desire Turkey had for development and the need for American aid to realize this played a pivotal role in Ankara willingly entering the international system the US created and led”.⁴²³ As such, Bostanoglu argues “Turkey being situated within the American hegemony was due to Turkish foreign policy being guided by a Realist search for security”⁴²⁴ yet unlike the literature in general she narrates this as a negative attribute that caused “[Turkish foreign policy] into a predicament whereby it had or perceived had no alternative”.⁴²⁵ Bostanoglu provides the example of the Bandung Conference, where she states that Turkey’s attitude “had alienated the Third World who was attempting to convert non-alignment into a political movement” by “defending the Western bloc, NATO and had argued that non-alignment meant being swallowed like Czechoslovakia”.⁴²⁶ With respect to the Korean War, she argues “they saw participation in the Korean War as “the only alternative” to getting accepted into the NATO”.⁴²⁷ As such the “realist perspective was dominant in Turkey’s evaluation of the Korean issue. Turkey’s decision reflected considerations of the balance of power and how they could counter the Soviet threat by joining the US security system”.⁴²⁸ Bostanoglu considers the post-Second World War alignment of Turkey inevitable because of the manner in which Turkey in analyzing the international system in realist fashion defined the Cold War and its national interests in a certain manner. Yet Bostanoglu does not discuss how this definition took place and why the “realist” perspective became dominant rather than other ways of perceiving the international system at the time or whether or not there were alternatives.

⁴²² Bostanoglu, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri politikası*, 336

⁴²³ Bostanoglu, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri politikası*, 332

⁴²⁴ Bostanoglu, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri politikası*, 380

⁴²⁵ Bostanoglu, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri politikası*, 336

⁴²⁶ Bostanoglu, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri politikası*.

⁴²⁷ Bostanoglu, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri politikası*, 385

⁴²⁸ Bostanoglu, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri politikası*, 395

Vanderlippe in *The Politics of Turkish Democracy* argues that “since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the scope of political debate had been narrowly defined and participation in the political arena restricted to a limited group of participants, who shared similar backgrounds, experiences, and views of the Turkish nations, its needs and its future”.⁴²⁹ Vanderlippe attempts to assess “in what ways did Inonu pursue the Kemalist agenda, and in what ways did he move away from it, ... to pursue his own “Inonu-ist” program”.⁴³⁰ The main political discourses of the period; “defining and achieving development and programs; expanding or limiting the influence of central bureaucracy and the military; defining nation and community, and establishing beneficial relations with the Western powers, particularly Britain, Germany and Russia, and later the United States”.⁴³¹ Vanderlippe argues that Inonu redefined “Kemalism to suit new needs, and minimizes the new international and domestic challenges that arose during world War II and the early Cold War, and the innovation devised to deal with new realities”.⁴³² As such, “Inonu’s presidency can be seen as an intersection in modern Turkish history, from which two roads could be followed. Following one road would mean shifting dissent and the possibilities of any democratic development, while the other would mean opening the system to all voices of dissent and alternative views of the Turkish future”.⁴³³ At the end “the road chosen was neither the route to complete suppression of dissent nor to truly open, representative democracy. Rather it was a path of multi-party politics, a truncated form of democracy”⁴³⁴ that was formed within the 1938-1950 period.

Turkish foreign policy is narrated as being ‘realist’ and Turkey is presented as acting according to its national interests. These national interests are presented as being based on the narrative of the Republican ideals; a specific idea of Westernization and modernization. Furthermore, a continuing theme in these accounts is the ‘inevitability’ of Turkey’s choice because of its natural inclination to ally with the West. The international system is presented as being ‘bipolar’ and the Soviet ‘threat’ leading Turkey to its natural ally; the United States and the

⁴²⁹ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 1

⁴³⁰ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 5

⁴³¹ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 7

⁴³² Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 27

⁴³³ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 5

⁴³⁴ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 5

Western security system established by it. The international order that is defined in these works is based on a Western-centric conception of the international system focusing on great power politics and balance of power conceptualizations. The centre of the narrative is American foreign policy and Turkey's inevitable need to align with the West. It presents a limited account of the international and reduced it to the priorities of the great powers and European state system. The next section will focus on the literature dealing with relations with the United States since within the period being discussed United States became what represented the West to Turkey.

IV. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

This section will focus on works that narrate Turkey's relationship with the United States. During the time-period under question the West became synonymous with the United States and as such the 'international'. Thus, the narrations of the West and the international can also be discerned from the way in which the United States is configured into the story of Turkish foreign policy. George Harris's book *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971*,⁴³⁵ places the story within the perspective of bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States and argues that "conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 gave concrete evidence that the Kremlin had not abandoned the traditional Russian ambition to control the Black Sea straits".⁴³⁶ In this narrative Soviet intentions are presented within the continuity of Russian expansionism. Hence, the cause of the problem in the narratives of Turkish foreign policy is the age-long Russian expansionism. Furthermore, a 'traditionalist' Cold War perspective is presented as the United States is characterised as being reactive towards Soviet actions. Harris states "In Washington, hopes of meaningful cooperation with the USSR had collapsed in the wake of the unsuccessful conference of foreign ministers in December 1945, especially as a result of Soviet intransigence over Iran".⁴³⁷ The process of the

⁴³⁵ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective in traditional perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972).

⁴³⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 12

⁴³⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 19

emerging Cold War is not given in detail and the United States is presented as an actor that attempts to cooperate but realises that it is in vain. Although the narrative is one that pertains to traditional Cold War historiography, Harris diverges from the ‘traditionalist’ storyline when he accords Turkey much more agency than is done in Cold War literature. America is presented as attempting to cooperate with the Soviet Union and as such not realizing the danger posed by the Soviet Union and the concerns presented by Turkey. As Harris states; “Washington did not immediately signal to Moscow American interest in Turkey’s territorial integrity, lest such a move disturb the atmosphere of the Potsdam conference scheduled to convene in July 1945”.⁴³⁸ According to this narrative, the United States does not comprehend the nature of Russian actions and needed to be convinced. The aim of Turkey was “to bring the U.S. position on the Straits into harmony with the minimum Turkish view and to involve America in defending Turkey against the Soviet Union”.⁴³⁹ The narrative portrays Turkey as an actor that actively seeks to change the mind of American decision-makers according to which Turkey “stepped up its consultations with the United States, attempting to dramatize the Soviet threat, arguing that Kremlin would be deterred not by concessions but by firmness”.⁴⁴⁰ The traditional American foreign policy is adopted in discussing the way in which the United States acted within the international system. Furthermore, a pericentrist perspective is adopted in trying to give Turkey more agency with respect to altering traditional American foreign policy. Yet, even though more agency is being given the center of the story is still the United States and the international order it was setting up.

George McGhee in *The-US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection: how the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s NATO entry contained the Soviets*, as the title suggests, concentrates on the regional aspects and portrays Turkey’s alliance with the United States as a successful policy by the United States foreign policy decision-makers. He states that “when the United States decided in 1947 to provide Turkey with massive military assistance under the Truman Doctrine and in the early 1950s to help Turkey gain admission to the NATO alliance, the door

⁴³⁸ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 16

⁴³⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 17

⁴⁴⁰ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 18

to a Soviet invasion of the Middle East was slammed shut”.⁴⁴¹ Hence, the Truman Doctrine is not only characterized as aiding Turkey in the face of Soviet expansionism but also preventing Soviet expansion into the Near and Middle East. Furthermore, McGhee argues that “Turkey’s decision to join NATO and the West was not; I believe, the result of a temporary convenience or opportunism. It can best be described as the meeting of historical trends that were operating in both Turkey and the West”.⁴⁴² The narrative of westernization/modernization is present in McGhee’s account whereby the actions and choices made by Turkey were also about fulfilling the project of westernization which the alliance with the ‘West’ was an important part of.

McGhee presents a traditionalist Cold War explanation whereby he states that “the West, particularly the United States, recognized after the last war the aggressive and expansionist nature of Soviet communism and determined to protect themselves and the free world against it”.⁴⁴³ Hence, the United States reacts towards Soviet aggressiveness and expansionism in order to protect itself and the free world. Within this narrative the Cold War is caused by Soviet actions whereby the Truman Doctrine was a policy that succeeded in preventing it. Furthermore, according to this narrative Turkey was included within the Truman Doctrine because “failure to aid Greece could convince the Turks that it would be less dangerous to yield to Soviet pressures, even without a direct military threat, than to try to resist”.⁴⁴⁴ McGhee ascribes to the traditional American foreign policy narrative and attempts to situate Turkey within that story. As such it is a reproduction of the Western-centric narratives of the international system.

Oral Sander’s *Turkish-American relation 1947-1964*, concentrates on the bilateral relations. Sander argues that the “Truman Doctrine was the first indicator after the Second World War between Western countries who wanted to continue a system that was destroyed 25 years ago and the Soviet Union that had no allegiance to the

⁴⁴¹ George C. McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: how the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s NATO entry contained the Soviets* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), xii

⁴⁴² McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 9

⁴⁴³ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 9-10

⁴⁴⁴ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 21

system and interpreted it as being against themselves”.⁴⁴⁵ Hence, the definition of the Cold War presents a perspective more akin to the revisionist school in Cold War historiography. Rather than defining America as reacting to Soviet aggressiveness the conflict is narrated as emanating from attempts and differences in defining the post-WWII international system. He argues that the aim of the United States was to “contain Soviet expansionism where ever in the world and to ensure American economic and political expansion” hence “the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan ended the transitory phase of the ‘Cold War’”.⁴⁴⁶ The Cold War is presented as having been caused by American actions and policies such as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan that aimed to expand American economic interests. The reasons for Turkish foreign policy decision-making and alliance with the United States is listed as “Soviet threat against Turkey after the Second World War, the economic aid necessary for Turkey to realize development and westernization efforts that started with Atatürk”.⁴⁴⁷ Hence, according to Sander, “Moscow’s threat continued in 1947 and Turkish policy-makers believed that safety against the Soviet Union could only be maintained by Western alliance”.⁴⁴⁸

Furthermore, Sander argues that “Turkey voted in line with American policies in international institutions and was viewed as a speaker for the West”.⁴⁴⁹ Thus, “as a result of this, it can be observed that a period of coolness started in Turkey’s relations with Asian-African states”.⁴⁵⁰ Sander stresses the importance of Turkey’s relations with Asian-African states and argues that “Turkey turned her back to Asia not after having entered NATO during the Bandung conference in 1955 but much before in 1949, by not attending the Asian States Meeting held that year. Turkey answered the invitation by stating that although interested in the Indonesian issue, it felt it did not have the right to attend a Asian conference as a European state”.⁴⁵¹ Sander’s comments have to be considered within the political context in which he was writing. From the end of the 1960s onwards and especially at the start of the 1970s, Turkish-American relations were in a state of

⁴⁴⁵ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, 1947-1964* (Ankara: A.U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1979), 13

⁴⁴⁶ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 18

⁴⁴⁷ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 18

⁴⁴⁸ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 19

⁴⁴⁹ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 121

⁴⁵⁰ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 121

⁴⁵¹ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 37

constant crisis specifically because of the Cyprus issue. Turkey's attempts to find support at the United Nations were not producing any results mainly because it could not get the support of Third World countries. Against this background, Sander's insistence on the manner in which Turkey rebuffed Asian-African relations becomes more meaningful. This narrative ascribes to a revisionist school of interpretation and in that sense is predicated on an understanding of American foreign policy that reverses the traditionalist assumptions but still pertains to a Eurocentric perception of world politics.

Ataov Turkaya in *NATO and Turkey* argues "under the cover of the "Cold War" epitaph, the United States is endeavouring to subdue all her allies and present them from pursuing an independent foreign and domestic foreign policy. The *sine qua non* of this subordination is the acceptance of the main cold war issues, notably the 'communist menace'".⁴⁵² Turkkaya presents a narrative in revisionist fashion by arguing that;

"the U.S. pretended that the world's difficulties were due to the Soviet Union, and its "agents" or "fellow-travellers". It seldom considered whether or not most of it was its own Open Door Policy. A cardinal truth of our century is that American leadership is still enhancing the traditional objective of the 1890s. For decades nothing satisfied the U.S. but free access to foreign markets. Expansion overseas was thought of as the solution to the recurring economic crisis. Production had increased so enormously that new markets were needed to dispose of the surplus. The Open Door Policy has enabled the U.S. to "stabilize" the world in favour of the American metropolis and establish a new empire".⁴⁵³

With respect to Turkey, Turkkaya argues, "the ruling circles of Turkey, having failed to develop the country, tied their hopes to the capitalist classes in the West. From the point of view of the existing social classes in Turkey, the Second world War stimulated the Turkish bourgeoisie and helped it to be stronger"⁴⁵⁴ whereby "it was under these circumstances that the two leftist parties were brought to the court, the newly-formed unions were closed down, a leftwing printing press was smashed after mob attack encouraged and directed by the government".⁴⁵⁵ According to Turkkaya's narrative Turkey's alliance had already been decided

⁴⁵² Ataov Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey* (Ankara; Sevinc Print. House, 1970), 1

⁴⁵³ Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey*, 5

⁴⁵⁴ Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey*, 91

⁴⁵⁵ Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey*, 91

because of the capitalist leanings of the state and the rising bourgeois class. As such, “even before the famous Soviet notes were submitted to Turkey, the country was ripe to take part in the Western world”.⁴⁵⁶ The Soviet Union and the Soviet threat were used to make the alliance easier rather than being the reasons for it. As a consequence, “a widespread geopolitical thesis, which supposedly explains Russian expansion in terms of a conscious urge to the warm waters, gained ground in importance, the Soviet notes on the Straits was interpreted as expressions of a centuries-old national longing”.⁴⁵⁷ Such a perspective “was presented to the public that the Russians would not be content unless they reached warm ports”.⁴⁵⁸ Yet,

“the recurring appearance of such a generalization, however, stems from a desire to justify the appearance of the United States, another great power in this part of the world. What seems to be behind such arguments is to veil the concessions of the Turkish ruling circles. It is the merge with the Western capital and the granting of privileges that needed cover”.⁴⁵⁹

Within this narrative Turkey is not left without alternative but rather willingly chooses to ally with the West and not because of any external threat but because of the domestic alignment of forces that favor capitalism. Turkey’s relations with the United States and narratives of it were conditioned by the manner in which the Turkish state identified itself. This section has attempted demonstrate the way in which bilateral relations with the United States dealt US dealt with the story of the Cold War. The next section focuses on the narratives about the Straits issue since it is one of the central ‘events’ of any account of the Cold War that includes Turkey within it.

V. STRAITS “ISSUE”

In *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, Ferenc A. Vali like Harris ascribes to a traditionalist narrative of the origins of the Cold War. Vali states that “the attitude of the West and especially of the United States had changed; the Cold War was

⁴⁵⁶ Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey*, 92

⁴⁵⁷ Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey*, 96

⁴⁵⁸ Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey*, 96

⁴⁵⁹ Turkkaya, *NATO and Turkey*, 97

already a fact of life Washington realized that Soviet designs were clearly directed towards subverting Turkish resistance and that their ulterior aim was to extend Communist control over the Near and Middle East”.⁴⁶⁰ According to Vali, the foreign policy of Turkey was based on “how to avoid the embrace of the Muscovite giant, whose victims in Eastern and Central Europe provided tragic precedents, was rightly as a question of life and death. The threatening shadow of Moscow determined Turkey’s basic policy lines during the decade following 1946 and, with a reduced emphasis, still determines it in present”.⁴⁶¹ The characterization of the Soviet Union in this narrative is one of an expansionist power infringing upon the sovereignty of Turkey after having put under its dominion Eastern and Central Europe. In accordance with the traditionalist explanations of the Cold War, Turkey and the United States are reacting to Soviet actions.

Vali portrays Turkish foreign policy as ‘realistic’ and ‘pragmatic’ whereby he states that “foreign affairs were conducted in Ankara in a spirit of realism”.⁴⁶² As such, Turkey determined its choices realistically and decided to cooperate with the United States. Furthermore, the Cold War is presented as a Manichean conflict comprised of two completely opposing sides with no room for maneuver. Vali states that “in the late 1940s, it appeared to all observers that as a consequence of the Cold War the globe was being split into Communist and anti-communist spheres. In such a dichotomous world, Turkey could not hesitate about where to place her destiny”.⁴⁶³ The Cold War and how it came about is not analyzed in detail, nor is a definition provided. The characterizations in the narrative demonstrate a traditionalist view of the Cold War dynamics. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy aims are embedded within the Westernization discourse when he states that “we must understand that Turkey’s nearly unique urge to become a member of the European family of nations and to be recognized as such provided an additional impulse to her desire to be tried by every available device, to the West”.⁴⁶⁴ As such, Turkey’s alliance with the ‘West’ was inevitable because the

⁴⁶⁰ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: the foreign policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 35

⁴⁶¹ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 35

⁴⁶² Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 72

⁴⁶³ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 115

⁴⁶⁴ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 115

Cold War meant a world divided into two and since Turkey had to protect her sovereignty against an expansionist Soviet Union. Adding to that narrative Turkey's quest for Westernization and modernization Turkey's alliance with the United States is presented as being inevitable.

Feridun Cemal Erkin's book *Türk-Sovyet ilişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (*Turkish-Soviet Relations and the Issue of the Straits*), specifically concentrating on the Straits issue presents Soviet demands as a continuance of Russian expansionism and desire to acquire the Straits. As such he states that "it was evident that the [straits] that had dominated the thoughts of Tsars from Grand Peter onwards had also engulfed the Soviet Union".⁴⁶⁵ Hence, the narrative is taken back to the 1900s to prove that the Straits issue was a continuing concern for the Russian empire. Furthermore, Erkin argues that "the unfounded ideas put forward by Stalin, were accepted by the other two Allies without even a mere refusal, because of the importance Great Britain and the United States gave to preserving the Soviet Union within the Allied Coalition rather than the reasonableness of the ideas".⁴⁶⁶ The narrative Erkin presents is one of Soviet expansionism, intractableness and unwarranted demands and the appeasement attempts by the United States and Great Britain in order not to disrupt the Grand Alliance. Hence, a traditionalist outlook is presented in the narrative whereby the United States and Great Britain want to sustain cooperation but cannot preserve it because of Soviet policies.

The story of the 'Straits' is central in the accounts of Turkey's experience of the Cold War. As presented, narratives that focus on the "Straits Issue" is narrated based on a traditionalist perspective of the causes of the Cold War. The next section takes a closer look at the manner in which the Cold War and Turkey's role in it was written.

VI. "COLD WAR"

⁴⁶⁵ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Basnur Matbaası, 1968), 254

⁴⁶⁶ Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, 267

This section will focus on works that deal specifically with the ‘Cold War’ as the focus of the story. Aysegul Sever’s book *Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu (Turkey, the West and the Middle East within the Cold War encirclement)* is one of the few books that deals exclusively with the ‘Cold War’. Sever argues for adopting a post-revisionist posture by stating that “Cold War years are no longer just focusing on the United States-Soviet Union struggle and as a consequence Great Britain’s role in the birth and development of the Cold War is being stressed in many works”.⁴⁶⁷ As such, Sever concentrates on the role of Great Britain specifically with respect to Turkey. Sever’s narrative takes the story of Russian-Turkish relations back to the 19th century stressing the continuity in Russian motivations when she argues that “in the past the Russians, especially in the 19th century, would pressure the Ottomans whenever they felt powerful to establish control of the Straits”.⁴⁶⁸ The narrative is based on continuing Russian aggressiveness and Turkish efforts to prevent Russian expansion towards Turkey and convince the allies of the urgency of the threat. She argues that “the Turkish government had urged Washington to take a firm stance towards the Soviet Union by sending a series of reports ever since the end of the war”.⁴⁶⁹ Furthermore, according to Sever’s story Great Britain realizes the threat and with Turkey attempts to persuade the United States of its existence whereby “England already had doubts after the war as it had during, about whether cooperation with the Soviets could be continued”.⁴⁷⁰ Thus, “in parallel with the Inonu administration the English government believed that Soviet demands towards Turkey could not be accepted and would violate post-war international peace efforts”. According to this the United States realized the danger posed by the Soviet Union, of which Turkey and Great Britain had been aware, with time. She argues that “by 1946, United States had realized that Soviet demands towards Turkey was an example of its expansionist policies and joined Great Britain”.⁴⁷¹ As such, despite claims of post-revisionism, the argument does resemble the traditionalist historiography whereby the United States realizes the Soviet expansionist aims and reacts to them.

⁴⁶⁷ Aysegul Sever, *Soguk Savas kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu, 1945-1958* (Bagcilar; Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1997), 12

⁴⁶⁸ Sever, *Soguk Savas kusatmasinda Turkiye*, 17

⁴⁶⁹ Sever, *Soguk Savas kusatmasinda Turkiye*, 26

⁴⁷⁰ Sever, *Soguk Savas kusatmasinda Turkiye*, 242

⁴⁷¹ Sever, *Soguk Savas kusatmasinda Turkiye*, 246

Sever's book presents the process of the evolving Cold War, analyzing the people, policies and the process involved but her narrative also perpetuates some dominant narratives about Soviet relations with Turkey. Sever states that "Turkey when faced with Soviet demands decided that they could no longer follow a policy of neutrality and that their future was with the West".⁴⁷² Furthermore, the narrative ascribes to a 'traditional' interpretation of American foreign policy. The story presented can be considered as being pericentrist in that it aims to bring in Turkey to the story of the Cold War and underline Turkey as one of the actors to convince the United States of the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Ekavi Athanassopoulou's book concentrates on the origins of the Cold War specifically the process of Turkey joining NATO. The narrative is more based upon the events leading up to Turkey's membership of NATO and brings forth analysis of the main characters and events of the period under analysis but Athanassopoulou like Sever does perpetuate dominant narratives about Turkish foreign policy. The account is one of a 'realistic' foreign policy whereby she argues that "Turkish foreign policy remained consistent in what had always been a pragmatic orientation".⁴⁷³ Furthermore, she states that "the pragmatic Turkish leaders never concealed their distrust of Moscow and their preference, should the question arise to side with the powers which were interested in guaranteeing the regional *status quo* and represented the western world into which Turkey wished to be integrated".⁴⁷⁴ This statement has two assumptions in line with the dominant narratives about Turkish foreign policy. Firstly, that the distrust towards Moscow had always existed establishing continuity between 19th century Russia and the Soviet Union whereby the period of cooperation that started with the establishment of the Republic becomes a 'pragmatic' and 'realistic' policy. As such Turkish alliance with the Soviet Union becomes one of convenience rather than one of genuine trust. This leads to the second assumption, which is that genuine trust existed towards the Western powers with whom Turkey wished to integrate. The narrative of westernization/modernization and the aim of the

⁴⁷² Sever, *Soguk Savas kusatmasinda Turkiye*, 57

⁴⁷³ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 76

⁴⁷⁴ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests*, 76

Republic to become integrated with the West are present in the account. Turkey's aim from its establishment onwards was westernization/modernization, thus her 'natural allies' were the Western states and not the Soviet Union.

Athanassopoulou's account presents a traditionalist account of the Cold War when she argues that "Washington's decision to resist any Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean by building up Turkey's military strength," hence Washington becomes a passive actor realising Soviet 'designs' after which it decides to prevent them. As a consequence, "after its notes of 1946 Moscow did not resume its diplomatic pressure on Ankara. Thanks to the combined British-American support, the Turkish government found itself in a strong position regarding Stalin's designs".⁴⁷⁵ Thus, as with Sever, Athanassopoulou's narrative is a pericentrist account of the Cold War and the agency given to Turkey is one of an actor that demonstrates to the United States the importance of maintaining the balance of power.

Bruce Kuniholm in *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* "argues that Great Power relations in the Near East cast significant light on the origins of the Cold War and that the historical struggle for power along the northern tier was an important factor in the development of the post-war conflict between the United States and Soviet Union"⁴⁷⁶ and attempts to "show how traditional interests along the Northern Tier evolve into the postwar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and to follow the process by which American-Soviet rivalry gradually supersedes the earlier Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region".⁴⁷⁷ Kuniholm locates the issues experienced in the Near East within the narrative of great power rivalry that had existed in the region ever since the 19th century and in accordance starts the story with the Eastern Question. Kuniholm argues that the Eastern Question was "the question of what should take the Ottoman Empire's place" and "as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the Eastern Question became increasingly central to the rivalry of the Great Powers, whose interests clashed in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean".⁴⁷⁸ Furthermore, Kuniholm argues,

⁴⁷⁵ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests*, 51

⁴⁷⁶ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, xvi

⁴⁷⁷ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, xvi

⁴⁷⁸ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 6

“great Britain and Russia – especially from the 1830s onward – were the powers chiefly concerned with the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Because Britain faced Russian expansion into the Balkans, the Straits Convention of 1841 has been interpreted as representing “the early application of a policy of containment”, a policy not unlike that of the Truman Doctrine a century later”.⁴⁷⁹ Kuniholm embeds the Truman Doctrine within the dynamics of great power rivalry that existed for a century. As such for Kuniholm the Cold War in the Near East was the “resurrection of the Eastern Question”⁴⁸⁰ which began when “on 19 March, when Molotov handed Selim Sarper, the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, a statement denouncing the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 17 December 1925”.⁴⁸¹ Kuniholm’s narrative presents the United States as coming to realize the Soviet threat and argues, “Soviet attitudes toward Turkey were gradually seen in the context of larger issues which the United States was slowly coming to appreciate”.⁴⁸² As such, the balance of power dynamics that involved Turkey slowly became apparent to the United States that then assumed the role of Great Britain in this centuries’ rivalry.

Accounts of the Cold War have adhered to traditionalist Cold War narrative with respect to the origins. The Soviet Union is narrated as being expansionist whereas the United is on the defensive. Furthermore, embedding Turkey into this narrative has been done in a way that reinforces the dominant narratives about Turkish foreign policy. The “realist” and “rational” choice of a westernizing and modernizing Turkish state was to ally itself against an expansionist Soviet Union.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has aimed to discuss the main narratives that permeate the Turkish historiography about its own foreign policy tradition and the Cold War. The aim has not been to present an exhaustive literature review of Turkish foreign policy, the Straits issue or Turkey’s relations with the United States. The aim has been to

⁴⁷⁹ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 7

⁴⁸⁰ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 255

⁴⁸¹ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 255

⁴⁸² Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 269

highlight through the main works dealing with those issues the dominant characterizations, narratives and periodisations prevalent in the literature.

This overview demonstrates the manner in which narratives and characterizations dominate the comprehension of a time frame. For example, the continuity narrative does not leave room for the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Turkey in the inter-war period. Such a perspective blurs the understanding of the conditions of Soviet-Turkish relations and diminishes its dynamics to Russian aims towards the Straits. In a similar fashion the westernization narrative subsumes the trends, views and perspectives of the Turkish populace to the attainment of a goal (westernization) and embeds it into a linear and progressive story line. The story of Turkey progressing toward westernization silences other stories that were available in other aspects of society and this affects Turkey's self-conception of herself even in the present with the discussion of 'secular elites' versus 'resurgent Islamist views' whereby the 'secular elite' is confronted with a Turkey they have for so long silenced. The 'realistic' foreign policy assertion is present with respect to every aspect of Turkish foreign policy literature even if what is meant by the notion is hardly ever elaborated upon. Even a non-theoretical claim of realism being Turkey pursuing its national interests is not adequately discussed under the supposition that those interests are evident. This posture again delimits the scope of the story for the 'interests' are not identical for every group or class in a society and how they are constructed and one interest becomes dominant over another is also a process of silencing that needs to be considered.

As such, the stories of Turkey and concepts are fixed in order to fit the central story of the Cold War. Furthermore, the Western-centric conceptualization of world politics is reproduced. It needs to be underlined that this reproduction should not be seen as the result of imposition. The Western-centric narratives of history fit into a certain conceptualization of Turkey and reproducing those Western-centric narratives also reproduce that conceptualization of Turkey. As such, the works in this chapter need to be evaluated not only as reproducing the historiographical operations in the Cold War but also through that as privileging and reproducing a specific idea of Turkey. The next section focuses on the way in

which the linear narrative of the Cold War and the historiographical operations discussed in this section can be disrupted and problematized.

SECTION II: STORIES OF SILENCES

“We can agree, I think, that invisible things are not necessarily “not-there”; that a void may be empty but not be a vacuum. In addition, certain absences are so stressed, so ornate, so planned, they call attention to themselves; arrest us with intentionality and purpose, like neighborhoods that are defined by the population held away from them. Looking at the scope of American literature, I can't help thinking that the question should never have been “Why am I, an Afro-American, absent from it?” It is not a particularly interesting query anyway. The spectacularly interesting question is “What intellectual feats had to be performed by the author or his critic to erase me from a society seething with my presence, and what effect has that performance had on the

work?" What are the strategies of escape from knowledge? Of willful oblivion? I am not recommending an inquiry into the obvious impulse that overtakes a soldier sitting in a World War I trench to think of salmon fishing. That kind of pointed "turning from," deliberate escapism, or transcendence may be lifesaving in a circumstance of immediate duress. The exploration I am suggesting is, how does one sit in the audience observing, watching the performance of Young America, say, in the nineteenth century, say, and reconstruct the play, its director, its plot, and its cast in such a manner that its very point never surfaces? Not why. How? [...]In 1850 at the height of slavery and burgeoning abolitionism, American writers chose romance. Where, I wonder, in these romances is the shadow of the presence from which the text has fled? Where does it heighten, where does it dislocate, where does it necessitate novelistic invention; what does it release; what does it hobble?"⁴⁸³

Silences are inevitable. It is in the nature of every story, every periodization, every characterization and every definition. No event, issue, concept or period can have a perfect closure. There is no perfect starting point, development or end. There are always choices involved in drawing the boundaries of 'events', 'issues' and 'concepts'. As such, every story, every periodization, every characterization and every definition has its silences and absences that are constitutive of their production. As Morrison in the above quote so aptly puts it "a void may be empty, but it is not a vacuum".⁴⁸⁴ That there is a silence and absence does not mean there is a vacuum but that there is a reason for the silence and the absence. The overarching narratives of the past (such as the Cold War) based upon a Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics come to constitute 'the past' and are reproduced as the only way of representing the past. These narratives silence 'local' histories and fix concepts in order to provide closures and linearity to the stories being told. This process 'edits' out events and issues and uncomplicates concepts in order to 'fit' these stories within parameters and periodizations of the general story.

The previous section outlined the historiographical operations on the Cold War. Two points were underlined in the chapters analyzing the historical discourse on the Cold War. Firstly, the various 'interpretations' of the Cold War are premised upon a Eurocentric conception of world politics. Furthermore, the different interpretations are rooted in alternative conceptualizations of American foreign policy. Secondly, the overarching narrative of the 'Cold War' operated in a way

⁴⁸³ Toni Morrison, 'Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Anglo-American Presence in American Literature', *Michigan Quarterly Review*, XXVII :I (1989) : 11-12

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

that edited out other possible stories that might disrupt the linearity and trajectory of the 'main' story. The aim of this section is to disrupt the linearity of the story and problematize the fixed concepts used within the explanatory frameworks. As such, it is an attempt to tell the stories of the silences, absences and the complicated nature of the negotiations of identities and processes. The following chapters aim to open up for discussion and question the linearity of concepts and events and identities that are accepted as being fixed and static throughout the historiographical operations. Three points will be underlined in the following chapters. Firstly, the concepts of westernization, modernization and democratization are and were contested concepts. Yet the overarching narrative of the Cold War unproblematicizes these concepts and presents them as closed boxes that cannot be questioned. These concepts become redacted through the narrative configurations that constitute the Cold War. As discussed in the previous chapter, the main themes that exist within Turkish historiography about the Cold War and Turkish history are modernization, Westernization, national security and the international. In the orthodox narrative of the Cold War and orthodox narrative of Turkish history that becomes embedded within the historiographical discourse on the Cold War, the story is based on dichotomies of good/evil, right/wrong, inside/outside and these were dichotomies that were already existent in the understanding of the Turkish nation. such, the historiographical operations and the editing out and fixing of concepts constructs objects of analysis as static. Which brings forth the second point to be underlined which is that along with concepts such as westernization, democratization and the international, a homogenous and fixed 'Turkey' is also constructed within these narratives. As a consequence, Turkey becomes an object to be narrated rather than a subject to be questioned. What the following chapters aim to ask is who is represented in this homogenous and fixed 'Turkey', whose voice becomes concomitant to that of Turkey and which voices are forgotten and silences. As Campbell states,

“national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities that do not possess prediscursive, stable entities. In other words, states are never finished as entities, the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction; with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of

becoming. For a state to end the practices of representation would be to expose the lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death”.⁴⁸⁵

In that sense the writing of the Cold War and the narrative configurations it reproduces also reproduce a specific idea and story of Turkey, democratization and westernization. What this section aims to underline is the process of the re/formulation and re/production of these identities and concepts. Thirdly, the category of ‘events’ need to be problematized. As discussed, the story of the Cold War includes acts of editing out. What is edited out, what constitutes an ‘event’ as an event, can that event be understood and narrated differently, were the alternative views on the ‘event’ as it transpired? These are all questions that need to be directed at the period under question in order to disrupt the linearity imposed upon ‘the past’ and the construction of an unproblematized ‘Cold War’ as an event.

The following chapters were organized in order to bring forth these points. The chapters are divided according to three time frames that are in general employed in the periodizations within the Cold War historiography; 1945-1947, 1947-1949, 1949-1951. This division is done in order to underline the ‘process’ of the re/formulation and re/definition of concepts, identities and events. The chapters themselves are divided in similar fashions. The introductory parts of the chapters aim to provide an overview of the main debates of the period. The second parts concentrate on the definitions of democracy and the third parts on definitions of national security and the international. The last part of the chapters is entitled ‘Silencing, Co-opting, Redefining’ and aims to further underline the process of re/defining .

The events of the period are widely accepted as paving the way for “the Cold War order” and determining Turkey’s role in it. As argued in Chapter 3, Turkish narratives of these events have been based on a set of discourses. These discourses were the inevitability of the Cold War, the continuity in foreign policy and of westernization. The next section demonstrates the manner in which these discourses were produced/reproduced and how they were countered at the time. The aim is to demonstrate that the dominant narratives themselves evolved over

⁴⁸⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 12

time in response to the alternative narratives and changing international and domestic circumstances. It is not a case of imposing the template of a never changing dominant narrative on to existing conditions. It is an ongoing process of negotiation between the dominant and alternative narratives and responses to the changing conditions. It needs to be underlined that the aim of this section is not a historical narrative of the period between 1945-1950.⁴⁸⁶ The focus is on bringing forth ‘events’ and discussing the negotiations and mediations of concepts during the period. Thus, it includes more and less than the historical narrative of the Cold War and as such it has its own inherent silences and absences and its own boundaries.

CHAPTER V: TRANSITIONING - 1945-1947

I. INTRODUCTION

The period from 1945-1947 is narrated as the transition period both for the international system and Turkish domestic politics. In the international front, the Second World War had ended and the international system was being transformed. The victorious powers were designing the future of the international system through conferences such as Yalta and Potsdam. As these conferences and

⁴⁸⁶ For a detailed narrative of the period see the three volumes by Cemil Kocak. *İkinci Parti: Türkiye’de İki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları (1945-1950)* (Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 2010); *İktidar ve Demokratlar: Türkiye’de İki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları (1945-1950)* (Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 2012); *Rejim Krizi: Türkiye’de İki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları (1945-1950)* (Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 2013).

the peace negotiations progressed it became clear that the Soviet Union and the United States did not share the same vision for the future of the international system. United States' vision consisted of an international liberal economic system that would serve its interests and ensure that a conflict like the Second World War was not repeated. The Soviet Union's vision did not see free trade as the solution but the source of the conflict and wanted territorial securities so as to not be attacked again. Both powers were driven by a search for security based on their differing perceptions of threat and definitions of security.⁴⁸⁷

Soviet Union's search for security affected Turkey directly because one of the territorial securities the Soviet Union sought was related to the Bosphorus. On June 1945 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper held a meeting to discuss the renewal of the Turkish-Soviet Friendship Treaty. In that meeting Molotov presented a series of demands as a condition for renewing the Friendship Treaty. These demands were; changing the Montreux agreement; the right to establish bases in the Bosphorus and the secession of Kars and Ardahan. Turkish government rejected these demands.⁴⁸⁸ The United States' interest in Turkey developed in relation to Turkey's increasingly tense relations with the Soviet Union. The United States sending the funeral of the deceased Turkish ambassador Munir Ertegun in 1946 with USS Missouri is accepted as one the first signals of America's growing interest in Turkey.

Domestically, this period is characterized as "transition to democracy" mainly because in 1946 Turkey's first multi-party elections were held. The Land Reform debates paved the way for the solidification of an opposition within the Republican Party. The Declaration of the Four, a proposal presented on 12 June 1945, by Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Koprulu and Refik Koraltan, called for changes in the political system such as multi-party elections and freedom of the press. This faction would become the founders of the Democrat Party

⁴⁸⁷ For further information about this period and conflicting interest of the United States and Soviet Union see David S. Painter, *The Cold War: An International History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Melvyn Leffler and David S. Painter, *Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of The Cold War, Vol.1: Origins*, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

⁴⁸⁸ More detailed discussion of these events will follow in this section

established in January 1946. The first multi-party elections were held in 21 July 1946. The creation of a second party and the elections created a tense political atmosphere but was intercepted with the 12 July Declaration by Ismet Inonu where he stressed his intention to be neutral between the government and the opposition.

This section aims to discuss the nature of the ‘transition’ by problematizing the concepts that the Cold War historiography fixes and disrupting the linearity of the story. This will be done through underlining the negotiation and dialogue in the process of ‘transition’. There was not one definition and understanding of democracy, westernization, national security or the international. There was an ongoing debate about the nature of the ‘transition’ and how democracy and national security should be defined. The historiographical operations on the Cold War privileges one definition and understanding of democracy, national security and the international and presents them as uncontested facts. The definitions and conceptualizations that are privileged are the dominant narratives of the period representing the views of the Republican regime. The criticism directed towards this regime, how these alternative narratives were comprehended and represented are edited out of the stories of the Cold War. Furthermore, the debates and how these narratives were redefined, reframed and reformulated during this period also get silences. Thus, the aim is to demonstrate the process and the debate and the way in which a redefining and reformulation of the concepts of democracy, national security and international underwent not in a unilinear manner but because of the interactions with the alternative narratives. The dominant narrative was based upon a very specific understanding of the Republican regime, its history and its aims. In a discussion with journalists Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu presented the orthodox narrative of the Turkish nation and state;

“In order to strengthen the Turkish nation, the Asian institutions had to be destroyed and replaced by European ones. The great men and their friends who did not hesitate against the immense difficulties they faced decided this. According to the decisions the aim was to speedily Westernize, Europeanize, strengthen and civilize Turkey. As such an unyielding Turkey replaced submissive Turkey”.⁴⁸⁹

The main dichotomy in this definition is the Western/non-Western, modern/pre-

⁴⁸⁹ Meeting with Journalists, Sukru Saracoglu, 5 September 1945 in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 11.64.6.

modern one.⁴⁹⁰ Destroying “Asian” institutions is a step to “Westernize and civilize” the Turkish nation. The main dichotomy is of what Turkey had been; Asian, uncivilized and what it is and constantly aspires to be; strong, European and civilized. Furthermore, the narrative assumes a clear break from the past institutions that did not necessarily exist. The unacceptable, illegitimate are branded as “reactionary” politics that endanger the principles of the revolution such as the Caliphate and Arabic letters. Anything associated with the Ottoman, the “Asian”, the “uncivilized” past is constructed as a threat to the future of the Turkish state. This clear dichotomy constructed with the past classifies everything associated with it as dangerous and harmful as such leading to further divisions of acceptable/unacceptable, legitimate/illegitimate, good/evil. This exclusion was also extended to ideologies deemed not compatible with the main characteristics of the Turkish state. Within the contours of these definitions there is no room for communism since national unity assumed the non-existence of classes and class conflict.

The changing conditions both domestically and internationally necessitated that this narrative be reframed and redefined. The process of debating the contours of the Turkish regime was a continuing process; it did not start with the end of the Second World War. The alternative narrative led by Vatan and Tan newspapers had been advocating for reforms since the 1940s. The narrative reframings of this period were not triggered by the end of Second World War but were eased because of it. These narrative reframings did not occur in response to just one single event. Rather it was an ongoing process of debating and redefining. Identities are not fixed in time and space and are constantly renegotiated. This renegotiation intensifies during times of flux when there are important international and domestic changes occurring. Hence, there was a renegotiation of Turkey’s identity, foreign policy and political regime, of ‘Turkey’ itself and the categories such as westernization and modernization that were considered to be constitutive of it. As Campbell states; “no state possesses a pre-discursive, stable identity and no state is free from the tension between the various domains that

⁴⁹⁰ This binary opposition is one that permeates Turkish (and Ottoman) history and also Turkey’s present. A closer look at the European Union debates within Turkey demonstrates that these dichotomies have not been resolved and continue to condition the elite’s perception of the international system.

need to be aligned for a political community to come into being, an alignment that is in response to, rather than constitutive of a prior and stable identity”⁴⁹¹ This section will juxtapose the dominant and alternative narratives with an aim to demonstrate how they communicated with each other, reacted to each other while debating the main events.

The debate during this period was framed around the redefinition, reproduction and reification of two main narratives. The first narrative aimed to redefine/reproduce the dominant understanding of democracy and communism. As mentioned earlier, this period is characterized as “Turkey’s transition to democracy” and the debates were central in defining and establishing the nature of the transition and the democracy to be established. Hence, the main contours of the political were redefined, reproduced through the discussions revolving around events such as the establishment of the Democrat Party and the Soviet demands. Even though the Soviet demands are a matter of foreign policy, the discussion of the issue and the manner in which the debates were framed had a direct relation to the “renegotiations” on the meaning of democracy. The threat of the Soviet Union was presented as an unquestionable fact⁴⁹² and as a consequence the alternative views were connected to national security. The second narrative redefined and reproduced Turkey’s main foreign policy goals specifically defining their relations with the United States. As discussed earlier, this period is defined by the transitional nature of the international system and Turkish political regime. The debates during this period forced upon reframing and redefining Turkish foreign policy aims in accordance with the emerging Western and specifically US-led definition of the international system. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will focus on the definition of democracy that was being debated and negotiated. The second part will discuss the reframings of the international system and the ‘transition’ it was undergoing. The third part will discuss the way in which the ‘debate’ resulted in a silencing and co-opting of the critical narratives.

⁴⁹¹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 91

⁴⁹² For an analysis of how representations of the Soviet Union produced it as a ‘threat’ and an ‘other’ see; Kivanc Cos and Pinar Bilgin, ‘Stalin’s Demands: Constructions of the ‘Soviet Other’ in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1919-1945’, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6 (2010): 43-60.

II. 'TRANSITION' TO DEMOCRACY

The renegotiation and redefinition of the nature of the political regime centered around two main reframings. The primary focus was defining what democracy was while the second was juxtaposing any possible regime change with national security. This section will discuss the ways in which the discussions surrounding the future of the political regime

The focus of the alternative narrative with respect to redefining identities was improvements that needed to be made to the political regime. Zekeriya Sertel wrote a series of articles in *Tan* questioning the nature of democracy in Turkey and discussing possible reforms. In one of these articles he stated that; "Turkish revolution is at an important crossroads. We need to change the laws that have pacified the community. We need a parliament that reflects the will of the people and is based on free elections. Turkey can enter this route easier than other since it has not experienced war".⁴⁹³ The main focus of the alternative narrative was directed towards the lack of democratic reforms and the authoritarian attitude of the government towards the opposition. As argued by Sertel;

"government newspapers argue that "there are no Fascists in turkey" ... there are no fascists in Turkey because the name of fascism is democracy. Democracy is such a universal mask that once you wear it you can defend racist and totalitarian elements. Especially if you have a defender like People's Party, do not be afraid, your independence is safe".⁴⁹⁴

The main argument was that the authoritarian elements in the Turkish government were being masked as part of democracy and the democratization was being halted in order to keep the old system intact. As Sertel stated "I am of the opinion that neither socialism nor communism can develop in a country that has not yet established ... [democracy]. All I want is a genuine Western democracy".⁴⁹⁵ As such their main concern was the one-party system and the restrictions imposed by them. Furthermore, these critics felt that the government was not achieving the Republican ideals themselves. An anti-government poster at the university stated;

⁴⁹³ Zekeriya Sertel, 'Can We Expect Anything from the Government and Parliament', *Tan*, 22 August 1945

⁴⁹⁴ "There are no fascists in Turkey", *Tan*, 20 October 1945

⁴⁹⁵ "Is Miss Sertel Sunni or Shia?", *Tan*, 1 September 1945

“which communism are you talking about? Is it communism to tell the people about your indiscretions, wealth and robberies, while they suffer. NO!! It is nothing but stating the truth. Is this democracy? A nation’s independence cannot be protected and defended in this manner. You fascists do not know what democracy means”.⁴⁹⁶

The focus of the criticism was how to improve the living conditions of the Turkish population and democratization. The purpose of their criticisms did not directly concern the foreign policy choices of the government but did indirectly threaten them since such changes meant the questioning of the authority of the state and the Republican ideal. As a consequence, the articles that criticised the nature of democracy were perceived as direct threats to the Republican regime. In an article they present different definitions of democracy by stating that;

“According to the American President Abraham Lincoln, democracy is:
rule of the people by the people for the people
According to England democracy is;
Rule of the world by England for England
Democracy according to Greece is;
Rule of the Greek people by the Greek king, and rule of the Greek king
by England for England,
The definition of democracy according to America today;
Rule of the world by the atom bomb for the United States,
Democracy according to Turkey is,
Rule of the people by the People’s Party”⁴⁹⁷

As can be seen in the above quotation, the criticism centered around the People’s Party’s domination over the definition and application of democracy. The main concern of these criticisms was the state of democracy and more so the economic condition of the country after the Second World War.

The dominant narrative framed the debate primarily based on perceptions of national threat. The first step was questioning the necessity of reforms, “our laws, procedures, approaches have been based on the principles of the People’s Party ... to change this situation there needs to be a reason, is there such a reason”?⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, it was stated that; “the government considers the support of Republican institutions as the basis of democracy”.⁴⁹⁹ The question of democracy and the nature of the political regime were framed in such a way as to prioritize Republican institutions and principles. Hence any reform that was demanded was

⁴⁹⁶ “Anti-government poster at university,” 4.1.1946 in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30.1.0.0, Place: 210 428 9,

⁴⁹⁷ Markopasa

⁴⁹⁸ Ethem Izzet Benice, In Light of Free Elections, *Son Telgraf*, 9 June 1945

⁴⁹⁹ 5 September 1945, Meeting with Journalists, Sukru Saracoglu, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivi, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File A6, Code: 30.1.11, Place: 68 6

considered within the sphere of whether or not it was in accordance with Republican principles, and national security both of which were defined by the dominant narrative. As a consequence, any view that did not conform to these definitions or any reform proposal that envisioned a different trajectory for Turkey's transition to democracy was branded as communist and as 'foreign agents'. As Sukru Saracoglu stated in a speech; "in recent weeks Istanbul newspapers have "attacked". They have started giving advice to the government and nation. They can not stop talking about the sins committed by People's Party and the Republican government for the last 20 years in foreign policy".⁵⁰⁰ Thus, the criticism was framed as something that endangered national unity and as a tool used by foreign agents to instigate internal trouble. As stated in *Vakit*; "we can see that a new phase of trials are beginning. People talk of the benefits of party opposition even of its necessity. If those that defend the necessity of party conflicts in the name of democracy have not lost their minds then they must definitely be enemies of Turkish national unity".⁵⁰¹

The Declaration of the Four was perceived as an attack on the authority of the Republican Regime and questioning of its legitimacy. According to the dominant narrative, Declaration of the Four meant, "a new phase of trials are beginning. People who talk of the benefits of party opposition, even of its necessity; if those that defend the necessity of party conflicts in the name of democracy are not delusional then they must definitely be enemies of Turkish national unity".⁵⁰² The main assumption was that more parties meant more disagreement and more infighting causing instability in the governance process. The dominant narrative prioritized stability over democratization. As argued in an article in *Ulus*; "those who complain about a lack of freedom have started their attacks, what happened to there being no freedoms. As fascism is being eradicated in Europe there were those that want to brand some Turkish citizens as fascists. There are no fascists in Turkey. There are Turks in Turkey".⁵⁰³ This stance is in line with the narratives of national unity. Within this narrative the Turkish nation acted in unison and any threat had to be 'foreign'. As with discussions of democracy, discussions about

⁵⁰⁰ 5 September 1945, Meeting with Journalists, Sukru Saracoglu

⁵⁰¹ Enemies of National Unity, *Vakit*, 25 June 1945

⁵⁰² Enemies of National Unity, *Vakit*, 25 June 1945

⁵⁰³ Mumtaz Faik Ferih, "Number 1 Patriot", *Ulus*, 11 July 1945

foreign policy were also limited by an understanding of maintaining national unity. As argued by the Prime Minister; “When the issue is defense of foreign policy, the revolution and its products whatever its colours all Turkish newspapers are on the same side with the government”.⁵⁰⁴ The focus was on unity rather than democratization and criticisms towards the government demanding more reforms were taken as attempts to destabilize the government and threaten national unity; “Democracy, freedom are good things. But which kind and until where? Is Turkey searching for the most appropriate way for itself or is this country who survived foreign change being threatened from inside”.⁵⁰⁵ The question for the government was to what extent reforms would threaten their hold on to power and their vision of Turkey from being realized and hence democratization was interpreted as a danger from within that could open the way for questioning the basic principles of the Republican regime.

As can be observed discussions about the nature of the democratic regime in Turkey were seen as direct threats to national unity and demanding reforms was interpreted as an attack on the government. The dominant elite perceived these criticisms as questioning their authority and the main principles upon which the Republican regime was built. The framing of the debate pitted democratization against national unity whereby the narrative told a story of Turkey sacrificing its Republican ideals in order to democratize hence weakening unity and threatening its accomplishments. Such a construction limited the possibility of an open debate on the subject. Once democratization and debating it was linked to the survival of the unity of the state, any discussion could be branded as a threat. As Republican ideals and upholding them was used to frame the definition of domestic politics it also influenced the perceptions of outside.

As discussed the framing of democracy centered on understandings of national security and the international. As such the next section will focus on the debates surrounding national security and the competing definitions of the international.

⁵⁰⁴Prime Minister’s Meeting with Journalists, 6 March in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 11.65.1.

⁵⁰⁵ *Aksam*, 15 June 1945

III. REDEFINING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The second narrative focused upon redefining Turkey's definition of "threat" and "national security". These redefinitions and reframings occurred in two main ways. First, was to align Turkey's foreign policy with that of the international system and juxtapose Turkey and its relations with the Soviet Union on the international Cold War narrative. The second was to reframe Turkey's general role in international relations and role in the Second World War.

Sukru Saracoglu stated in a speech that the "aim is to establish deep and genuine friendship bonds, we hope that in order to achieve positive results these efforts are reciprocated. We do not want anything from anyone and we have nothing to give".⁵⁰⁶ This line of argumentation aimed to establish Turkey's role in the new international system as an ally of the "peace-loving" nations. As Nihat Erim argued; "if any change in the status of the Straits is going to be considered, any new proposal should be in accordance with the new direction and new mentality"...⁵⁰⁷ The United Nations and its principles were established as the basis of the new international system and Turkey's actions were narrated as aiming to ascribe by these principles. Furthermore, the relations with the Soviet Union were included within the general structure of the United Nations; "the principles established with the UN are more than enough to satisfy the worries Soviet Union Soviet Union has with respect to the defense of the Straits".⁵⁰⁸ According to this perspective; "it is the duty of every state including Russia to improve inter-state relations in order to establish world peace".⁵⁰⁹ As such Soviet actions were not only framed as being a threat to Turkey's national sovereignty but also a threat to the new international system being set up by the United States within which Turkey situated itself. The Soviet demands were narrated into the general Soviet actions as proof that they threatened the peace and stability of the international system. In an article criticizing Soviet actions Nihat Erim stated that;

⁵⁰⁶ 0 30 01 11 64 6, 5 September 1945, Meeting with Journalists

⁵⁰⁷ Nihat Erim, 'The Straits Issue Again', *Ulus*, 17 August 1946

⁵⁰⁸ Manchester Guardian 30 11 1946, Turkish PM's views on the Straits Issue, M. Philips Price) in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 11 67 3,

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

“Soviets have demonstrated lack of trust in the UN system with the administration styles it created in Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and in Iran, and in their policy of intimidation and attrition”.⁵¹⁰ Thus the Soviet note to Turkey became part of Soviet Union’s pattern of challenging the UN system being set up by the United States. It was embedded into the narrative of an expanding Soviet Union that threatened and infiltrated governments with which it shared a border. Furthermore, it was argued that, “it is only Turkey that has stood against all the pressures”.⁵¹¹ As such Turkey was situated on the side of the United States resisting Soviet pressures and upholding the principles of the United Nations. According to this narrative, Soviet Union was threatening the territorial integrity of Turkey and by not giving into its demands Turkey was aiding the international efforts against aggression. Hence, Nihat Erim stated in an article that, “in no era was the Turkish straits a private matter between Russia and the Turkish nation”.⁵¹² The Soviet note was narrated as a threat to Turkey, international peace and a possible cause for a Third World War. As such, reacting and criticizing Turkey’s policies in this sphere were considered as endangering the national security of the state.

Zekeriya Sertel questioned the actions of the government by stating that; “the noteworthy part is that, this news has so far only been given by English sources and created by Huseyin Cahit ... It is not right to leave the nation under the influence of foreign sources”.⁵¹³ He further stated that “we do not know to what extent these rumours are true. It is inconceivable that Russia would make such a mistake”.⁵¹⁴ Huseyin Cahit Yalcin responded to their article by stating that “Zekeriya Sertel sees the world as a fairytale, I envy him, ... San Francisco conference has guaranteed world peace. As such there is nothing to worry about! Our friendship with another state is not only dependent on our wishes. The other side has to want the same friendship. Zekeriya Sertel is a victim of his nice dreams”.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹⁰ Nihat Erim, ‘The only missing link’, *Ulus*, 18 August 1946,

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁵¹² Nihat Erim, ‘Reaction to the Soviet Note’, *Ulus*, 24 August 1946,

⁵¹³ Zekeriya Sertel, Turkish Public Needs Enlightenment, *Tan*, 28 June 1945

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁵ Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, Turkey in the Face of Third World War, *Tanin*, 27 June 1945

Unity in foreign policy, adherence to the main threats of the Republican ideals as classified by the dichotomies was a precondition to taking part in the main discursive spaces. Any mention of communism, improving relations with the Soviet Union, criticism of the United States was branded as being unacceptable, illegitimate and threatening the unity of the state, hence automatically marginalizing those viewpoints. As argued by a leading newspaper; “The damage done by the red fascists has gone beyond a case of ideas and ideologies, and has started to incite the populace against each other and small magazines are trying to systematically create anarchy in the country through their publications”.⁵¹⁶ Furthermore, any attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union was branded as being a futile exercise of appeasement since “words, promises, signatures mean nothing to the red fascists. There is only opportunity for them”.⁵¹⁷ Soviet foreign policy aims was regarded with suspicion and any attempt to enter talks was seen as appeasement. As argued by Abidin Diner ;

“History has shown that a loose and cowardly appeasement policy gave Germany and Japan courage and caused the Second World War. Soviet Russia aims to fill the void left by Germany and Japan. Since Moscow worships power, it interprets lenient policies as a sign of weakness and attempts to realize its own ambitions at every juncture. Either Soviet Russia will continue to expand or there will be war. Since lenient policies have failed, United States and Great Britain have no choice but to apply a policy based on power and resilience”.⁵¹⁸

The interpretation of the Second War World, the international system and Soviet foreign policy aims in this article is in accordance with the traditional American Cold War interpretations that questioned appeasement as a viable policy option, that regarded Soviet Union as an expansionist power that could not be reasoned with and that concluded that this expansion had to be met with resolution. Such an approach not only vilifies the Soviet Union to an extent where their every action is reduced to the seeking for more power for the sake of it but also closed any possibility of approaching the issues experienced with the Soviet Union in a diplomatic manner.

⁵¹⁶ “Against Foreign Ideologies”, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1946 (Talebe Numayisi ve Tass Ajansi, Tasvir Aralık 1945)

⁵¹⁷ Huseyin Cahit Yalcin

⁵¹⁸ Abidin Diner, “Rusya’ya Karsi Uysal mi, Metin mi Davranmali”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1947

The second important focus was on the role of Turkey in the international system and during the Second World War. The Soviet attacks on Turkey's neutrality during the Second World War was one of the issues mentioned by the articles discussing the Soviet note. As Nihat Erim argued "a base means surrendering our sovereign rights. In order to suffer such a punishment one (a state) needs to be a defeated nation. That is why, the day the Russians gave the note the newspapers started publications attempting to make Turkey look guilty in the Second World War".⁵¹⁹ According to Saracoglu, "Turkey sided with the allies at the first sign of a war as soon as the war started it mobilized a million soldiers and prepared itself for any possibilities. Germans must have understood the high cost of doing things the hard way We stood with guns until the end of the war, sure of the opinion that we had a role in the war fought in the name of humanity".⁵²⁰ The reframing was primarily a reaction to Soviet attacks about Turkey's role in the Second World War but also part of a general reframing of Turkey's place in the international system. The reframing of the narrative focused upon Turkey aligning itself with the "West" from the start and this was supported by the reframing of Turkey's westernization narrative whereby the West referred to the United States rather than Europe.

These reframings were opposed by focusing upon imperialism and highlighting the anti-imperialist root of the War of Independence and the Republican regime. Sabahattin Ali's writings focused on imperialism and references to the Independence War.

"Foreign investment will return to our country. While giving this news newspapers are rejoicing. Official authorities are aiding the entry of foreign money into the nation.

Once this investment comes, motorways will run through the cities will be filled with airplanes, the nation will be filled with goods.

Then what was the purpose of the struggle to eradicate foreign investment in the last forty years.

Now I remember. I was just a five or six year old child. Mobilization had begun. The adventurist government of the time tried to sugar coat this bloody adventure by shouting;

"Capitulations are removed"

During the four years mobilization and three year Independence War we were told to be fighting in order to rid ourselves of the semi-colonization foreign investment had caused.

⁵¹⁹ Nihat Erim, 'With Respect to Russian Demands', *Ulus*, 15 August 1946

⁵²⁰ PM's Speech 6.4.1946, in *Basbakanlik Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File:A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 11 65 2

If we were going to invite them with open arms, why did we throw them out with celebrations”?⁵²¹

The main stance of the alternative narrative was underlying the anti-imperialist nature of the Turkish revolution. Hence, there was not a rejection of Republican ideals but a different interpretation of it. According to the alternative narrative, Turkish foreign policy had to be based on neutrality and siding with either the soviet Union or the United States meant opening Turkey for foreign influence.

In another article he argued that;

“Henry Wallace, who is the Secretary of Agriculture is heroically fighting against America’s imperialist policies used to be America’s Vice President ...

Wallace is in struggle with his own government for the sake of independence and freedom of small nations. He argues that Truman is destroying what President Roosevelt tried to establish.

Similar to our situation, just as we get cursed for saying Ataturk’s creation is crumbling, they curse Wallace. Here are a few headlines from our newspapers:

“Our number one enemy Moscow Wallace”

“Informer, talkative Wallace”

“Wallace has lost it again” ..

“What is Wallace saying”

Big nations are scheming to share small nations. This creates the road for third world war. Against this small nations need to unite and establish balance between the big nations. What about this is Moscovism? On the contrary it is imperialist

This is what we think”.⁵²²

The main argument was that Turkey’s independence, an independence that had been fought for should not be jeopardized with the foreign policy choices of the government and that an alliance with the United States and aid being received from them would be another way to colonize Turkey and bring it under the tutelage of a western power. The criticism toward the government, the demand for further democratization and the questioning of the foreign policy led the authorities to label Markopasa and the people who worked there as communists and Muscovites.

IV. SILENCING, CO-OPTING, REDEFINING

⁵²¹ Sabahattin Ali, ‘Foreign Investment’, *Markopasa*, 2 Aralık 1946 in *Markopasa Yazilari ve Otekiler*, 124-25

⁵²² Hangi Cepheden Gelirse Gelsin Emperyalizmin Aleyhindeyiz, in Ali, *Markopasa Yazilari ve Otekiler*, 148-9

This section will discuss the manner in which the alternative narratives were silenced, co-opted and/or redefined by the dominant narratives. The previous section demonstrated how the dominant and alternative narratives redefined the issues of democracy, foreign policy and national security. The dominant narrative adopted itself to the changing international and domestic condition. The manner in which issues were framed, as mentioned, limited the range of discussions on the subject but also marginalized and villanized the alternative narrative. This section will discuss how the alternative narratives and the people advocating them were targeted as enemies of Turkey.

Tan newspaper mainly discussed the nature of democracy in Turkey and was a center for opposition to the government. The opposition toward the government at first was a coalition of liberals, socialists and communists. Once RPP chose to use communism as a tool to attack Democrat Party, the main opposition party severed its ties with the leftists. The Tan incident and the events that led to it fractured this coalition leading the Democrat Party to align itself with the dominant discourse of the ruling party. As the debates about the future of the political regime and foreign policy intensified so did the accusations of communism and threats to national security. As a consequence, the liberal front started to crumble as the attacks on Tan made it clear to members of the Democrat Party that they needed to ascribe to the definitions of democracy and national security propagated by the dominant narrative and challenged the Republican system within that narrative. The next section will discuss the events revolving around the Tan Incident.

The series of events that led to the destruction of this coalition started with the establishment of *Gorusler Magazine*. Tevfik Rustu Aras, Zekeriya Sertel and Cami Baykurt had been meeting in Aras's house along with Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar where the programme of the future party was discussed. Once the party had been established they decided to launch a newspaper to act as the official newspaper of the Party⁵²³. It was to be run by Sabiha Sertel named *Gorusler* after her column in Tan Newspaper. Sabiha Sertel, Zekeriya Sertel, Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Koprulu, Tevfik Rustu Aras, Cami Baykurt, Halide Edip Adivar, Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi Berkes and

⁵²³ Sertel, *Hatirladiklarim*, 224

Adnan Cemgil had promised articles and this was advertised on the cover of the first issue.

Gorusler was published on 1 December 1945 and by noon a second print had been ordered. The magazine was met with a lot of criticism. Cumhuriyet Newspaper compared the “G” to a sickle and described the magazine as “red”.⁵²⁴ Sabiha Sertel and Huseyin Cahit Yalcin had been having arguments through their columns since the end of the Second World War and Huseyin Cahit Yalcin used Gorusler Magazine as a tool to brand the Sertel’s as “communist”. Discussions about democratic reforms had become central after Inonu’s speech. Ahmet Emin Yalman joined the Sertel’s in their demand for democratization. The “liberal” front had been formed. Zekeriya Sertel wrote a series of three articles entitled “This Parliament, this government and this party can not bring change [Degismeyi Bu Meclis Yapamaz, Bu Hukumet Yapamaz, Bu Parti Yapamaz” starting on 27 August 1945.

Huseyin Cahit Yalcin responded with an article entitled “Realities that Stand Out [Goze Carpan Hakikatler]” on 27 August 1945 where he stated that “Sabiha Sertel wants the government even the head of government to change, and for the People’s Party to share its power with other parties. Moscow also wants this. Sabiha Sertel wants democracy today, tomorrow she’ll want other things”.⁵²⁵ Yalcin focused on equating more freedoms with national instability that could lead to a communist takeover.

One of their most famous exchanges took place between October – December 1945 leading to the 4 December events. They wrote articles back and forth discussing the existence of fascism in Turkey and what it means. On 16 October 1945 Sabiha Sertel wrote an article entitled “Happy Fascists[Mes’ut Fasistler]” where she argued that;

“All elements – right and left – in all corners of the world have united against Fascism. Those who used to spread fascist doctrines are being

⁵²⁴ Mumcu, *40’ların Cadi Kazani*, 90-91

⁵²⁵ Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, “Realities that Stand Out [Goze Carpan Hakikatler],” *Tanin*, 27 August 1945.

eliminated. But the Fascists in Turkey continue to sing like nightingales as during war. According to them, those who advocate further democratization in Turkey are traitors. Because fascism is the enemy of all leftist views. Only Argentina, Portugal, Spain and Turkey are left as places where these views can be expressed and defended as freely as before. Even though the elimination of Fascists and fascist thought is the priority of the new world being established, our fascist have painted their black and brown shirts with democracy and established a front against right and left. Happy Fascists”.⁵²⁶ⁱ

Sertel was attacking the dominant narrative and the Republican establishment for not starting reforms and for allowing authoritarian elements to continue. In an article on 20 October 1945, Sertel wrote that;

The case that government newspapers, have been fervently defending lately has been: “There are no fascists in Turkey”. Starting from 1933 and accelerating in 1942 until today, books and articles defending the Fascist ideology and racism thesis were not burned. Magazines, books, and leaflets remain alive.

Fascism now has the mask of democracy Democracy is such an international mask that once you put it on your face, you can defend racist and totalitarian elements. Especially if you have a defender like People’s Party don’t be afraid. Freedom is safe”.⁵²⁷

Sabiha Sertel argued that fascism in Turkey had never been suppressed and now using the discourses of democracy and national unity it was establishing its power and refusing any criticism. According to Sertel, the government’s hold on the press was a totalitarian policy. Huseyin Cahit Yalcin wrote a response in 23 October 1945 entitled “Struggle to Destroy Fascism” where he argued that;

“I understand Moscow claiming that Fascists exist in Turkey, complaining that Fascists are in the government and demanding the eradication of Fascism in Turkey. Because, according to them, this will weaken Turkey, make it an easy prey for Moscow and establishing a Bolshevik “friendly” government But how can our heart not hurt when we see one of our own, a citizen from our own soul and blood repeating the same words like a parrot aiding imperialist Bolshevik propaganda”.⁵²⁸

This article again touches on the “foreign agents” narrative and Huseyin Cahit argued that it pains him to see such views expressed but he has to call them out. The dominant narrative of national unity and the instability reforms will create are continued in these articles.

⁵²⁶ Sabiha Sertel, “Happy Fascists [Mes’ut Fasistler],” *Tan*, 16 October 1945.

⁵²⁷ Sabiha Sertel, *Tan*, 20 October 1945

⁵²⁸ Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, ‘Struggle to Destroy Fascism’, *Tanin*, 23 October 1945

Sabiha Sertel's article on 1 December 1945 entitled "Bu devrim Ibret ve Meserret Gazeteleri" stated that;

"People's Party has given authority on their side to answer the critiques of Tan and Vatan. But these answers are demagogical ravings filled with slander towards Tan and Vatan newspaper and their owners. We excuse them on this count. Because what are they to do when the government is indefensible. People's Party has given written and verbal order not to read or sell these newspapers because it considers Tan and Vatan's publications in favor of independence and democracy as treason".⁵²⁹

Huseyin Cahit Yalcin on 4 December entitled "Kalkin Ey .. Ehli Vatan: Bir Vatan Cephesine Luzum Vardir [Rise up Tame Nation: There is a need for a home front] where he stated that;

"This nation, for centuries, resisted attacks from the north. Today again land and bases from the Bhosphorus is demanded When I opened "Gorusler" and read Mrs. Sertel's "Chained Independence" article, I immediately understood the kind of independence they aimed to achieve with red irons adorning the pages".⁵³⁰

The article was the catalysis for what is called the December 4 events where students destroyed Tan Newspaper. This episode demonstrates clearly that not only was there debate but a very heated one about the nature of democracy in Turkey. The alternative view that Turkey needed reforms was being voiced, the governments policies or lack thereof was being discussed and furthermore these criticisms were being countered by the usage of the dominant narrative. The criticisms were not discussed but rather attacked by relying on how making them unsettled the unity of the nation. Yalcin's attacks on Sertel do not discuss the specific merits of a policy or a certain reform rather he frames the criticism as efforts of 'foreign agents' to destabilize Turkey. The notion of 'foreign agents' is a recurring one as it assumes Turkey to be unified only to be infiltrated by 'foreign agents' aiming to divide the country.

DECEMBER 4 EVENTS

On 4 December students started to walk from Istanbul University towards Tan Newspaper. Zekeriya Sertel had warned the governor Lutfi Kirdar but the

⁵²⁹ Sabiha Sertel, 'Bu Devrim Ibret ve Meserret Gazeteleri', *Tan*, 1 December 1945.

⁵³⁰ Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, "Kalkin Ey Ehli Vatan: Bir Vatan Cephesine ihtiyac Vardir [Rise up ... Tame Nation: There is a need for a home front]," *Tanin*, 4 December 1945.

demonstrators met with no resistance as they walked to Tan newspaper. After destroying Tan, they walked towards the printing houses of *La Turquie* and *Yeni Dunya*. They ranted “Long Live Inonu, Damn the Communists”. The plan was to go to Kadikoy and attack the Sertel’s house but the governor stopped them when he ordered the Kadikoy ferry the demonstrators were riding to the islands. Sabiha Sertel, Zekeriya Sertel and Cami Baykurt were arrested and investigations were started about the lecturers who had promised articles.⁵³¹

In his memoirs Zekeriya Sertel recounts the events of 4 December as follows:

“Towards the end of 1945, the first issue of the magazine ‘Gorusler’ was published. Gorusler’s publication made a huge impact. The first issue was snatched. Within a day we had no copies left. Under the title “Chained Independence” the magazine had demonstrated through strong articles and pictures how the one chief and one party system chained our democratic right and freedoms. In the first page we declared that we had obtained articles from Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Koprulu. Gorusler received wide interest because it answered the public’s need for freedom. The public found what it wanted to say but couldn’t in this magazine. However, the publication of the magazine had angered the government especially Inonu and Saracoglu. It was the second and third day of the publication. An acquaintance came. He informed me that tomorrow some university students were going to organize a demonstration in front of the publication house. He also advised to take precautions ... I phoned the Governor Lutfi Kirdar. I gave the news and requested that the government take precautions. The Governor: “I know and I have taken the necessary precautions, don’t worry.”

I opened the newspaper the next day. Huseyin Cahit Yalcin had an article in Tanin entitled “Kalkin Ey Ehli Vatan” provoking the public against us. He called the Tan newspaper communist and called on the public to destroy our publishing house. This meant that the demonstration had been organized by the government and had ordered Huseyin Cahit to write such an article. Early that morning a student phoned warning me that some students were getting ready to attack the Tan publishing house. I phoned the governor again and asked what precautions were taken.

He said “Don’t worry. The police blockaded the publishing house. There’s no danger.”

The morning of 4 December 1945 fascist university students with bijlen, sledges and red ink attacked the publishing house. The police just watched the events unfold. The demonstrations used the bijlen to break the doors. They broke the machines with the sledges. Then with bottles of red ink in their hands they started looking for us shouting “where are the Sertel’s”. Their aim was to undress us, paint us in red and then take us around in streets shouting “Here are the reds”. All these happened in front of the police.⁵³²

Sabiha Sertel’s account also discusses the warnings from the Governor and states

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⁵³² Sertel, *Hatirladiklarim*, 267-271

that:

“ Zekeriya ... phoned the Governor Lutfi Kirdar:
‘I had received information about an attack on the publication house and informed you. You said ‘Don’t worry, nothing will happen’. But the publication house has been destroyed and now I hear that they’re attempting to come to our house. At least prevent that.’
The Governor answered by saying:
‘The danger has passed, but, where are you phoning from?’
‘My house’
‘Don’t stay there!’
So we were still not safe, We returned home after three days.⁵³³

Celal Bayar and Tevfik Rustu Aras refused any involvement with the magazine. This had broken the alliance of the “liberals” and “leftists” against the government in calling for further democratization. Sertel states in his memoirs that;

“Tevfik Rustu had separated from Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. The newly established Democrat Party had started denying the principles we had thought of at first. We knew that Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes would want to break away to liberalism sooner or later. But we had thought that we could at least work together until a democratic system was established. The destruction of Tan publishing house accelerated the process and everyone retreated to their own camp before we could achieve our aims”.⁵³⁴

As the “liberals” aligned themselves with the center and adopted the dominant narrative two trends appeared. Firstly, the “left” became more and more of a fringe opposition and the attacks towards it intensified. Secondly, the “liberals” and namely the Democrat Party adopted RPP’s tactic of accusing people of being leftist. As shown in this caricature Vatan and Tan both tried to influence the new party and create an alliance against the government.



Whites, Reds – our boat
Those on the boat: Leave us alone, let us go our way

⁵³³ Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi* (Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1987), 314-317

⁵³⁴ Sertel, *Hatirladiklarim*, 235

The events that led to the destruction of Tan ensured that Vatan and Democrat Party distanced themselves completely from Tan and the possibility of any alliance against the policies of the government was destroyed. The constant attacks towards Tan newspaper, the reaction of the students, the fact that the writers of the magazine rather than the students themselves were reproached by law demonstrates a systemic effort by the government to silence alternative voices.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter focused on the period from 1945 to 1947 in an attempt to explain the beginning of the ‘transition period’. As a transitional period, the main narratives about the Turkish nation, democracy, foreign policy threats were being defined and redefined based on Turkey’s historical definition of itself and the changing international and domestic conditions. The dominant narrative itself adopted to these changing conditions by internationalizing the foreign policy objectives of Turkey and adopting an orthodox interpretation of American foreign policy. The democratization debates were controlled through framing the debate on national security terms and aligning them with the changing international conditions. As a consequence, the liberal front that presented alternative narratives was destroyed and an important component of the front, the Democrat Party, was co-opted into the dominant narrative. It needs to be further emphasized that the Cold War narrative was an enterprise readily entered into by Turkish elites. The juxtaposition of the Cold War narrative into the events of the day reinforced the general Turkish narrative of itself. This section has demonstrated how these narratives and discourses about the Turkish nation, democracy, foreign policy, the United States and the international system not only reinforced the Cold War narrative but also reinforced a specific understanding of Turkish history. The dominant discourses of/about events were based on a specific understanding of modernity, of democratization, and most importantly of the Turkish nation. As Hobsbawm states “the “narrative” of the nation is told and retold through national histories, literatures, the media and popular culture, which together provide a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and

rituals”.⁵³⁵ The manner in which the international system, foreign policy and threats to national unity were interpreted is linked to an understanding of Turkey’s past and an ideal for its future. The next chapter focuses on the period between 1947 and 1949 when the debates about democratization and foreign policy shift focus. With the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan the alignment of Turkey with the Western sphere becomes more apparent there is an increasing criticism from the alternative narratives. Furthermore, the democratization debate shifts focus as the dominant narrative becomes a defender of democratization on its own terms.

CHAPTER VI: SOLIDIFICATION

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the period from the announcement of the Truman Doctrine till the start of the Korean War. This period is generally characterized as the solidification of Cold War alliances and the establishment of United States’s Cold War foreign policy. American foreign policy through the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine starts to delineate its sphere of influence. With respect to Turkey, in the international level it is perceived as the period when Turkey joined the Western alliance. The events of the period such as the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan solidified Turkey’s position within the Cold War discourse. Domestically, this period is also when the ‘transition to democracy’ is ‘achieved’.

Turkish-American relations became closer and Turkey entered the Western Alliance with the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The Truman Doctrine declared on 12 March 1947 stated that economic and military aid would be extended to Greece and Turkey in order to help them against the Soviet Union. The declaration itself did not name the Soviet Union but stated

⁵³⁵ Hobsbawn, “Inventing the Past,” 52

that it was ‘the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’” The Marshall Plan declared on June 1947 aimed to reconstruct the devastated economies of European states. The plan was extended to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but it was rejected. This was another instance of the diverging visions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Domestically, the democratization debates shifted focus as the dominant narrative became a defender of democratization defined on their own terms. The debates surrounding the extension of Martial Law is an example of how democracy was defined in order to fit the dominant narratives understanding of Turkey as a nation and its role in the international system.

These narratives focus on the establishment of the Cold War dynamics and Turkey’s efforts to situate itself within them. This chapter focuses on the two main narratives that are being consolidated during this period. The first narrative focuses on domestic politics and the redefinition of what democratization means based on the newly forming understanding of national security. The second narrative focuses on internationalizing Turkey’s crisis and situating them within the Cold War dynamics. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part will discuss the dominant and alternative narratives in domestic and foreign policy focusing specifically on the main narratives within these spheres. It will provide the main debates surrounding the concepts of democratization and national security and discuss the manner in which these redefinitions became embedded into the narratives of Turkish identity. This part will also discuss the ways in which Turkish foreign policy was embedded into the narrative of the Cold War and aligned with Western ideals and aims. The second part of the chapter will discuss the ways in which the opposition shown to the dominant narratives in the previous section was silenced and co-opted by the dominant narrative. The next step was to establish dominance over the definition of democratization and silence the remaining factions. The first part focuses on domestic politics and specifically the narratives of democratization and national security and how they became interlinked. The second part discusses Turkish foreign policy and the aim to embed the crises faced into the parameters of the emerging Cold War dynamics.

II. 'SOLIDIFYING' DEMOCRACY

This section aims to discuss the ways in which the debate shifted its focus from whether or not democratization was necessary to how and when democratization should happen and who should be included in the process. The debate was framed so as to exclude communism from the democratization process by identifying it as a threat to national security. By excluding communism and socialism from their definition of democratization, they could stand for democratization and also national security. By controlling the process of democratization and tying it to an understanding of national security, the narrative changed from framing democratization as a danger to national security to framing democratization – a democratization defined by them – as necessary to national security. As such the narrative of “threatening to divide the state” remained the same but rather than have as its perpetrators liberal democrats, it only focused on communists.

The framing of the debate around communism ensured that not only was it against national unity but also against the goal of westernization and modernization that were the cornerstones of the Republican ideal. As argued by Cihad Baban;

“There are communist agents in Turkey .. .disguising in different manners, there are teachers among them, leftist voices have come from the Faculty of History and Language in Ankara and became teachers ... the danger is spreading ... the Ankara University Senate has not shown the sensibility expected from it in this national cause”.⁵³⁶

The continuing theme of ‘foreign agents’ needs to be underlined here as it implied that Turkey itself was a unitary and stable unit but it was these ‘agents’ creating instability. As such the problems being experienced were the result of a conscious foreign effort to destabilize Turkey and not because of issues that might be inherent in the Turkish political system. Framing communism as a threat to national unity defined democratization that could happen in a specific manner. Recep Peker defined it in a 1947 speech “communism is the denial of

⁵³⁶ Cihad Baban, ‘Leftist Issue in the Ankara University’, *Tasvir*, 21 December 1947

nationalism” and argued that those who adhered to international ideologies were threatening national unity. Thus according to this perspective, the primary focus of the communism debate is not about how it affects democratization but how it affects national unity. He also stated “apart from those that have led astray by international ideologies, all Turks want national unity”.⁵³⁷ Thus, communism was defined a direct threat to national unity. National unity was/is one of the cornerstones of the narrative of Turkish identity; and national unity was concomitant with complete belief with Republican ideals. As such predicating national unity into the discussions of communism automatically brands it as a national threat. Democracy was reconceptualized based on this understanding of the threat of communism and became interrelated primarily with nationalism.

This was not only limited to communists nor was this attitude towards communism developed concomitant to the development of Cold War dynamics. The discussions of religion, democracy, and changing press law, extending martial law were all interpreted as threats to Republican ideals. As stated “the government considers the support of Republican institutions as the basis of democracy”.⁵³⁸ Definition of the Turkish nation was directly implicated within this discussion since changing the nature of the one-party regime would have inevitably altered the trajectory the Turkish state was set on. Communism was seen as a way to destabilize the Turkish state and communists were seen as agents of the Soviet Union. As stated in *Ulus* newspaper “the activities of the red fifth column are linked with the issue of Russian demands. The main issue is to weaken the present government who is determined to defend the right of Turkey till the end”.⁵³⁹ As such communism was a tool used by “foreign agents” to threaten national unity but unlike previous threats it used internal dynamics and citizens to achieve this goal hence becoming even more dangerous to national unity. Examples from Greece were given to demonstrate this point; “Greece is not under occupation. They do not have Serb or Bulgarian gangs in their mountains. All these are because of their own children who are left without

⁵³⁷ Recep Peker makes a Description of Nationalism, *Ulus*, 29 March 1947, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arxivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 12.6.9.7.

⁵³⁸ In the Face of a Comlicated Nature, Nihat Erim, 1 December 1948, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arxivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 11.68.2.

⁵³⁹ “Continuing Provocations”, *Ulus*, 31 August 1946

any love for their nation once under the influence and service of foreigners”.⁵⁴⁰ ‘Foreign agents’ infiltrating to destabilize the government is a common narrative used in Turkish historiography.⁵⁴¹ It achieves the vilification of an “other” sinister enough to corrupt Turkish citizens but also reifies the narrative of national unity since national unity though threatened is still intact for events are not ascribed directly to Turkish citizens but “foreign agents” and once those “foreign agents” are dealt with national unity can continue. Internal provocation became the rationale for continuing a certain style of democracy, the continuation of martial law, closing down of parties and the limiting of general freedoms. As argued,

“the propaganda against the Turkish state that started outside have in no time turned to internal attacks on the regime and state authority. We are for freedom. If communism was not a system that specifically targeted the elimination of freedom we could have allowed it to be discussed. But communism will destroy the freedoms it champions the first chance it gets. Communism is a new form of imperialism. Communism in Turkey is about the survival of the Turkish state”.⁵⁴²

The framing of the discussion excludes communism in the definitions of democracy. The freedoms that are being demanded are presented as ploys from communist agents to take over and eradicate democracy and national unity. The alternative narratives focused on the domestic problems that Turkey was encountering and the need to solve them. Turkish foreign policy in itself was not the focus of their criticisms but rather the domestic condition of Turkey.

⁵⁴⁰ “An Important Example”, *Ulus*, 7 September 1946

⁵⁴¹ For the way in which the ‘foreign agents’ narrative is used in Turkish history textbooks see:

⁵⁴² “You can not threaten the Existence of the Turkish nation”, *Ulus*, 18 December 1946



As can be seen in the above illustration the criticism towards the definition of democracy was focusing on the economic hardships. The illustration does not differentiate between political allegiances but presents all the parties involved as interested in their own plight and crying because of their own concerns whereas the public at large is crying because of hunger. As stated in an article;

“what did we do in 25 years
 we tore down houses and built public squares
 we built statutes
 when we couldn’t deal with one party ... we established another one
 we made Fahri Kurtulus a member of Parliament
 we made Cemil Barlas a minister
 what we didn’t do
 we couldn’t give the people the coal they needed
 we couldn’t save the hundreds of kids dying of tuberculosis
 we still couldn’t teach the people to live without food, water and clothes
 and to economize”⁵⁴³

⁵⁴³ Markopasa, 5 November 1948

The debates surrounding the extension of the Martial Law demonstrated how domestic politics and foreign policy concerns became more interlinked. Furthermore, the debates reveal the manner in which the international system, the 'Cold War' and Turkey's role in it were defined by the dominant narrative. In a speech explaining domestic and foreign policy, Prime Minister Recep Peker stated that; "When the existence of states are in consideration the main issue is strategy. The area where Martial Law is being imposed is the Marmara area where the Bosphorus is .. this is the area that will be first thought of if Turkey is going to be attacked. As a consequence, it is the most important area in establishing Turkey's security".⁵⁴⁴

Furthermore, in describing the present state of the international system he stated that;

"Even though the war between the Allies and Axis powers is over, the guns and bombs of the Second World War have been replaced by an insidious silence. Turkey needs to be alert because in the present danger will not be as obvious as an invasion. Land has been demanded of Turkey. A foreign base has been demanded under the guise of common defense in the Bosphorus. We live in a period where there has not been a withdrawal of these demands".⁵⁴⁵

As such the threat Turkey was facing was identified. It was under danger of an external attack and had to be prepared for it by continuing martial law. These discussions framed Turkey's national security with Cold War terms. Rasin Kaplan stated that; "when the great American nation states that peace has not yet been established, that peace is in danger, and one of those areas under the most danger is our borders, some are still indecisive and still don't comprehend the reasons for martial law".⁵⁴⁶ Hence, the reframing was based on America's definitions of threat and Turkey was positioned within that definition. As stated in the report; "there is no peace in the world and international trust has not been established. President Truman has pointed out the dark and dangerous situation the world is in his speech to the Congress".⁵⁴⁷ Thus, the danger defined by Truman was adopted to be the primary concern of the Turkish state. Furthermore, it was stated that; "the pain and suffering continued as could be

⁵⁴⁴ Parliament Meeting, 28.5.1947, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30 01, Place: 12 71 3

⁵⁴⁵ Parliament Meeting, 28.5.1947, 0 30 01 12 71 3,

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

seen in the continuing chaos in Greece. Which nation does not take precautions when her neighbors' house is burning down? Our first precaution is martial law. Martial Law creates order".⁵⁴⁸

The opposition countered this effort by pointing out that martial law was interfering with political life. Bayar pointed out "why is martial law necessary on top of the security provided by the political force"?⁵⁴⁹ A further argument used by the opposition was that martial law might be used as a political tool to weaken the opposition and police domestic politics. Ismail Hakki Cevik pointed out that even though the argument for martial law was to fight communism, the government's actions proved otherwise, it was used for domestic purposes. The opposition in its arguments against the extension of martial law tied the matter of political stability and the future of the democratization process.⁵⁵⁰

Furthermore, Hasan Dincer in his speech argued that;

"even though absolute peace has not been established the Second World War is over, and even though there might be foreign powers who have demands on our lands these are not valid reasons to extend martial law. Because our constitution specifies that martial law can be declared when there is an external threat. It means that politically and militarily war has become inevitable".⁵⁵¹

The arguments concentrated on maintaining a division between internal stability and external threats. The Republican Party wanted a national security approach that linked the domestic and foreign threat. The main discussion point was its implication for the democratization process. The Republican Party wanted to control the process by directly associating it to the notion of national security. The opposition countered this because it would limit the democratization process.

Their priority as can be seen in these discussions is the maintenance of order. Furthermore, the 'Cold War' understanding of international distrust, of imminent danger are reproduced within these debates as Truman's declaration that threat still exists is taken to demonstrate that Turkey needs to continue being ready for a possibility of war. The problems with the Soviet Union were intertwined with

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

the American narrative of the Cold War not only underlying the importance of Turkey as one of the states directly under threat but also further strengthening the dominant discourse about foreign threats against the Turkish state. The foreign policy/domestic politics became more intertwined as the Cold War discourse adopted necessitated further controls by the government to monitor the communist threat against the unity of the state. The discourse adopted is that of the Cold War whereby the next attack might not necessarily be one of direct attack causing the Third World War but the threat is communist infiltration that can be defended by allying oneself with freedom loving nations. The tensions with the Soviet Union was embedded into this discourse of threat and necessity for security.

III. INTERNATIONALIZING FOREIGN POLICY

This section focuses on how the foreign policy issues Turkey faced were internationalized and Turkish foreign policy in general was embedded into the general American Cold War narrative. This was done through adopting America's Cold War discourse and the western interpretations of the international system and Soviet foreign policy.

Firstly, the dominant narrative adopted an orthodox interpretation of American foreign policy defining it as primarily isolationist. A similar statement was made in 1947 to a New York Times correspondent; "The Prime Minister expressed his contentment of America leaving its isolationist policies and argued that American involvement will not only help the world but also the United States herself."⁵⁵² More detailed discussions were made in newspapers that argued that;

"Ever since gaining its independence 169 years ago United States has served to save the independence of humanity twice. In the first world war American army came to the help of Europe that had lost its strength and hope It has again been this nation that brought in its technical knowledge and military strength and increased the Allies chance of a victory".⁵⁵³

This narrative was taken further by Falih Rifki Atay who argued that; "American

⁵⁵² NY Times Correspondent on Turkey, 17 April 1947, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:12.70.5.

⁵⁵³ Esat Tekeli, "America's Independence Day", *Ulus*, 6 July 1945

foreign policy has left its isolationist policy and changed its direction after participating in two world wars in 25 years without any calculations or territorial designs. It is no doubt that if this direction had been adopted at the end of the First World War the Second World War would not have happened”.⁵⁵⁴ This view is in line with the “orthodox realist” explanation of American foreign policy⁵⁵⁵ that argues that American isolationist policies had to be left behind and America needed to become more involved in European affairs to prevent further wars. The Turkish narrative of American foreign policy clearly ascribed to the orthodox realist interpretation of American foreign policy. The Prime Minister ascribes to the dominant American narrative about America’s isolationist policies and it coming to the aid of states in need. The alliance with the United States was also presented as part of the Westernization process, and as part of the progress deeply embedded in the definition of the Turkish nation.

“America who is in every way the strongest and most democratic state in the world has decided to strengthen our nation that is the fortress of democracy in the Near and Middle East. She is giving millions of dollars worth of arms and supplies to support our national defense. She is sending specialists to demonstrate how to use them. The only way to develop and renew our country is to take advantage of America”.⁵⁵⁶

America is presented as the pinnacle of modernization that Turkish identity was based on achieving. As such their aid becomes a necessary step in the progression towards that goal that was established by the revolution. Thus it is not only that America has higher ideals but also that those Republican ideals are what are based upon. Moreover, Turkey’s role in receiving the aid and in allying itself with America was explained within the contours of the Cold War discourse (explaining the international system and Turkey’s relations with other states).

Framing America and its foreign policy goals as representative of the Republican ideals Turkey aimed to realize meant that Turkish foreign policy aims, threats

⁵⁵⁴ “Decisiveness in Foreign Policy”, *Ulus*, 8 October 1946

⁵⁵⁵ Halle argued that “in 1917-1918, the United States, morally and psychologically unequipped to do so, came into the War at the eleventh hour to restore the balance of power, while pretending that it was doing something altogether different and nobler. The result was that the lesson was not learned the first time, that it had to be repeated in 1941, and that it would finally be learned only in 1947, when at last the United States, now grim and realistic, would abandon its isolationist policy and all its outworn traditions in order to meet the challenges of Stalinist Russia”, *Cold War as History*, 26

⁵⁵⁶ Abidin Daver, “Devlet Makinesini Islah”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 August 1948

were redefined in order to fit these principles. In an article written on 1948 Nihat Erim provided an overview of the international system by stating that;

“On the one hand Iranian government forces have received orders to enter Azerbaijan lands and on the other hand the change in attitude Molotov displayed in New YorkThe tense atmosphere that has existed since the war ended has reacted its limit. Especially in recent weeks it has reached a new level when Molotov asked about the number of Allied soldiers in Allied states. The implication of this question was; what is the purpose of these forces. This question was not left unanswered. England and the United States stated that we should not only state how many forces are on the ground but how many forces a state has mobilized. The implication was that the reason behind allied forces in Europe is the large army the Soviet Union has at home”.⁵⁵⁷

The interpretation of the Second War World, the international system and Soviet foreign policy aims in this article is in accordance with the traditional American Cold War interpretations that questioned appeasement as a viable policy option, that regarded Soviet Union as an expansionist power that could not be reasoned with and that concluded that this expansion had to be met with resolution. Such an approach not only vilifies the Soviet Union to an extent where their every action is reduced to the seeking for more power for the sake of it but also closes any possibility of approaching the issues experienced with the Soviet Union in a diplomatic manner. Hence, the Cold War definition of the international system and America’s conception of threat were adopted. Furthermore, the turbulence in Greece is given as a reason to be careful since the threat can expand. Moreover, examples from Italy and Belgium were given in newspapers about the dangers posed by communism. *Yeni Sabah* argued that;

“It is clear that communists are creating frenzy in Italy, government searches in communist headquarters found guns, ammunitions and bombs. The communists themselves admitted that they were going to side with the Soviets and create anarchy. Shouldn’t necessary precautions be taken against the armament of the fifth column? In the case of an outside attack the army will be busy fighting the enemy. Should it also be expected to deal with domestic sabotage and rebellion”.⁵⁵⁸

By giving examples of the dilemmas faced by established democracies in Europe, the article argues that; “we need to learn lessons from these foreign examples as we are just entering the democratic stage”.⁵⁵⁹ The implication of

⁵⁵⁷ Ulus Newspaper, 1 December 1948, In the Face of a Complicated Picture, Nihat Erim, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 11 68 2,

⁵⁵⁸ *Yeni Sabah*, 8.8. 1950

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

these arguments was that Europe with all the established rules and procedures was ill-equipped to deal with the threat of communist infiltration which could not only be solved by large armies. How could Turkey deal with these threats when it had such fragile institutions? As the government program stated in 1947; “aim of the government is to further develop democracy and establish political security which we believe is a prerequisite for it”.⁵⁶⁰ Yet by adopting the discourse of the Cold War the dominant political understanding of what constituted a threat to establishing political security was widened. Political security now included any leftist ideas, any criticism that the present rules and procedures be changed, any questioning of the foreign policy choices. As stated by Nihat Erim; “Think of our foreign relations, think of the threats we face, in these conditions if martial law is lifted, if press is completely free, how will this end? What will happen after”?⁵⁶¹ Thus lifting restrictions on the press, not renewing the martial law became direct threats on the Turkish nation. The argument was based on the threat of “communism” being so prevalent and ‘foreign agents’ manipulating Turkish citizens. Russia’s aims and its dealings with Turkey were embedded within the larger Cold War context. Nihat Erim argued in an article that;

“Turkish answer proved baseless the tension trying to be stirred about a couple of small ships that crossed the Straits during the Second World War. Soviets want to change the Montreux Agreement for reasons yet unknown. They want to set up such a system that the Black Sea states - i.e. Russia - can have privileged rights. Aim is to have Turkey in a position so that it has to bow to the Soviets, Russia does not only aim for hegemony in the Black Sea but also the Mediterranean”.⁵⁶²

The Russian threat is not only presented as a threat to Turkey but also to the region and the international system situating Turkey at the center of it. The argument is based upon Turkey’s credentials as a “peace-loving nation” who wants to solve issues through international means. As stated by the Prime Minister;

“We desire sincere and friendly relations with all our neighbors including our great neighbor Soviet Russia. but the realization of this does not depend solely on our desire In view of the overall

⁵⁶⁰ The Government Programme read by Hasan Saka, 13 October 1947, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: D7, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:54.328.3.

⁵⁶¹ Nihat Erim Kocaeli Speech (the Changing of the Press Law), in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:11.65.7.

⁵⁶² Nihat Erim, “After the Turkish Answer”, *Ulus*, 24 October 1946, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:11.66.2.

security, not only of Turkey but also of the Mediterranean region to which Turkey belongs we deem it essential that a Mediterranean defense system should be set up and linked to the general security system provided for under the Atlantic pact”.⁵⁶³

Internationalizing the problem also meant internationalizing the solution clearly situating Turkey within the Western Alliance. In its foreign policy declarations references are made to the United Nations, its principles and how Turkey is an intricate part of it by stating that “our government who has abided by the principles of the United Nations will continue to work for the establishment of peace and security”.⁵⁶⁴ As well as internationalizing the problem, relations with the Soviet Union were also embedded in a democracy/authoritarianism dichotomy that reproduced the main Cold War narrative and American foreign policy aims. As stated in Tanin; “It is a trouble upon the world Russia is not a state or government owned by a nation, it’s a huge ragtag, a nations’ prison and an example of hell on earth .. Rights and liberties of the civilized European states cannot enter the borders of the Russian Empire. Because if Russian rulers recognize freedoms Russia will crumble”.⁵⁶⁵

Soviet foreign policy aims was regarded with suspicion and any attempt to enter talks was seen as appeasement. As argued by Abidin Daver ;

“History has shown that a loose and cowardly appeasement policy gave Germany and Japan courage and caused the Second World War. Soviet Russia aims to fill the void left by Germany and Japan. Since Moscow worships power, it interprets lenient policies as a sign of weakness and attempts to realize its own ambitions at every juncture. Either Soviet Russia will continue to expand or there will be war. Since lenient policies have failed, United States and Great Britain have no choice but to apply a policy based on power and resilience”.⁵⁶⁶

The alternative narrative concentrated on the implications of the American aid and aligning with America. Was America really exporting democracy or buying Turkey’s independence? The criticism focused on how aligning with America meant betraying the ideals of the Turkish revolution and independence. As the below cartoon illustrates, American aid and its promise of democratization was

⁵⁶³ Questions submitted to H.E. M. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey, by Mr. Ralph Izzard, Special Correspondent to the Daily Mail, London, 5 June 1950, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: E4, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:60.372..2.

⁵⁶⁴ Nihat Erim, “In the Face of a Complicated Nature”, *Ulus*, 1 December 1948, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 11.68.6

⁵⁶⁵ Tanin, 5 January 1946

⁵⁶⁶ Abidin Daver, “Rusya’ya Karsi Uysal mi, Metin mi Davranmali”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1947

seen as another vehicle for imperialism.



According to Ali, the Republic had lost its anti-imperialist and populist qualities and resorted to violence and necessitated the support of America to remain in power. He stated that, “they’re making up the story of communists in the country”, and argued that;

“in reality our country has neither enough communists to constitute a threat, nor a workers’ movement strong enough to support them. Despite this such a threat is being fabricated in order to get money from the States.... That is why they allow socialist parties to be opened so that they can close them for being “communist”. Newspapers that have done nothing but tell the truth are branded as “reds” and silenced. Professors who have an independent mind are fired. All these are done to give the impression, internally and externally, that the country is under a red threat”.⁵⁶⁷

Leftist papers criticized the alliance with America because they felt that it diverted attention from the urgent reforms necessary to democratize Turkey and that a policy of neutrality would have benefited the realization of those reforms more. Hence to them the Marshall Plan was a way of creating dependency to the West that the independence war and the establishment of the Republic with its anti—imperialist rhetoric had initially tried to avert. As stated; “WHERE ARE WE GOING? Are we going to sign another Sevr agreement in the 25th anniversary of the Republic”.⁵⁶⁸ Mehmet Ali Aybar argued “Turkey was leaving

⁵⁶⁷ Zincirli Hurriyet, 5.2.1948

⁵⁶⁸ Towards a New Sevr, Zincirli Hurriyet, year 1, No: 1, 5 April 1947

a Swiss and Swedish type neutrality in favour of becoming an American station in the Near East necessitating a large army and stated that there is no benefit in allying Turkey to only one side”.⁵⁶⁹ With respect to the Marshall Plan he stated that “do you know what America wants from us in return for 150 million \$ They want us to play the role Poland played in WWII, and for us to already surrender to America. We need to be friends with America, England and the Soviet Union”.⁵⁷⁰



Fascism used to enter like this, Imperialism enters like this

As seen in this cartoon published in Markopasa on 21 April 1947, the aid is perceived as being just another vehicle for controlling Turkey; whereas fascism used troops the Americans were using dollars. To the critics Marshall Plan was a vehicle for Western imperialism and would result in turning into a dependent country. The foreign policy of allying with the United States was criticized on two fronts. Firstly there was the argument that the United States was not Turkey's only choice. The left because of the manner in which Turkey became linked to an alliance limiting its foreign policy options criticized the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Secondly, the argument revolved around economic imperialism and how the Marshall Plan and American “aid” would colonize Turkey. The main themes of the criticisms were not directly linked to Marxist thought but based on Turkey's war of independence and the struggle to lift the capitulations imposed on the Ottoman Empire.

⁵⁶⁹ Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Before and Above Everything Independence”, Zincirli Hurriyet, 5 April 1947, Year 1, No. 1, p.4

⁵⁷⁰ Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Before and Above Everything Independence”

IV. SILENCING, CO-OPTING, REDEFINING



As the above illustration demonstrates communism had been framed as an open threat and accusing someone of being a communist was something that could be done without much evidence. The debates within this period marginalized the alternative narratives even further. The two events that represented their further marginalization and being branded as traitors was the endless cases brought against Markopasa and the Sokmensuer speech.

MARKOPASA CASES

Cemil Barlas had accused Markopasa of having “roots outside” implying that Markopasa writers had ties to the Soviet Union. As seen before the “foreign agents” narrative was used again to thwart criticisms towards the government. Markopasa writers reciprocated the accusation by stating that;

“you have become slaves by opening your doors to foreign investments. You have put up walls against ideas and science. As if these weren’t enough, now you go on about roots, roots outside, inside, on air ... Why are our roots outside? Did we cover the face of freedom? Are we carrying fake identity cards? Do we have foreign bank accounts? We

will continue to tell the truth even if it means looting, death or deportation. Is that why our root is outside”?⁵⁷¹

In reply to Huseyin Cahit Yalcin argued that; “according to him saying “let’s not sell out to the English” means let’s sell out to the Russians. Maybe its impossible for those like Yalcin to live without selling at, but we are only on the side of independence and justice”⁵⁷² The main discussion revolved around staying true to the anti-imperialist roots of the war of independence and maintaining neutrality. There writers actively questioned the narrative of inevitability of choosing a side and argued that Turkey could have more agency if it did not use the United States as a tool to maintain the status quo. The newspaper was under constant pressure from the government and ran with headlines such as “newspaper that is published when not being seized”, “political humor newspaper that is published when it finds the opportunity”, and “it is sold everywhere in the world but Ankara and Samsun”.⁵⁷³

During its brief life a myriad of cases were opened against it. Cemil Sait Barlas opened a case on January 1947 where Sabahattin Ali was accused of insulting Cemil Barlas and all parliamentarians. The article was written as a response to a speech Cemil Barlas gave where he argued that Markopasa had roots outside.⁵⁷⁴ Sabahattin Ali was sentenced to 4 months of jail time and was released on September 1947. On 10 March 1947 Falih Rifki Atay opened a case for the article “Marko Pasa Ansiklopedisi: Biliyor musunuz? [Marko Pasa Encyclopedia: Did you know?]", where it was insinuated that Falih Rifki Atay lived in wealth. Sabahattin Ali was sentenced to three months of jail but the sentence was postponed. An unexpected oversight led to further cases when Markopasa did not respond in time to a demand about the author of a poem entitled “Dedigin” sent to it by a reader. The court closed Markopasa but because the notification had not reached them they published the 22nd issue of the magazine on 19 May 1947 causing two other cases to be opened. When Marko Pasa was closed down by martial law Sabahattin Ali opened Merhum Pasa on 26 May 1947. Two

⁵⁷¹ *Markopasa*, 16 December 1946

⁵⁷² *Markopasa*, 16 December 1946

⁵⁷³ *Markopasa*

⁵⁷⁴ This is again another example of the “foreign agents” narrative that was so prevalently used during this time and is still a part of the Turkish foreign policy narrative.

articles from its first issue were also brought to court. Nihal Atsız opened a case because of an article entitled “Young Friend [Genc Arkadas]” and Ismet Rasin Tumkurt because of “Hasan Ali – Kenan Doner” article. Sabahattin Ali was sent to jail for 12 days.⁵⁷⁵

The story of MarkoPasa presents a narrative not only of alternative visions but also a systemic effort to silence them by the government. MarkoPasa was not a “communist” publication. It criticized the government openly and did have leftist leanings but it did not support alliance with the Soviet Union per se. What it did was challenge the dominant narrative of “inevitability” of having no choice but to choose a side, of America’s “ideals” and pure motivations. They were branded as a “communist” threat because it strengthened the governments position against them. Including MarkoPasa in any narrative of the Turkish Cold War not only destabilizes the inevitability narrative but also problematizes the westernization and modernity narrative.

SOKMENSUER SPEECH

On Janury 1947 Giresun representative Ahmed Ulus made an inquiry about the investigations on communist movement conducted by the State of Emergency. In reply Sukru Sokmensuer read a report outlining the communist movement in Turkey classifying them into five periods. According to Sokmensuer in the fourth period “we witness sneaky and systemic communist publication activities. Poets and authors such as Nazim Hikmet started to spread communist ideas under the guise of art and these publications had some effect on young and excited brains.”⁵⁷⁶ Sokmensuer read reports and letters claimed to have belonged to Sefik Husnu. One of these reports stated that “we guided perfectly two Marxist magazines published in Ankara. On the other side we tried to publish articles in Tan newspaper that conveyed our views on the war and general politics.”⁵⁷⁷ According to this speech, the communists also attempted to lure

⁵⁷⁵ For further details on the history and cases surrounding Markopasa see; Levent Canteke, *Markopasa: Bir Mizah ve Muhalefet Efsanesi* (Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001); for a more comprehensive account of the popular culture of the 1945-1950 period with references to Markopasa and other magazines see Levent Canteke, *Cumhuriyetin Bulug Cagi* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2008).

⁵⁷⁶ Oner, *Davam*, 7

⁵⁷⁷ *Ayin Tarihi*; January 1947

opposition leaders by using Tevfik Rustu Aras to contact them. He further implied that Maresal Fevzi Cakmak consciously or not was involved in these communist activities.

In response to these accusations, on 5 February 1947 Maresal wrote an article stating that he was and always had been against communism. To prove that he provided examples of curtailing communism when he was part of the armed forces and added that he had even warned the government in the past of an Education Minister supporting communist activities.⁵⁷⁸ On 8 February 1947 Hasan Ali Yucel wrote an open letter asking the Maresal whether or not the mentioned Education Minister was himself. Fevzi Cakmak did not answer this letter but Kenan Oner wrote an accusatory article in *Yeni Sabah*. In response Hasan Ali Yucel opened a defamation case against him where he stated that “not only did you harbour communists in your ministry, you also protected them against attacks. You destroyed, beat up and crushed 23 young men with tortures that made one regret the ending of the Spanish Inquisition by mixing them up with nationalist issues”.⁵⁷⁹ The Oner-Yucel case started in February and one of the main issues it focused on was the identity of the communists Yucel protected.

27 DECEMBER DEMONSTRATIONS

The political climate was becoming tenser over the issue of who were communists and whether or not they were infiltrating the government. A series of events culminated in the 27 December demonstrations. The trigger for the events was the petition signed by 67 students demanding the expulsion of Prof. Pertev Naili Boratav (editor of *Yurt ve Dunya*) and Assoc. Prof. Behice Boran (editor of *Adimlar*) from the university. On 5 March 1947 *24 SAAT* published a petition signed by 108 students attacking the petition of 67 students defending the lecturers. On 5 March Pertev Naili Boratav had to cancel a conference because the hall was filled with students making anti-communist speeches.

⁵⁷⁸ Oner, *Davam*, 10

⁵⁷⁹ Gokhan Atilgan, *Behice Boran: Ogretim Uyesi, Siyasetci, Kurumcu* (Istanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2007), 90

Selahattin Erturk warned about the “red flames surrounding the nation”.⁵⁸⁰ On 6 March around a thousand demonstrators demanded that conferences be cancelled, expulsion of the communist teachers and students and the seizure of the Yurt and Dünya’s that had been bought during Yucel’s term. Kansu attempts to appease them without much result. The demonstrators sang the National Anthem and walked towards Ulus Square while destroying copies of *Marko Pasa* and 24 Saat. The demonstrators are not investigated.⁵⁸¹ Hikmet Tanyu wrote a leaflet that repeated Sokmensuer’s allegations and described the demonstrations. Assoc. Prof of History at DTCF Osman Turan published a leaflet entitled “Gafletten Uyanalım” where he argued that these lecturers needed to be treated as “foreigners” as done in the United States and Great Britain.⁵⁸²

On 11 December Law Faculty Student Association General Assembly declared, “communism should be crashed where ever its seen, Reason for our existence is to live for the country, and to die for it when necessary”.⁵⁸³ The decision painted the decision to fight communism as a life and death issue. The declaration branded being a communist as being traitors and was narrated in an either/or dichotomy. Furthermore, they declared that “being communist meant being a Russian agent”.⁵⁸⁴ All associations associated with the National Student Association declared their support for the Law Association.⁵⁸⁵

On 17 December 1947 Vatan newspaper declared “Anatolia has received with content the decision of Turkish Student Association. The other day students from Izmir, Kutahya, and Konya sent letters declaring that they also mobilized in the struggle against communism”.⁵⁸⁶ RPP representative Fahri Kurtulus declared in a speech in Istanbul University that the communists started all fires.⁵⁸⁷ On 19 December 1947 Parliamentarian Sadi Irmak made a speech stating that “these people carry list of names of the nationalists they aim to hang by the courts they

⁵⁸⁰ Mumcu, *40’lerin Cadi Kazani*, 101; Cetik, *Universitede Cadi Kazani*, 19-21

⁵⁸¹ Mumcu, *40’lerin Cadi Kazani*, 19-21

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⁵⁸³ Komunizmle Mucadele, *Tasvir*, 12 Aralik 1947

⁵⁸⁴ Komunizmle Mucadele, *Tasvir*, 12 Aralik 1947

⁵⁸⁵ Atilgan, *Behice Boran*, 99

⁵⁸⁶ ‘Gencligin Kominizm ile Mucadelesi’, *Vatan*, 17 Aralik 1947; Atilgan, *Behice Boran*, 99

⁵⁸⁷ ‘Egitim Bakanligi Binasini Moskova Emrindeki Kizillar Yakti’, *Kudret*, 27 Aralik 1947, 1,4.

aim to establish” referring to Boran, Boratav and Berkes.⁵⁸⁸

Sokmensuer’s speech, nationalist student demonstrations, petitions, and the leaflets increased the tension during this period and led to the 27 December demonstration. The morning of 27 December nationalist youth walked towards Ulus Square shouting, “we don’t want communist teachers”, after singing the Turkish National Anthem and put a wreath on the Ulus monument and then turned to Cebeci where about ten thousand had gathered”.⁵⁸⁹ Afterwards they walked to History Faculty and forcefully entered Rector Sevkett Aziz Kansu’s office and demanded that he chant, “Damn the Communists” with them. They made him write, sign and stamp his resignation. From there they went to Turkish Youth Association (Türkiye Gençler Derneği - TGD) center and destroyed it. This demonstration lasted 5 hours and did not meet any resistance from the police forces. Some parliamentarians even joined the demonstrations.⁵⁹⁰

These events demonstrate that not only were the leftist opposition and criticism slowly marginalized but anyone deemed to not completely support the government was also attacked under the guise that they were “communists” and “Russian agents”. Furthermore, even a small narration of the series of events demonstrates that this period was not “unproblematic. It was not only domestic politics and democratization that was questioned but also the alliance with the West, specifically the United States endangering the Westernization narrative that was central to the identity of the Turkish state.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The main narratives that permeated the recounting of events as shown in this chapter can be observed in these discourses and as such there is a clear alignment between the dominant discourses of the events as they unfolded and as they were

⁵⁸⁸ ‘Meclis Milli Egitim Encümeninde Solcu Prof.’ler Hakkında Sıddetli Tenkitler Yapıldı’, *Tasvir*, 20 Aralık 1947, 1.5; ‘Fakultedeki Tahkikat Meselesi’, *Ulus*, 23 Aralık 1947, 1.2; Derendelioglu 1977: 198

⁵⁸⁹ “Ankarada Yüksek Tahsil Gençliğinin Heyecanı”, *Vatan*, 7 Mart 1947, 1.4; “Gençliğin Komünizm Aleyhinde Mitingi”, 28 Aralık 1947, 1.4.; “Fakulteden Tahkikat Meselesi”, *Ulus*, 23 Aralık 1947, 1.2.

⁵⁹⁰ Atılğan, *Behice Boran*, 100

recounted. The chronological sequence of events presented in the histories of the Cold War reinforces the dominant discourse presented above. They concentrate on the “Soviet threat”, the American aid in the form of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the process of democratization “started” by the Inonu government with the multi-party elections of 1946. Such a narrative tells the story of the Turkish nation democratizing and westernizing in a way that fits into the imagination of the Turkish nation and the trajectory it should follow. The Cold War was emplotted into the westernization narrative with the alliance to the United States whereby joining NATO, entering the Korean War was presented as being accepted by the “West” and as proof that Turkey had finally become part of “Europe” and risen “to the level of civilized nations”. The Cold War alliance was written into the westernization narrative of the Turkish nation and it reified and reproduced the notion that Turkey was part of the “West”. Based on that the becoming of part of the “Western democracies” within the Cold War also supported Turkey’s claims to democratize and become part of the modern, developed and western world. The understanding of modernization and democracy held by US officials when dealing with Third World countries fit the general vision the elites had for Turkey’s future.

The dominant discourses that were produced and reified during this period were based on a certain understanding of the Turkish nation. The narrative (re)produced by the dominant elite is the Turkish nation imagined since the establishment of the republic; an imagination rooted in a specific comprehension of modernity and westernization. This argument not only highlights the specific nature of the Turkish modernization project (based on a strictly defined materialist-positivist interpretation) but also the continuities between the Ottoman Empire and Turkish state that were “forgotten” by the Turkish ruling elite as they based the identity of the Turkish state on dichotomies such as modern/pre-modern, western/non-western where the Ottoman past was constructed as the pre-modern, non-western “other” of the Turkish state.

CHAPTER VII - CLOSURES

I. INTRODUCTION

The period from 1949 to 1951 is usually part of the ‘closure’ of the origins story of the Cold War. It contains within itself events such as the Korean War and the establishment of NATO that are narrated as the closing events of the origins of the Cold War. These events signals that the Cold War had began. NATO has an important place in that narrative as the culmination of the ‘change’ American foreign policy undergoes from an isolationist power to one that enters alliances in order to assume its role as the ‘protector’ if the world. The period between 1949 and 1951 are characterized by the rise to power of the Democratic Party and Turkey’s entrance into the Atlantic Pact. The Democrat Party won the 14 May 1950 elections. Celal Bayar became President of the Turkish Republic and he appointed Adnan Menderes as Prime Minister. This was a massive change in Turkish domestic politics. For the first time since its establishment the founding party, RPP, was out of power. Despite this change of power the dominant

narratives that had been established with respect to democratization and foreign policy were continued under the rule of the Democrat Party. The rule of the Democrat Party reified the dominant narratives about westernization and the American Cold War discourse.

The aim of this chapter is to show the final stage in the dominant narratives establishing themselves and the silencing of the alternative voices. Through the stages outlined in previous chapters, Turkish foreign policy and domestic politics was aligned with the changing international conditions based on dominant narratives of westernization and democratization that were part of the Republican ideal. The results of these processes become clear with Turkey joining the Korean War and its search for a place in the Atlantic Pact.

“The representation that constitute a crisis are produced in and through cultural processes and out of cultural resources – that is, in reality we know and endow it with meaning. This constructive process is unavoidable for the simple reason that in order for the state to act, state officials must produce representations. These representations fix in place one particular set of greatness that come to constitute ‘a situation’ to which the state must then respond”.⁵⁹¹

The previous chapters provided an overview of the transition in the codes of intelligibility’ from 1945-1947 to 1947-1949 showing the construction and representation of events based on codes of intelligibility’ giving meaning to events and constructing threats by drawing from Turkish history. The domestic and foreign policy of Turkey during these periods went through stages of silencing alternative narratives and adapting to changing international conditions.

II. “CLOSURES” OF DEMOCRACY

The dominant narrative of democratization, westernization and the communist threat carried did not alter with the change of government but was actually more forceful than ever before. The definition of communism and democracy were aligned even more closely with the Cold War discourse that was being adopted. A recurrent theme in pointing out the threat of communism and why democratization needed to be controlled were the problems being faced in

⁵⁹¹ Jutta Weldes, *The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. identity and missiles in Cuba*, 57

Western European countries. The main argument was that if communism could create instability in western democracies, how could Turkey's newly forming democracy survive such a threat. Democratization had to be controlled in order to make sure that the threat of communism did not overtake the Republican ideals.

As argued in *Yeni Sabah*;

“It is clear that communists are creating frenzy in Italy. Government searches in communist headquarters found guns, ammunitions and bombs. The communist themselves admitted that they were to side with the Soviets and create anarchy ... Shouldn't necessary precautions be taken against the armament of the fifth column. In the case of an outside attack the army will be busy fighting the enemy. Should it also be expected to deal with the domestic sabotage and rebellion”.⁵⁹²

The dominant understanding of communism and democracy were aligned together, if communism was too dangerous than it was acceptable to make sacrifices from democratization. Any communist activity was presented as being in league with the Soviet Union and as part of an effort to destabilize governments to further the interests of the Soviet Union. Within this framework stability was prioritized over democracy and any reforms that would create room for communist activities was denied. As stated in an article; “the understanding of democracy and independence in this manner may cost a lot. We need to learn lessons from these foreign examples as we are just entering the democratic stage.”⁵⁹³ Hence the general attitude was to use the examples of western democracies in trouble in order to underline why democratization had to be monitored in Turkey. According to this narrative, the international conditions and the Cold War meant that Turkey was not in a situation to afford all the freedoms of a western democracy.

In an interview⁵⁹⁴ given on 1 December 1953, the Prime Minister answered a question about communism in Turkey by stating that; “there is no significant communist issue in Turkey. This is because communism is against the traditions of the Turkish nation and is incompatible with its sense of freedom and independence”.⁵⁹⁵ As such, communism in Turkey was branded as being

⁵⁹² Newspaper Clippings, 8.8.1950, *Yeni Sabah*, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 204, Place: 811 3

⁵⁹³ 204 811 3, Newspaper Clippings, 8.8.1950, *Yeni Sabah*

⁵⁹⁴ The interview was given to U.S. news and World Report

⁵⁹⁵ *Ayin Tarihi*, Aralık 1953, no.241

‘impossible.’ In a rally against communism workers stated that even though communism had tried to enter the Turkish workers’ minds “the Turkish worker was shrewd enough to defeat that sickness”.⁵⁹⁶ Another important debate was the criticism surrounding the manner in which troops had been sent to Korea. In a speech in 1950 the Prime Minister stated that; “I want to remind everyone of the vicious attacks towards us because of the Korean events. No one has forgotten the severity of the attacks made at critical moments in the state’s security and international reputations”.⁵⁹⁷ What was underlined was that questioning foreign policy actions even if only to emphasize the necessity for democratic processes was deemed unacceptable. He further stated that;

“I will discuss an event that pleased us in Erzurum. People’s Party received us in Erzurum. People’s Party received us cordially. We had productive discussions about the future of the country. Nation party members demonstrated the same hospitality. Erzurum showed that the freedom necessary for multi-party system can be established. A multi-party system does not necessarily have to lead to bitter rivalries. It shows that despite differing views citizens will look for ways to serve their country without hurting each other. There is a group at the center that continuously creates an atmosphere of disturbance. These incitements are artificial and do not exist within party officials”.⁵⁹⁸

Within this framing the questioning of the democratic process was reduced to a number of party officials who wanted to make political gain out of criticism when it had to be clear that questioning foreign policy was against the ‘national interest’.

The linking of foreign policy and democracy thus continues whereby ‘democracy’ can not mean questioning foreign policy objectives and presenting a ‘weak’ Turkey that is squabbling among itself. The joining of Korean War and the Atlantic pact itself were moreover presented as part of the process of democratization and acceptance of Turkey among the ‘civilized’, ‘modern’ and ‘democratic’ states. This attitude is best reflected in a statement made by Fuad Koprlulu in 1951 where he states that “the Atlantic Pact is not just a military and

⁵⁹⁶ 204 811 3, Newspaper Clippings, *Aksam*, 27 Augustos 1950,

⁵⁹⁷ President and Prime Minister in Erzurum, in *Basbakanlik Arsivleri*, *Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 30 01, Place: 2 141

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

political community, it is also a civilizational community, a culture community, a democratic nations community”.⁵⁹⁹

III. INTERNATIONALIZING FOREIGN POLICY

The establishment and consolidation of an understanding of the threat of communism and democratization was interlinked with Turkish foreign policy being analysed through the lenses of the Cold War and its actions being embedded in the Western alliance. One of the great debates of this period centered around Turkey’s involvement in the Korean War and being accepted into the Atlantic Pact. Turkey aligned itself definitively in the Western camp of the Cold War divide and argued in favor of more alliances and pact in order to protect against Soviet infiltration.

Discourses about the Cold War were used in drawing the boundaries for the kind of democracy to be established, the nature of the Turkish state and how its history was to be understood. Government officials used the Cold War discourses to strengthen their own position. As such not only did they inject Turkey into the orthodox Cold War narrative but they also amplified Turkey’s role in it. Especially surrounding the discussions about the Marshall Plan Turkish officials underlined Turkey’s importance and the necessity for further aid in order to keep Turkey as a bulwark against communism. As stated by *Yeni Sabah*; “Turkish officials argued that because of its strategic importance and geographic location put the country in a position of strength and made her an important asset in the fight against communism”.⁶⁰⁰ Newspapers published endless articles asking the government to be more proactive in obtaining American aid, underlining the importance of joining the Atlantic Pact and attempted to underline Turkey’s importance in the Cold War. The argument was that: “When a great and rich nation like England gets the maximum amount of aid, its not right that Turkey, whose economy suffered from the war, even though it did not enter it, should

⁵⁹⁹ *Ayin Tarihi*, Ekim 1951, no.215

⁶⁰⁰ *Yeni Sabah*, Newspaper Clippings, 8 August 1950, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: 1. BURO, Code:490..1.0.0, Place:204.811.3.

receive less than Sweden who was neutral during the war and is neutral now”.⁶⁰¹

Turkish argument was based on the assumption that Turkey deserved more aid because of its pivotal role in the Cold War and because of its alliance with the West. Sedat Simavi stated in an article; “We have to explain to the Americans that we have a strong army. We are trustworthy people. We do not have communism. As such we deserve the most aid,” furthermore he argued that “Europe has one hope today: the Turkish army”.⁶⁰² Turkey’s strategic importance in the Cold War divisions was constantly underlined by the press and the government and used as one of the main arguments for more aid.

As stated in *Cumhuriyet*;

“events at the end of WWII and Soviet Russia’s policies have strengthened Turkey’s alliance with the democratic front ascribing to the principles of the United Nations. This front needs to include us in its haphazard agreements. Turkey should either be included in the Atlantic Pact like Italy, or in a Mediterranean Pact set up to compliment it, and if these are not possible Necmettin Sadak should endeavour to obtain a guarantee from Great Britain and the United States”.⁶⁰³

The main premise of the arguments was Turkey’s strategic importance in the Cold War geopolitics. Menderes argued in an interview that; “in view of the over-all security, not only of Turkey but also of the Mediterranean region to which Turkey belongs, we deem it essential that a Mediterranean defense system should be set up and linked to the general security system provided for under the Atlantic pact”.⁶⁰⁴ Turkish foreign policy aims stressed alliances mainly because belonging to one would underline turkey’s acceptance into the Western bloc. This was seen as a step in the westernization of Turkey that had been part of the Republican ideal. Within the international conditions this westernization was defined primarily through belonging to the western security system rather than adopting Western democratic ideals. As Menderes stated; “I have stressed the importance we attach to our alliance with Great BritainI believe that it is to the vital

⁶⁰¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 19.9.1950

⁶⁰² Sedat Simavi, “American Aid,” *Hurriyet*, 14 January 1951, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: 1. BURO, Code:490..1.0.0, Place:204.811.3.

⁶⁰³ *Cumhuriyet*, 2 April 1949

⁶⁰⁴ Questions submitted to M. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey, by Mr. Ralph Izzard, Special Correspondent, ‘The Daily Mail’, London, 5.6.1950 in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 60 372 2

interests of both parties that we should strive to further reinforce, in the practical field this alliance which has assumed a national character in Turkey and which has become one of the pillars of our foreign policy".⁶⁰⁵ It is important to note that Menderes defines the alliance with Great Britain as having "assumed a national character." Within the dominant narratives of westernization and democratization, more so than the reforms in domestic politics, the alliance with the West was presented as proof of Turkey's successful Westernization process. This is evident in Menderes's declaration on 21 February 1951 where he states that; "Turkey's acceptance into the Atlantic Pact with equal rights has been received with pleasure. This event is an important step in achieving the common security aimed by the Democratic world".⁶⁰⁶ Two points are important here; "equal rights" and "Democratic world". According to the dominant narrative acceptance into the Atlantic Pact implied being accepted as part of the West and as an affirmation of Turkey being democratic.

The main foreign policy debate centered around the Atlantic Pact and the necessity for accepting Turkey into the pact. In an article in 1950 Necmeddin Sadak emphasized that "whether Turkey enters the Atlantic Pact or not is not only about Turkey's security but also of Europe's. The issue is not Turkey being accepted to this and that pact. Events have shown how inadequate the Atlantic pact is. [...] Under these circumstances not taking advantage of Turkey's status and strength within the European security system is as much an oversight as leaving Turkey's security out of any contractual obligations".⁶⁰⁷

In an article Hikmet Bayur outlined the problems in the international system and the opportunities it presented Turkey by stating that;

"The reality of the situation is that Russia is not a direct threat to America. United States has to protect certain states that can constitute support for it so that it is not left facing a Russia that took over a great part of the old world. The Soviets after swallowing most Eastern and Central European states in 1945, have set out to swallow Asia by using local communists [...] they have swallowed China, now they are swallowing Korea. In this endeavor, Russia at times takes advantage of the nationalistic and anti-imperialist feelings of Asians. For example in

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁶ Declaration by PM Adnan Menderes, 21.2.1951, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 13 76 7

⁶⁰⁷ Necmeddin Sadak, 'Atlantik Pakti ve Türkiye'. Aksam, 15.8. 1950, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: 408, Code: 1 204, Place: 809 1

Indo-China, nationalists and communists have united in fighting against the French. But if America was not protecting them Russia would have already taken India and Indo-China behind the Iron Curtain and it still might.”⁶⁰⁸

Because of these reasons he argues that neither Asia nor Europe is showing the United States the necessary understanding and this situation “provides Turkey an opportunity to play the role of a great power”.⁶⁰⁹ These perspectives were based on underlying the strategic importance of Turkey to Cold War dynamics in general and European security system specifically. The main premise of the alternative narrative was to continue to argue for neutrality in foreign policy and underline the anti-imperialist nature of the Turkish revolution. According to these narratives establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union was seen as the basis for an independent Turkish foreign policy. As stated by Zekeriya Sertel; “History has made us neighbors with the Soviets ... Soviet Union is no longer Tsarist Russia. It would be stupid to ignore this historical change. Soviets could have no aims towards Turkey other than friendship. For a Turkey that has experienced the pains of imperialism the right path is friendship with the Soviets”.⁶¹⁰ The argument was not to forsake one side for the other but to establish friendly relations with all without becoming entangled in great power politics; “we said that let’s expand the alliance with Britain and make one with the United States and Russia. Russia’s position as a strong state and as our northern neighbour will not change. History has proven that it is in our interest to live in peace with our neighbour. We want friendship with all states for the sake of Turkey”.⁶¹¹

Zekeriya Sertel’s letter to the Prime Minister on 1951 where he stated that;

“I don’t think Turkey’s entrance to the Atlantic Pact is possible nor is it desirable. Considering the fragile nature of turkey’s geopolitical position, the only policy that will ensure its safety is neutrality. Unfortunately since all ideas in the country are under certain influences being directed towards a certain direction and since any differing opinion are being branded as traitors those who want to establish friendly relations with the Soviets as Ataturk suggested are being silenced and neutrality policy is no longer discussed nor is it possible to be defended. Since the times of Ismet Inonu Turkey has always been careful to align its policies with the United states and has never considered the possibility of other policies. Even today American and Western

⁶⁰⁸ Hikmet Bayur, ‘Amerika, Asya, Avrupa ve Biz, Kudret, 21.08.1950, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: 408, Code: 1 204, Place: 809 1

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁰ Sertel, *Hatirladiklarim*

⁶¹¹ Sertel, *Hatirladiklarim*

guarantees are pursued, when in reality the most serious, safe and healthy policy is that of neutrality. It can be argued that there can no longer be a small neutral country and Turkey once forced to choose a side had to side with the democracies”.⁶¹²

IV. SILENCING, CO-OPTING, REDEFINING

As discussed, the mainstream opposition had already been co-opted or silenced by this time and the dominant narrative had been consolidated. There were some attempts to question Turkey’s involvement in the Korean War and its foreign policy choices in general but they never achieved a wide audience like Markopasa’s criticisms used to. The Young Turks European Committee and the Turkish Pacifist Organization are examples from the fringes that did not achieve success and especially in the case of Turkish Pacifist Organization were tried and imprisoned immediately.

The Young Turks European Committee issued an invitation to join against the use of the atomic bomb and where they criticized the foreign policy of the government. In an Open Letter to the DP Government the Committee stated that; “When the Turkish public voted the DP government on 14 May it convicted Turkey to a domestic policy that is anti-democratic and a foreign policy based on being America’s slave.DP Party programme, its actions in the last two months and the latest clemency law have been used as tools to limit the democratic rights of Turkish voters and peasants under the mask of ‘clearing out leftist movements’”.⁶¹³ In this letter they also made a series of demands:

- “1. State institutions need to be cleared of all foreigners and all agreements that destroy our economic independence need to be cancelled.
2. Join the Stockholm Declaration in demanding the banning of atomic bombs
3. to enter into friendly relations with the Soviet Union and people’s democracies, recognize China, Korea and Germany”.⁶¹⁴

They further stated that; “they claim that the Soviet state will attack our country.

⁶¹² Zekeriya Sertel’s letter, 24 April 1951, in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: B2, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 41.243..9.

⁶¹³ Young Turks European Committee, 31.07.1950 in *Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 41 242 10

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*

In reality the only threat is US imperialism”.⁶¹⁵ The alternative narrative continued its attacks on the foreign policy choices of the government but at this time it was only a few fringe groups left and their declarations and protests were not able to become mainstream. Furthermore, their attacks were branded as being against national unity especially at a time when Turkey had been accepted into the West, the protests were framed as endangering Turkey’s chances of achieving its Republican ideals. Menderes stated that; “I want to remind everyone of the vicious attacks towards us because if the Korean events. No one has forgotten the severity of the attacks made at critical moments in the state’s security and international reputation”.⁶¹⁶

Turkish Pacifist Association established by Behice Boran aimed to “enlighten the Turkish public about the dangers of atomic weapons and atomic war”.⁶¹⁷ TPA was the main opposition to the decision to send soldiers to Korea. Their main argument centered around the argument that the decision had been taken not to ensure the safety and interests of the Turkish nation but to ensure the interests of the United States. Their aim was to make a declaration to explain their opposition to the public. They also sent a telegram to the Turkish National Assembly highlighting three points:

- “1. Council of Ministers took the decision to send soldiers after a series of meetings with American Senator Caine.
2. This decision could not have been taken, as argued, to uphold the agreements entered into with the United Nations
3. Sending soldiers to Korea meant a declaration of war and the constitution gave that right to the Parliament. The government making this decision was unconstitutional”.⁶¹⁸

The declaration was distributed around Istanbul but the distributors were arrested within days. In the aftermath of the arrests Menderes gave a speech where he stated that “any propaganda and incitement against sending troops to Korea can not be resolved with good intentions”.⁶¹⁹ Behice Boran and associates were convicted to 15 months in prison. The nationalists found this sentence light and argued that “there is death to communists in Korea, but here there is prison.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁶ President and Prime Minister in Erzurum, 3.10.1950 in *Basbakanlik Arsivi, Cumhuriyet Arsivi*, File: A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 2 14 1

⁶¹⁷ Atilgan, *Behice Boran*, 148

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 152

⁶¹⁹ Atilgan, *Behice Boran*, 159

Communists in other places should flee to Turkey to save their lives! It was the nation's right to see at least two communists hanged".⁶²⁰ As such the attempts to question were either too marginalized to have effect or were silenced swiftly before they could have any effect. By 1950 the dominant narrative of the Cold War dynamics, of democratization, of westernization had been safely established.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter focused on the period between 1949 and 1951 when the dominant discourses that have been traced in the previous chapters had become established and the alternative narratives previously discussed had become marginalized. The Korean War and the Atlantic Pact were clear manifestations of the manner in which the national security definition of the dominant narrative had become consolidated. Turkey joined a war that it had no direct interests in because of the Cold War dynamics that it embedded its foreign policy into. Furthermore, this period clearly demonstrates the manner in which the democratization process was defined and controlled by the dominant narrative to fit a certain understanding of what the Turkish nation meant and what represented Republican ideals. That the decision for the Korean War could be taken through undemocratic means but be justified because it meant Turkey's acceptance among "democratic" nations is an example of how a very specific understanding of democracy had been adopted.

The preceding chapters have attempted to demonstrate the 'process' and the debates in re/formulating and re/defining concepts, identities and events that become fixed and linear through the historiographical operation on the Cold War. These chapters have tried to disrupt these historiographical operations on three fronts.

⁶²⁰ Darendioglu, *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik*, 255

CONCLUSION

“I have tried to describe my position in terms of circles, standing there in the middle. These circles contain the audiences that get to hear my story. The closest circle is the one closest to my home in Igboland, because the material I am using is their material. But unless I’m writing in the Igbo language, I use a language developed elsewhere, which is English. That affects the way I write. It even affects to some extent the stories I write. So there is, if you like, a kind of paradox there already. But then, if you can, visualize a large number of ever-widening circles, including all, like Yeats’s widening gyre. As more and more people are incorporated in this network, they will get different levels of meaning out of the story, depending on what they already know, or what they suspect. These circles go on indefinitely to include, ultimately, the whole world”.⁶²¹

The main of this thesis has been to underline what Achebe describes in the above quote with respect to the field of international relations. There are many stories of international relations as a field and there are many histories of international relations. These stories exist within ‘a large number of ever-widening circles’ yet the Eurocentrism of the field has predominantly presented itself as if there is only

⁶²¹ Jerome Brooks, “Interviews: Chinua Achebe, The Art of Fiction No.139”, *The Paris Review* 133, Winter (1994)

one center and a linear direction that expands from there. As such, the thesis has aimed to discuss how international relations as field can be ‘decentered’ or ‘decolonized’. There have been a series of strategies developed in this endeavor and they have all presented different ways to overcome the issue of Eurocentrism in the field. Building on these works the thesis has argued that problematization of history is of paramount importance in the project to decenter IR. The concepts used, identities constructed and stories told are based upon a limited understanding of history that is centered upon the Western experience. As a consequence, the historical epochs, periods, and events that are seen as being constitutive and used as an explanatory framework within the field themselves need to be questioned because “with few exceptions, the accounts of world politics that serve as the ground for IR theory-building and empirical analysis are Eurocentric, taking the perspective of the most powerful states in the international system”.⁶²² Thus, the thesis has focused on the ways in which Western-centric conceptualizations of history within the field of IR need to be questioned. This was done through focusing on the historiographical operations on the Cold War and the way in which these were re/produced in the Turkish context naturalizing concepts, events and identities and editing the ones that did not fit into the linear progression of the Eurocentric conceptualization. The thesis also underlined that this re/production also worked to naturalize the idea and ideal of ‘Turkey’ that worked to impose linearity on the stories of Turkey.

LOOKING BACK AT THE ARGUMENTS

The thesis first outlined conceptualizations of history that would form the cornerstone of the approach towards analyzing history. The differences between the ‘past’, the ‘chronicle’ and the ‘story’ were underlined in order to demonstrate how the writing of history involved choices of inclusion and exclusion. Historical narratives are stories, stories that have a clear beginning and an end, stories with clearly identifiable protagonists and antagonists, and especially an easily discernible central plot. The specific organization of the story; where one choose

⁶²² Laffey and Weldes, ‘Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 556

to start or end it, who one identifies as the protagonist or antagonist and what one identifies to be the moral of the story structure the story and provide a certain interpretation of the events discussed. The same events can be told by identifying different beginnings and ends, protagonists and antagonists and central plot and provide the reader with a different account of the same events (sometimes focusing on different events and the priority of events and their casual effect having changed).

The second chapter focused on the stories of international relations and the different perspectives from which stories of the international system, of state and sovereignty, of security have been told. This discussion demonstrated the way in which the 'critical' works on international themselves though attempting to question the 'traditional' story of international relations had issues when confronting the Eurocentrism of the field. Moreover, even when the Eurocentrism was being questioned and problematized the use of history still remained problematic. The last section of this chapter titled 'embedding non-western stories' highlighted this point by discussing the ways in which non-western stories of the international, of the state and of security become silenced and edited out in order to be embedded into the dominant stories of IR. As such, stories of the international system work to marginalize events, concepts and identities that do not fit into the general linear progression of the narrative of IR. The aim of the next section entitled 'Historiographical Operations on the Cold War' was to discuss how this process worked.

The section 'Historiographical Operations on the Cold War' was divided into two parts; 'Discussing the Origins' and 'Re/producing the Cold War'. The chapter 'Discussing the Origins' focused on the main texts within the historiography of the Cold War in an attempt to outline the borders that were drawn, events that were privileged and identities that were fixed by the historical discourse on the Cold War. This part demonstrated the way in which the differing historiographical schools ascribed to an established definition of the Cold War despite their differing perspectives on the role of the international system, the state and

American foreign policy. Furthermore, the discussion of these different works demonstrated the way in which they were based upon and re/produced a Eurocentric conception of world politics. This Eurocentrism worked at two levels. Firstly, the works took as their starting point a perspective of American foreign policy. Whether arguing from a ‘traditionalist’ perspective or a ‘revisionist’ perspective the premise of the arguments were formed around interpretations of American foreign policy. Secondly, however American foreign policy was interpreted, the story of the international system was premised on an Eurocentric conception of world politics. As such, the story stretched from the Napoleonic Wars to the Concert of Europe, from the unification of Germany to the First World War and from the First World War to the Second World War in a linear progression whereby the issue of the balance of power and how to maintain it occupied the center stage. It is within this narrative structure that the interpretation of American foreign policy is situated.

This trend was somewhat challenged with the pericentric tradition as it aimed to bring in other narratives into the story of the Cold War. Yet the story was still of the Cold War. The narratives were only embedded into the larger story rather than attempting to present an alternative story. Although this gave agency to the states that were overlooked in previous historiographical works it also reified the Cold War. As such giving voices to the marginalized stories meant that the dominant narratives of these states that fit the Cold War story would have to be brought to the forefront thereby strengthening the story of the Cold War rather than questioning or attempting to unsettle its dominance.

The chapter entitled ‘Re/producing the Cold War’ discusses the ways in which the borders of the historical discourse on the Cold War are re/produced within the Turkish academia. This chapter underlined how “hierarchy is not produced by the actions of states alone but also in scholarly and popular analyses of world politics”.⁶²³ The chapter discusses works that focus on the Cold War, bilateral relations with the United States and Turkish foreign policy in general. The chapter underlined how the historiographical operations on the Cold War are re/produced

⁶²³ Ibid., 558

within these works. As such, the works were premised upon a Eurocentric conception of world politics and naturalized events, concepts and identities in order to be able to situate Turkey within the grand narrative of the Cold War. This chapter further underlined that embedding into the grand narrative also works to reify, re/define and re/formulate an unproblematic and linear story of Turkey and its road to westernization, modernization and democratization. The next section aimed to problematize the events, concepts and identities that had been naturalized through the historiographical operations on the Cold War.

The second main section of the thesis entitled ‘Stories of Silences’ focused on unpacking the events, concepts and identities that were naturalized through the re/production of the historical discourse on the Cold War. The chapters within this section were organized in a manner that reflected the progressive narrative of the Cold War in order to highlight the continuities. Within these chapters the ‘process’ of re/determining, re/defining of events, concepts and identities is underlined. This is further underlined through the organizations of the chapters themselves that are divided into three parts; democratization, the international and silencing. The point that this section emphasizes is that the concepts, events and identities that were naturalized through the historical discourse on the Cold War were neither fixed nor static but were constantly being re/formulated and re/defined.

This thesis has underlined that historiography of events is constitutive of a hierarchy in international system. Whose stories are told and whose stories are left out is a determining factor in reproducing a hierarchy of states, a priority for certain concepts and privileging of a specific narration of identities. It is because of this that history plays a crucial role in re/producing the Eurocentrism of the field of IR and needs to be further problematized. As Laffey states; “power is both external to historical narrative and also constitutive of it, inscribed in the narrative and the sources on which it draws. The resulting historiography thus participates in struggles it claims only to describe or explain⁶²⁴. This creates the story based on

⁶²⁴ Ibid., 564

specific version of events and “a progressive linearity was absent on the Other side of the civilizational frontier.⁶²⁵” As a consequence states not part of this linear progressive narrative of the development of the international system aspire to embed their stories within this meta-narrative in order to have their stories told and gain agency. In this process they distort, overlook aspects of their stories that does not fit this narrative and actually take away their own agency in becoming part of the process that reproduces this meta-narrative. Krishna states, “the process of knowledge production is from the very outset regarded as the flip side of a process of concealment and unknowing. Among other things, this implies that whether one is for or against abstraction is an irrelevant question since it is an unavoidable moment in the constitution of knowledge. Rather, one ought to be ever vigilant about what it is that abstraction simultaneously conceals as it reveals.⁶²⁶” Thus the writing of history, theorizing of the international system is all immersed in power relations. The aim here is not to create another linear, progressive meta-narrative but to acknowledge the existence of one and analyze where and how it works to marginalize and silence voices.

LOOKING AT THE FUTURE OF THE MAIN ARGUMENTS

To summarize, the thesis has aimed to underline three main points with respect to decentering IR. Firstly, that problematizing history is an important part of the project and that more attention needs to be given to the issues of not only historicizing concepts but also telling histories of such concepts, events and identities. Secondly, that the road to ‘decentering IR’ is not necessarily in creating, constructing and/or producing alternative theories of IR. The existence of Chinese IR or Islamic IR theory will work reproduce essentialism of another kind. Furthermore, it will work to reproduce categories such as the nation-state or

⁶²⁵ John Hobson, ‘Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western imperialism ? Beyond Westphalian towards a post-racist critical IR’, *Review of International Studies*, 33 (2007) : 94

⁶²⁶ Krishna, ‘Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations’, in ed., Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*, 90

civilization rather than problematizing them. Thirdly, ‘decentering’ IR necessitates not only problematizing the concepts, histories and theories produced at the center but also focusing on how these are re/produced.

These points will be elaborated further in order to underline avenues for future research in order to decenter IR. The epochs, events and concepts of ‘international’ history that is a prominent part of the field of IR need to be further problematized. The last years have seen more efforts to uncover stories of the international and stories of the field of IR but this needs to be furthered. Firstly, histories of the international system has to be brought forward in a way that disrupts the way in which the story of the international, the state and sovereignty, and of security utilize Eurocentric conceptualizations of ‘world’ history. Secondly, the historiography of the field itself needs to be further questioned. There has been a series of works that has problematized the main story of the development of field but its focus remains the production of knowledge at the center. As Mignolo states;

“Theories travel, I heard, and when they get places, they are transformed, transcultured. But what happens when theories travel through the colonial difference? How do they get transcultured? Where are theories produced? Where do they come from? What function or role did theory X play in the place where it emerged and what is the function or role that such a theory played in the place where it traveled or has been exported? How are they rehearsed when they travel through the colonial difference? Are they just being rehearsal in a new scenario or do they face their limits in that new scenario?”⁶²⁷

Thus, the focus should not only be on the way in which disciplines, theories and concepts developed in the United States and Europe nor should the focus only be on the different theoretical traditions in continental Europe versus Anglo-American academia. These are important works in highlighting the stories of the discipline and theories but there are stories that are not limited to the United States and Europe. Further elaboration and discussion is needed on the way in which disciplines, theories and concepts travel and how they are transformed and transcultured. It needs to be further underlined that;

⁶²⁷ Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 173-4

“The language of modern politics is astonishingly and misleadingly universal. Whereever we go in the Third World, we meet socialists, liberals, a suspiciously high number of democrats of all kinds, nationalists of all varieties, federalists and centralists. Yet, much of the time, their actual behavior is quite substantially different from what we are led to expect by the long-established meanings of these terms in Western political and social thought. In studying Third World politics, therefore, we face A serious mismatch between the language that describes this world, and the objects which inhabit it Not [just] single isolated ideas but entire languages seem to be composed of systematically misleading expressions.⁶²⁸”

It is the route theories take, their different trajectories and the sociologies of the fields that need to be further analyzed. If there is more than one story of international relations and more than one theory of international relations, why is it that theories are named ‘realist’, liberal’ constructivist, post-structuralist lead one to assume sameness. Could there not be different historiographies of the field of IR, reasons for the sameness and consequences of the manner in which theories have travelled that have made them ‘same but different’. This does not mean that ‘different’ schools of IR whether Chinese, Islamist, or Latin American should be constructed in a manner that essentializes identities and reproduces hegemonies but rather that the reasons for the silences in the development of fields and translation of theories in other contexts should be discussed further in a manner that aims to uncover the hegemonic moves within the academia. As Hutchings so aptly puts;

‘It matters just as much how the parameters of dialogue are constructed in Chinese, Indian or Latin American IR as it does how they have been constructed in a discipline heretofore dominated by US and European scholars. If dialogue remains trapped in the sameness/difference binary, then the most we can hope for is a geopolitical relocation of disciplinary hegemony. [...] Work has to be done not to make sure that ‘non-Western’ voices are included in such exchanges but to make sure that excluded voices are included. This means paying attention to the power relations at work in the academy, wherever that academy is located, as well as in the particular issue or question at stake’.⁶²⁹

The thesis has been an attempt to open up space for questioning from this perspective whereby it is not ‘difference’ as such that is trying to be constructed

⁶²⁸ Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘In Search of Civil Society’, cited in Seth, ‘Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations’, 181.

⁶²⁹ Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Dialogue between Whom ? The Role of the West/Non-West Distinction in Promoting Global Dialogue in IR’, *Millennium : Journal of International Relations*, 39 :3 (2011) : 647

but rather how ‘sameness’ is re/produced within the academia and how that works to silence and edit out events, concepts, and identities. As such, bringing in a Turkish perspective on the Cold War into discussion does not equal bringing in a non-Western perspective on the Cold War if that Turkish perspective re/produces a Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics. It is through analyzing the way in which the field has developed, theories have travelled and have been translated and history is told in other contexts that the project of decentering IR can have an impact. How have these ‘non-Western’ fields developed, how did theories travel, how are they applied, which history is used and what are silences within these stories and the politics involved in silencing. In that sense an important step needs to be decolonizing the academia and uncovering the ways in which power relations work to silence certain perspectives not only in the Western context but also the non-Western context in order to clarify if really subjugated voices are being brought in or if the non-Western talking is one that re/produces the assumptions and histories of a Eurocentric field.

Specifically with respect to Turkey, the historiography of the field; its development and the way in which theories travel and are translated need to be questioned. How has the field of IR developed? What are the silences in the field? Who exercises hegemonic power and what are the politics behind this process of establishing hegemony and creating silences. How has ‘realist’, ‘liberal’, ‘constructivist’ theories travelled into Turkey and what were the silences and absences in these theories as they travelled and were translated? What are the politics behind this process of giving voice to certain aspects of theories while silencing others? In that sense, the role and complicity of the academia in re/creating and re/producing the hierarchies of the field of IR and of international relations needs to be uncovered further.

Furthermore, the works of Bahar Rumelili⁶³⁰ and Pinar Bilgin⁶³¹ need to be furthered in an effort to problematize ‘Turkey’ from a postcolonial perspective⁶³². Homi Bhabha states ‘counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries – both actual and conceptual – disturb those ideological maneuvers through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities’.⁶³³ Accordingly, the aim has been to emphasize the ‘fictionality’ of the categories, concepts, identities and events and question the linearity imposed upon their stories of development. Underlining the ‘postcolonial anxiety’ of Turkey will also work to uncover ways in which the ‘imagined community’ has been and can be imagined differently. Furthermore as Chatterjee so aptly summarized, ‘If nationalism in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined communities from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?’⁶³⁴ In that sense, the imaginaries of the Third World are being limited and policed with the already existing categories of what it means to be a nation-state, a state, a

⁶³⁰ Bahar Rumelili, ‘Liminal Identities and Processes of Domestication and Subversion in International Relations’, *Review of International Studies*, 38:2 (2012): 495-508; Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili, ‘The External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-Makers’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47:1 (2012): 28-48; Bahar Rumelili, ‘Modelling Democracy: Western Hegemony, Turkey and the Middle East’, in Viatcheslav Morozov, ed., *Decentering the West: The Idea of Democracy and the Struggle for Hegemony*. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013).

⁶³¹ Pinar Bilgin, ‘The Securityness of Secularism? The Case of Turkey’, *Security Dialogue*, 39:6 (2008): 593-614; Pinar Bilgin, ‘Globalization and In/Security: Middle Eastern Encounters with International Society and the Case of Turkey’ in Stephan Stetter ed., *The Middle East and Globalization: Encounters and Horizons* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Pinar Bilgin, ‘Turkey through western-oriented foreign policy’, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40 (2009): 105-125.

⁶³² These works should be taken as starting points to analyzing Turkey through a postcolonial perspective and opening the discussion for ‘Turkey’s postcoloniality’. Thus it needs to be underlined that despite the attempt to bring in Turkey within postcolonial discussions these works do not engage with postcolonial theory such as Frantz Fanon, Aime Cesaire and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak directly and it is this engagement that is necessary for further exploration of Turkey’s postcoloniality. See ; Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York : Grove Press, 2004) ; Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York : Grove Press, 2008) ; Aime Cesaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (New York : Monthly Review Press, 1972) ; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism’, *Critical Inquiry* 12 :1 (1985) : 243-261 ; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason : Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1999) ; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak ?’ in Cary Nelson and Larry Grossbery, eds., *Marxism and the interpretation of Culture* (Chicago : University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271-313. In that sense, a more direct engagement and elaboration is necessary such as the one of Viatcheslav Morozov with respect to explaining Russian foreign policy through postcolonial approaches. For further see, Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘ Subaltern Empire ? : Toward a Postcolonial Approach to Russian Foreign Policy’, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 60 :6 (2013) : 16-28.

⁶³³ Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London and New York : Routledge, 1994), 149.

⁶³⁴ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 5

democracy and so on.’ As such, what problematizing ‘Turkey’ through a postcolonial lens reveals with respect to the stories of the state, of sovereignty and of democracy will be important in decentering IR.

These questions and points need to be further elaborated upon in order to continue the project of decentering IR as it is beyond the scope of any one work to achieve that on its own. As this thesis has constantly underlined, all stories are defined by what is included and excluded within them and this story was no different. As such, the silences created within this story itself also need to be discussed further; such as furthering the disruption of the stories of Turkey, stories of the international system and stories of the field. The story thus far provided a limited disruption on each instance and all of them can be extended further. To conclude one is reminded of Samuel R. Delany’s words; “endings to be useful must be inconclusive”⁶³⁵ and as such there need not be clean breaks and definite conclusions but opening up of spaces for further questions though the question pertaining to how *this* ‘story’ ends remains to be answered;

‘Have you thought of an ending?’

‘Yes, several, and all are dark and unpleasant,’ said Frodo.

‘Oh, that won’t do!’ said Bilbo. ‘Books ought to have good endings. How would this do: *and they all settled down and lived together happily ever after?*’

‘It will do well, if it ever came to that,’ said Frodo.

“Ah!” said Sam. ‘And where will they live? That’s what I often wonder’⁶³⁶

⁶³⁵ Samuel R. Delany, *The Einstein Intersection* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1967), 166

⁶³⁶ J.R.R Tolkien, *The Fellowship of the Rings* (New York : Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004), 409

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